advantages to flow from the acquisition of San Domingo, and of the great disadvantages-I might almost say calamities-to flow from nonacquisition, that I believe the subject has only to be investigated to be approved." President Grant, Second Annual Message, 1870. 66 According to Mr. Blaine (2 Twenty Years in Congress, 458, 461), the negotiation for the annexation of the Dominican Republic was opened at the request of the authorities of San Domingo, and it began about three months after the President's inauguration. In July General O. E. Babcock, one of the President's private secretaries, was dispatched to San Domingo upon an errand of which the public knew nothing. He bore a letter of instructions from Secretary Fish, apparently limiting the mission to an inquiry into the condition, prospects, and resources of the island. From its tenor the negotiation of a treaty was not at that time anticipated by the State Department. General Babcock's mission finally resulted, however, in a treaty for the annexation of the Republic of Dominica, and a convention for the lease of the bay and peninsula of Samana-separately negotiated, and both concluded on the 29th of November, 1869. The territory included in the Dominican Republic is the eastern portion of the island of San Domingo, originally known as Hispaniola. It embraces, perhaps, two-thirds of the whole. The western part forms the Republic of Hayti. With the exception of Cuba, the island is the largest of the West India group. The total area is about 28,000 square miles-equivalent to Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Rhode Island combined. President Grant placed extrav agant estimates upon the value of the territory which he supposed was now acquired under the Babcock treaties. In his message to Congress he expressed the belief that the island would yield to the United States all the sugar, coffee, tobacco, and other tropical products which the country would consume. 'The production of our supply of these articles' said the President, will cut off more than $100,000,000 of our annual imports, besides largely increasing our exports.' 'It is easy' he went on to say, 'to see how our large debt abroad (after such an annexation) is ultimately to be extinguished.' He maintained that "the acquisition of San Domingo will furnish our citizens with the neces saries of every-day life at cheaper rates than ever before, and it is in fine a rapid stride towards that greatness which the intelligence, industry, and enterprise of our citizens entitle this country to assume among nations." The treaty was rejected by the Senate by a vote of 28 to 28. This, however, did not cause the withdrawal of the projects by the President. In his annual message of the succeeding December he reiterated his belief in terms quoted above. "The subject," so Mr. Blaine states, "at once led to discussion in both branches of Congress, in which the hostility to the scheme on the part of some leading men assumed the tone of personal exasperation towards General Grant. So intense was the opposition that the President's friends in the Senate did not deem it prudent even to discuss the measure which he recommended. As the best that could be done, Mr. Morton, of Indiana, introduced a resolution empowering the President to appoint three commissioners to proceed to San Domingo and make certain inquiries into the political condition of the island, and also into its agricultural and commercial value. The commissioners were to have no compensation. Their expenses were to be paid, and a secretary was to be provided. Even in this mild shape, the resolution was hotly opposed. It was finally adopted by the Senate, but when it reached the House, that body refused to concur, except with a proviso that nothing in this resolution shall be held, understood, or construed as committing Congress to the policy of annexing San Domingo. The Senate concurred in the condition thus attached, and the President approved it. It was plain that the Presi dent could not carry the annexation scheme, but he courted a searching investigation in order that the course he had pursued might be vindicated by the well considered judgment of impartial men. The President's selections for the commission were wisely made. Benjamin F. Wade, of Ohio, Andrew D. White, of New York, and Samuel G. Howe, of Massachusetts, were men entitled to the highest respect, and their con clusions, based on intelligent investigation, would exert large influence upon public opinion. The commission at once visited the island (carried thither on a United States vessel of war), made a thorough examination of all its resources, held conferences with its leading citizens, and concluded that the policy recommended by General Grant should be sustained. The commissioners corroborated General Grant's assertion that the island could supply the United States with sugar, coffee, and other tropical products needed for our consumption; and they upheld the President in his belief that the possession of the island by the United States would by the laws of trade make slave labor in the neighboring islands unprofitable, and render the whole slave and caste systems odious. In communicating the report, the President made some re marks which had a personal