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undeserved. This is true, and it is an imperfection which attaches to the plan; but it is an imperfection which also attaches to every scheme of education that is more than rudimentary. Since the Law Society have established the system of giving prizes and certificates of merit, they have introduced an educational division between the foremost and the less successful of their candidates. And the inequality reaches further back than the limits within which educational systems can operate. The students who would feel qualified to seek at a comparatively early age a high legal education, would necessarily be persons who would long have enjoyed many advantages. It would be indispensable that they should have such an acquaintance with either Latin or French as would imply that they had been fortunate enough to be taught well and early. The only reason why a special examination would be advisable before this class of students was admitted to attend the lectures of the inns of court, would be, that it would be absurd to expect that even the majority of articled clerks could have received a preliminary education sufficiently good to enable them to feel at home in the lecture-room. The division, therefore, already exists, and must exist. Some students in their early life are more fortunate and more forward than others. It can be no hardship that this should be recognised formally, if the recognition is likely to prove beneficial to the general body, to which the more and the less fortunate alike belong."

In connection with this subject of the preliminary examination, we may state that at the late meeting of the "National Association for the Promotion of Social Science," the subject of legal education was discussed, and that at the last meeting of the Metropolitan and Provincial Law Association some papers were read and discussions took place as to status and education of solicitors. In the one read by the secretary—“ On the rise and progress of attorneys and solicitors as a professional body," by Mr. J. O. Watson, of Liverpool · the writer recommended that every articled clerk should undergo an examination at an earlier stage; that public lectures on law should be established in all the principal towns, a certificate of having attended a certain number of courses, before admission to practice; and that the law prohibiting an attorney or solicitor having more than two articled clerks should be abolished.

The chairman read the next paper, "The establishment of an educational qualification for attorneys," by Mr. J. P. Aston, of Manchester. The writer argued that there was a great need for something more than professional education for attorneys, and that the three sources to which some might look for this improvement were the Legis

lature, the administration of the law, and attorneys themselves. But, in fact, attorneys must look to themselves; their united efforts would be necessary, and the law associations were the best media for those efforts. The mode of procedure would vary with the position and feeling of the particular associations; but there were some things that appeared capable of general application. Amongst these, every law association should seek to establish in connection with itself a junior association for articled clerks; an indispensable qualification for admission being the adducing of evidence of the applicant having undergone a certain amount of general education, the details being left to each parent association. Some acquaintance with classical literature, with mechanics, with general history, and especially the history of our own country, and of its constitution and laws, would seem requisite; and in the various districts appropriate differences would no doubt be made, in accordance with the peculiarities of each. The connection between the parent and the junior associations should be real, not nomi \]; and occasional meetings should be held for disc ssing subjects of interest. Mr. Aston offered numerous suggestions for the carrying out of his ideas.

It having been previously agreed to discuss these three papers conjointly, the discussion was now proceeded with. It was extremely miscellaneous, and, after more than an hour had been consumed, Mr. Field urged that something should be done to give to the whole a practical result. He said that so long since as 1852 there were referred to the Incorporated Society several points, of which two might be taken as the most important:-First, a preliminary examination before admission, which was, no doubt-although there had been no direct communication to that effect-under consideration. The second was almost equally important - the substitution for one final examination, which would lead to a great deal of pure "cram," of a series of examinations, each final in itself, which would lead to constant reading upon the part of articled clerks, they going before the examination just when they were really acquainted with any one of the points of examination. Several resolutions, followed by amendments, were proposed, as the best mode of securing action; but, in the end, the following, proposed by Mr. Field, and seconded by Mr. Heelis, mayor of Salford, was adopted: "That the committee of management be requested to seek a conference with the Council of the Incorporated Society, and that, if they should deem it necessary, they do take further steps for accomplishing the objects of those resolutions" [of 1852].

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We suppose all articled clerks will approve that part of the recommendation which refers to the

establishment of junior associations for articled clerks, a measure which we have for so many years advocated; and in connection with this we may refer our readers to another part of our publication,, where they will find a letter from Mr. Isaac Walker, proposing a meeting at Birmingham of the articled clerks, with the indispensable dinner, to consult upon measures for the welfare of the whole body of articled clerks. Mr. Walker informs us that as the attention of law societies and the profession generally has been for some time and is at the present time more than ever alive to the subject of legal education, it is thought that as articled clerks themselves are themselves the principal parties concerned in the matter, it is but right that they should have a voice in the matter, and give the profession an opportunity of hearing their view of the subject, and that a meeting of articled clerks in the manner proposed is the best way of getting their opinion on the subject.


(Continued from p. 149).

Difference between law and mathematics.-There is this difference to be observed between the two sciences of law and of mathematics, that in the latter, in which the reasoning is always upon lines and angles, which are self-evident, we reason from the cause to the effect; while the propositions themselves are of a nature to succeed each other, so that the preceding are regularly the key or clue to those which follow. In the law, on the contrary, the order of our reasoning is usually the reverse of this. We reason from the effect to the cause; and, far from having the traces of their connection before us, as in a series of mathematical investigations, we have necessarily to deduce each required principle, or point of law, from materials of information dispersed through the whole circle of the science, and, not unfrequently, to supply the intermediate links of a long chain of implied reasoning, in order to prove that their application is legitimate.

