of Danish owners, and if avowed and unredressed on our part this is a just cause of war. 1 Op., 566, Wirt, 1822. The attempted arrest of Koszta, in Turkey, by Austria, was treated in the Department of State as a violation of international law. Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Randall, March 14, April 17,1884. MSS But when an alleged criminal is brought within the jurisdiction of the United States by irregular extradition process or by kidnapping, this is a defense he cannot set up when tried for the offense for which the arrest was made. The wrong is for executive redress. Whart. Cr. Pl. and Prac., § 27. (5) AND SO OF FOREIGN JURISDICTION OF CRIMES. § 15. It is incompatible with the limits of the present work to give in detail the rulings of our courts in reference to jurisdiction of crimes. In another work they are given under the following heads : Federal judiciary has no common law jurisdiction (Whart. Cr. Federal courts have statutory jurisdiction over Offenses against law of nations (id., § 258). Offenses against federal sovereignty (id., § 259.) Offenses against individuals on federal soil or ships (id., § 260). Conflict and concurrence of jurisdictions. Offenses at sea cognizable in country of flag (id., 269). Federal courts have jurisdiction of crimes on high seas out of Sovereign has jurisdiction of sea within cannon-shot from shore Offenses by subjects abroad. Subjects may be responsible to their own sovereign for offenses abroad (id., 271). Apportionment of this sovereignty between Federal and State governments (id., 273). Also over political offenses abroad (id., 274). Political extraterritorial offenses by subjects are punishable (id., 275). Perjury and forgery before consular agents punishable at home (id., 276). Homicide by subjects abroad punishable in England (id., 277). Liability of extraterritorial principal. Extraterritorial principal may be intraterritorially indictable (id., 278). Agent's act in such case imputable to principal (id., 279). Doubts in cases where agent is independently liable (id., 280). Offenses by aliens in country of arrest. Aliens indictable in country of arrest by Roman law (id., 281). So in English and American law (id., 282). But not so as to belligerents (id., 283). Offenses by aliens abroad. Extraterritorial offenses against our rights may be intraterritorially indictable (id., 284). Jurisdiction claimed in cases of perjury and forgery before consuls (id., 285). Punishment in such cases (id., 286). Offenses spreading over a plurality of jurisdictions. Accessaries and co-conspirators indictable in place of accessaryship or conspiracy and of performance (id., 287). In continuous offenses each place of overt act has jurisdiction (id., 288). Adjustment of punishment in such cases (id., 289). In larceny thief is liable wherever goods are taken (id., 291). Law of place of performance may determine indictability (id., Sovereigns may have concurrent jurisdiction (id., 293). "No act committed in one country, however criminal, according to its laws, is criminal according to the laws of the other. Crimes, in a legal sense, are local, and are so only because the acts constituting them are declared to be so by the laws of the country where they are perpetrated. Great Britain cannot by her laws make an act committed within the jurisdiction of the United States criminal within her territories, however immoral of itself, and vice versa. The proposition is too clear to require illustration or to be contested; but, if that be admitted, it must also be admitted that the criminality referred to in the proviso is to be judged of by the laws of the place within whose jurisdiction the act was charged to have been perpetrated, and not where the fugitive is found." Mr. Calhoun, Sec. of State, to Mr. Everett, August 7, 1844. MSS. Inst., “We hold that the criminal jurisdiction of a nation is limited to its own dominions and to vessels under its flag on the high seas, and that it cannot extend it to acts committed within the dominion of another without violating its sovereignty and independence. Standing on this well-established and unquestioned principle, we cannot permit Great Britain or any other nation, be its object or motive what it may, to infringe our sovereignty and independence by extending its criminal jurisdiction to acts committed within the limits of the United States, be they perpetrated by whom they may. All therein are subject to their jurisdiction, entitled to their protection, and amenable exclusively to their laws." Mr. Calhoun, Sec. of State, to Mr. Everett, September 25, 1844. MSS. Inst., "By the law of nations every independent state possesses the exclu sive right of police over all persons within its jurisdiction, whether upon its soil or in its vessels upon the ocean, and this national prerogative can only be interfered with in cases where acts of piracy are committed, which, by the public law of the world, are cognizable by any power seizing the vessel, thus excluded from the common rights of the ocean." Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mr. Dallas, Feb. 23, 1859. MSS. Instruc., Great Britain. "Referring to the correspondence which has taken place concerning the case of Peter Martin, held in custody in British Columbia, and particularly to my notes of the 2d of November and the 6th of December last, I have now the honor to inform you that a dispatch has been received from the consul of the United States at Victoria, dated December 20, stating that Martin had been brought to trial for the assault charged against him, in a court of assize held at Victoria, on the 16th December ultimo, before the Hon. P. P. Crease, a justice of the supreme court of the province, and had been found guilty and sentenced to one year and nine months' imprisonment at hard labor, to take effect after the expiration of the term of imprisonment of fifteen months to which he was sentenced in September last. "The consul, who was present at the trial, states that two witnesses, who were on the spot at the happening of the occurrence, testified that the assault occurred in what is considered to be Alaska territory, one locating the point near the Stickine River, eight or ten miles from its mouth, the other at a distance of some ten or twenty miles from its mouth, and that the judge, in charging the jury, referred at some length to the point of jurisdiction and to the fact that a question had been raised by this Government concerning the right of a court in the province to try the prisoner for an offense committed in Alaska and to correspondence between the two Governments, but stated to the jury that he would entirely disembarrass them on that point by saying that no evidence had been produced or could be produced to show that the offense for which