bearing. The mere rejection by the Senate of a treaty negotiated by the President,' said he, 'only indicates a difference of opinion among different departments of the Government, without touching the character or wounding the pride of either. But when such rejection takes place simultaneously with the charges openly made of corruption on the part of the President, or of those employed by him, the case is different. Indeed, in such case, the honor of the nation demands investigation. This has been accomplished by the report of the commissioners, herewith transmitted, and which fully vindicates the purity of motives and action of those who represented the United States in the negotiation. And now my task is finished, and with it ends all personal solicitude on the subject. My duty being done, yours begins, and I gladly hand over the whole matter to the judgment of the American people, and of their representatives in Congress assembled.' The pointed remarks of the President were understood as referring to the speech made by Mr. Sumner when the resolution for the appointment of the commission was pending before the Senate. No further attempt was made by the President to urge the acquisition of San Domingo upon Congress. It was evident that neither the Senate nor House could be induced to approve the scheme, and the Administration was necessarily compelled to abandon it. But defeat did not change. General Grant's view of the question. He held to his belief in its expediency and value with characteristic tenacity. "In his last annual message to Congress (December, 1876), nearly six years after the controversy had closed, he recurred to the subject, to record once more his approval of it. If my view,' said he, 'had been concurred in, the country would be in a more prosperous condition today, both politically and financially.' He then proceeded to restate the question, and to sustain it with the arguments which he had presented to Congress in 1870 and 1871. His last words were, 'I do not present these views now as a recommendation for a renewal of the subject of annexation, but I do refer to it to vindicate my previous action in respect to it.'" As to convention with Dominican Republic for lease of peninsula and bay Senate Ex. Doc. No. 34, 41st Cong., 3d sess., gives President Grant's message of The message of President Grant of Apr. 5, 1871, communicating the report of (5) DANISH WEST INDIES. § 61a. There is no printed executive summary of the negotiations for the Danish West Indies. So far as can be learned from the archives of this Department, negotiations were commenced by Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, on July 17, 1866, by a note to the Danish minister, General Raasloff, offering $5,000,000 gold for the three islands to be delivered, with all fixed public property therein, without conditions or incumbrances. General Raasloff having shortly afterwards returned to Denmark to accept the ministry of war, the negotiations were transferred to Copenhagen, where they were con ducted by Mr. Yeaman, our minister there, on our part, and for the Danish Government, by Count Frijs, minister of foreign affairs, and General Raasloff. No counter-proposal was made until May 17, 1867, by the Danish Government. Then Count Frijs told Mr. Yeaman that Denmark expected $15,000,000 gold for the three islands, and that it would not cede them without the consent of the inhabitants; but that as his Government could not dispose of Santa Cruz without the consent of France, he was willing to cede St. Thomas and St. John for $.0,000,000 gold, and to treat separately as to Santa Cruz. On May 27, 1867, Mr. Seward sent Mr. Yeaman the draft of a convention such as he desired. In it he offered $7,500,000 for the three islands on the conditions above stated. And in addition he instructed Mr. Yeaman that in no case was a stipulation for the consent of the inhabitants to be inserted in the convention; that permission would be granted them to leave the island at any time within two years after the United States took possession of it, if they preferred their original alle. giance to that of the United States; and that the convention must be ratified on or before August 4, 1867. These terms not proving acceptable to Denmark, the negotiations were prolonged until finally Mr. Seward gave up the attempt to fix the date of ratification, concurred in a stipulation in the convention for the consent of the inhabitants, and offered $7,500,000 for St. Thomas and St. John. On this basis a treaty was concluded on October 25, 1867. This was promptly ratified by Denmark, but the United States Senate delayed action on it, and finally rejected it in the session of 1868, as appears by the records of the Department of State. As to negotiations for cession to the United States of the Danish West India Islands, see more fully Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Yeaman, May 27, 1867; Sept. 23, 1867 ff. MSS. Inst., Denmark. "Denmark had no particular desire to sell to the United States, but was persuaded to do so. The inhabitants of the islands had already voted to accept the United States as their sovereign. The late Mr. Charles Sumner, then chairman of the committee on foreign relations of the Senate, who was engaged in a personal quarrel with the administration, simply refused to report back the treaty to the Senate, and he was supported by a sufficient number of his committee and of Senators to enable the matter to be left in this position. It required new negotiations to prolong the term of ratification, and it was with great difficulty that in a subsequent session the treaty was finally brought before the Senate and rejected. As may be imagined, our friendly relations with Denmark were considerably impaired by this method of doing business." Schuyler's Am. Diplomacy, 23 ff. (6) HAWAII (SANDWICH ISLANDS). § 62. "The United States have regarded the existing authorities in the Sandwich Islands as a Government suited to the condition of the people, and resting on their own choice; and the President is of opinion that the interests of all commercial nations require that that Government should not be interfered with by foreign powers. Of the vessels which visit the islands, it is known that the great majority belong to the United States. The United States, therefore, are more interested in the fate of the islands and of their Government than any other nation can be; and this consideration induces the President to be quite willing to declare, as the sense of the Government of the United States, that the Government of the Sandwich Islands ought to be respected; that no power ought either to take possession of the islands as a conquest or for the purpose of colonization, and that no power ought to seek for any undue control over the existing Government, or any exclusive privileges or preferences with it in matters of commerce." Mr. Webster, Sec. of State, to Messrs. Haalilio and Richards, Dec. 19, 1842. 6 "Owing to their locality and to the course of the winds which prevail in this quarter of the world, the Sandwich Islands are the stopping place for almost all vessels passing from continent to continent across the Pacific Ocean. They are especially resorted to by the great numbers of vessels of the United States which are engaged in the whalefishery in those seas. The number of vessels of all sorts and the amount of property owned by citizens of the United States which are found in those islands in the course of a year are stated, probably with sufficient accuracy, in the letter of the agents. S. Mis. 162-VOL. I-27 417 "Just emerging from a state of barbarism, the Government of the islands is as yet feeble; but its dispositions appear to be just and pacific, and it seems anxious to improve the condition of its people by the introduction of knowledge, of religious and moral institutions, means of education, and the arts of civilized life. "It cannot but be in conformity with the interest and the wishes of the Government and the people of the United States that this community, thus existing in the midst of a vast expanse of ocean, should be respected, and all its rights strictly and conscientiously regarded. And this must also be the true interest of all other commercial states. Far remote from the dominions of European powers, its growth and prosperity as an independent state may yet be in a high degree useful to all whose trade is extended to those regions, while its nearer approach to this continent and the intercourse which American vessels have with it, such vessels constituting five-sixths of all which annually visit it, could not but create dissatisfaction on the part of the United States at any attempt by another power, should such an attempt be threatened or feared, to take possession of the islands, colonize them, and subvert the native Government. Considering, therefore, that the United States possess so very large a share in the intercourse with those islands, it is deemed not unfit to make the declaration that their Government seeks, nevertheless, no peculiar advantages, no exclusive control over the Hawaiian Government, but is content with its independent existence, and anxiously wishes for its security and prosperity. Its forbearance in this respect, under the circumstances of the very large intercourse which American vessels have with the islands, would justify this Government, should events hereafter arise to require it, in making a decided remonstrance against the adoption of an opposite policy by any other power. Under the circumstances, I recommend to Congress to provide for a moderate allowance, to be made out of the Treasury, to the consul residing there, that, in a Government so new and a country so remote, American citizens may have respectable authority to which to apply for redress in case of injury to their persons and property, and to whom the Government of the country may also make known any acts committed by American citizens of which it may think it has a right to complain." Message of President Tyler, Dec. 30, 1842. 6 Webster's Works, 463-4. See The Hawaiian Islands bear such peculiar relations to ourselves that "we might even feel justified, consistently with our own principles, in interfering by force to prevent their falling (by conquest) into the hands of one of the great powers of Europe." Mr. Legaré, Sec. of State, to Mr. Everett, June 13, 1843. MSS. Inst., Gr. Brit. See also Mr. Marcy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Buchanan, Mar. 11, 1853. MSS. Inst., Gr. Brit. |