the prisoner was on trial was really committed in Alaska, as the boundary between the two countries on the Stickine River remained undetermined, and no line of demarkation existed showing how far up that river American territory actually extends, whether it was five miles, ten miles, or thirty miles; and that, under these circumstances, the court had jurisdiction or concurrent jurisdiction, and the proceedings in trying the prisoner were just and proper. "In the note originally addressed to you, under date of November 2, it was suggested that if it appeared that the assault was committed within the territory of the United States, Martin could not properly be tried for the offense with which he was charged, and that he should be set at liberty; and I had the honor to request that you would call the attention of Her Majesty's proper authorities to the case, that an examination of the facts might be made before the case was disposed of. "The facts were laid before you, and while no unnecessary prominence was given to the violation of the sovereignty of the United States which had taken place, it was confidently hoped that before Martin was placed on trial for the new charge, or before any proceedings had been taken to continue his imprisonment on the former one, the facts would have been carefully examined by the colonial authorities and a conclusion reached as to what course should properly be taken, in view of the rights of Martin and of the sovereignty of the United States, which it was stated had been invaded, and it is a matter of regret that under the circumstances the court, with apparent knowledge of the facts, should have proceeded with the trial and have sentenced the prisoner, and assumed to decide questions having a serious bearing on the rights and jurisdiction of the two countries. Moreover, the posi tion assumed by the learned judge who presided at the trial, if rightly reported, seems to be such as I feel quite confident will not be sustained by Her Majesty's Government. "The absence of a line defined and marked on the surface of the earth as that of the limit or boundary between two countries cannot confer upon either a jurisdiction beyond the point where such line should in fact be. That is the boundary which the treaty makes the boundary. Surveys make it certain and patent, but do not alter rights or change rightful jurisdiction. "It may be inconvenient or difficult in a particular case to ascertain whether the spot on which some occurrence happened is or is not beyond the boundary-line; but this is simply a question of fact, upon the decision of which the right to entertain jurisdiction must depend. "I have the honor, therefore, to ask again your attention to the subject and to remark that if, as appears admittedly to be the fact, the colonial officers in transporting Martin from the place at which he was convicted to his place of imprisonment, via the Stickine River, did conduct him within and through what is the unquestioned territory of the United States, a violation of the sovereignty of the United States has been committed, and the recapture and removal of the prisoner from the jurisdiction of the United States to British soil was an illegal, violent, and forcible act, which cannot justify the subsequent proceedings whereby he has been, is, or may be, restrained of his liberty. "I have, therefore, to express the hope that if Her Majesty's authorities find the fact to be as it is represented, that Martin was conducted by the officers having him in custody into and through the Territory of Alaska, being part of and within the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the United States, he be set at liberty. "I must not allow this question to pass without entering an explicit dissent from the doctrine which seems to be advanced by the learned judge who presided at the trial of Martin, that jurisdiction or concur rent jurisdiction vests in Her Majesty's colonial authorities or courts over offenses committed within any part of the Territory of Alaska, even though so near to the treaty-line that uncertainty or doubt may exist on which side of such line the offense is committed. It cannot, I think, be necessary to argue this point, or to do more than record this dissent and denial of a doctrine which, I have no doubt, Her Majesty's Government agrees with me in repudiating." Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Sir Edward Thornton, January 10, 1877; MSS. Notes, "On July 22, 1886, the telegram of Mr. Jackson, minister at Mexico, dated July 21, 1886, was received here, stating the refusal of the Mexican Government to accede to the telegraphic demand of the undersigned for Cutting's release, the substance of which telegram is appended. On the same day a summary of the reasons for so declining was asked for by telegraph, and on the same night a reply from Mr. Jackson was received, giving a summary of the Mexican reasons. The substance of this telegraphic summary is annexed, and the full text of Mr. Mariscal's refusal is found among the accompaniments to a later dispatch from Mr. Jackson-No. 272, of July 22, 1886. "On July 26, 1886, Consul Brigham telegraphed to this Department that the governor of Chihuahua was pushing the trial of Cutting, who ignored the proceedings; copy of which telegram is appended. "On July 27, 1886, the instruction of the undersigned, numbered 228, was mailed to Mr. Jackson; copy thereof is annexed. "The last communication from Minister Jackson on the subject, being his dispatch No. 272, of July 22, 1886, herein before referred to, was received at this Department on the 31st ultimo. It conveys the text of the correspondence had by him with the Mexican secretary for foreign affairs, in which Cutting's release was demanded and refused. "In the interim since July 27, 1886, the undersigned has had several personal interviews with Mr. Matias Romero, the Mexican minister at this capital, whose desire for a satisfactory adjustment of this case has been manifested, but from whom the undersigned has procured no other information than is contained in the correspondence herein recited. "A copy of article 186 of the Mexican code, which was handed to the undersigned by Mr. Romero in support of the claim of Mexico to take cognizance of crimes of which Mexicans were the subject in foreign countries, is herewith appended. "This conflict of laws is even more profound than the literal difference of corresponding statutes, for it affects the underlying principles of security to personal liberty and freedom of speech or expression which are among the main objects sought to be secured by our frame-work of Government. "The present case may constitute a precedent fraught with the most serious results. "The alleged offense may be-and undoubtedly in the present case |