Blackstone's notions of laws in general.-But to return; since the question is now of Blackstone's Commentaries (ante, pp. 78, 148), considered not merely as an elementary treatise, in which inaccuracies would be venial, and professional misconclusions of no serious consequence, but in the widely different, and far more important character, of an institute for educating and forming lawyers; I object, in the first place, to those half-explained metaphysical distinctions, contained in his introductory chapter, upon the nature of laws in general. He tells us, that "the law of nature is the will of the Supreme Being, founded in the relations of justice, that

existed, in the nature of things, antecedent to any positive precept; and, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, that this is of course superior in obligation to any other." Secondly, that "the precepts of the revealed law are of the same original with those of the law of nature, and their intrinsic obligation of equal strength and perpetuity." And, thirdly, that "the revealed law is of infinitely more authenticity than that moral system which is framed by ethical writers, and denominated the natural law; because the one is the law of nature, expressly declared to be so by God himself-the other is only what, by the assistance of human reason, we imagine to be that law; and, since we are not as certain of the latter as of the former, that they are, therefore, not of equal authenticity, nor to be put in competition together" (1 Bl. Com. Introd. pp. 39, 42).

Blackstone superficial, defective, mistaken, &c.-It is not, however, upon the ground of objections like these, that I presume to contend against the propriety of commencing the study of the law by reading and common-placing Blackstone's Commentaries. A distinction may be fairly taken between the introductory matter, which is but inducement to the proposed course of study, and that which is properly the substance of it. But if the substance itself is infected with the same discolourings; if the manner of instruction is superficial, and the materials defective; if conclusions of science are often misconceived, and points of practice mistaken or misrepresented, these are strong arguments (and I rely upon the subjoined examples for the proof of what I advance), that this is no institute for educating and forming lawyers! I must solicit the patience of my readers, if I expose these details of legal investigation with somewhat more than unprofessional minuteness. Assertions against public opinion require to be maturely weighed, and ought to be well supported. That I may not, however, make this a more tedious task than is necessary, I will endeavour to confine myself to those examples alone which are the most easy to be understood, and to be as brief as the nature of the subject will allow in the consideration of them. The argument may be dull, but the discussion is interesting.

Releases, explanation of.-Let us take, for example, the explanation which is given in Blackstone, of releases. Releases are defined to be a species of conveyance which may enure either-1, per elargir le estate, as from the remainder-man or reversioner to the particular tenant; or, 2ndly, per mitter le estate, as between coparceners or joint-tenants; or, 3rdly, per mitter le droit, as from disseisee to disseisor; or, 4thly, per extinguisher le droit, as from disseisee to the lessee of disseisor; or, 5thly, by

way of entry and feoffment, as from disseisee to one of two disseisors (2 Bl. Comm. 324).

Distinction between release of right and extinguishment.-Now, I have three principal objections to make to this explanation of releases. The first is, that it does not point out the proper distinction between a release per mitter le droit, and a release per extinguisher le droit; viz., that in the former case the releasee can, but in the latter that he cannot, hold out every other. For example, a release per mitter le droit, is where the releasee can hold out every other. The release of the disseisee to the disseisor is of this description. And so it is if A., disseised by B. and C., releases to B. For B. shall now hold out C. in the same manner as if A. had regularly entered upon B. and C. as he might have lawfully done, and then made a separate feoffment to B. But if A. is disseised by B. who infeoffs C. and D., and afterwards A. releases to one of them, this is a release per extinguisher le droit of A. for the benefit of the two feoffees equally; for the one to whom the release is made cannot hold out the other.

Release to one of two disseisors and to one of two feoffees of disseisor.-The different operation of a release when made to one of two disseisors, and to one of two feoffees of a disseisor, is to be explained by the distinction which the law takes between a defective title and no title at all. For when the party has a defective title (not having the possession by his own wrong), the law protects him in the possession until he is lawfully evicted by the rightful claimant. But with respect to those who have no title at all, it is otherwise. Thus, if A. is disseised by B. and C., the disseisors have only a naked possession, unaccompanied with even the shadow of the right of possession; and, consequently, if A. releases to one of them, it operates as a feoffment to the releasee, precisely in the same manner as if A. had actually revested his former estate by his entry, and then granted, with livery of seisin, to the releasee (see Co. Litt. 275 b, and note 240). But where there are joint feoffees, and the disseisee releases to one of them, it operates for the benefit of each feoffee indifferently, because the feoffees have colour of title (Co. Litt. 194 b, 275 a, and note 239). originally, no tenant could make a feoffment without the lord's license; and when the lord consented to the alienation, the only form of conveyance was by livery of seisin, which was a public act, and to which the ceremonies of homage and fealty were also necessary. There was, consequently, in this case, a colourable title or presumption of right, but in the other case there was no pretence of any right or title at all (Co. Litt. 264 a, and note 208).


Release to lessee of disseisor.-Upon the same principle as before referred to, if the disseisee releases to

the lessee of the disseisor, this also is a release per extinguisher le droit of the disseisee, and of which the reversioner, as well as the lessee, shall have advantage. For they have both of them but one estate in law, and, therefore, the confirmation of the particular estate is equally the confirmation of the reversion. And so it is if a patron is usurped upon by two, and afterwards releases to one of them. It operates, by way of extinguishment, for the benefit of both equally; because the admission and institution are quasi a legal adjudication of the title.

Release where there is a right of entry, and where not. There is a further distinction to be taken between the operation of releases per mitter and vester le droit, and those per extinguisher le droit: viz., that in the former case the releasor is supposed to have a right of entry, and in the latter not. То this rule, however, there are some exceptions. For example, A. was disseised by B., an infant, who made a feoffment to C., and afterwards C. died seised, and the land descended to his heir, D., B. being still an infant. Now, in this case, A.'s entry was taken away by the descent; but B., the infant, might either enter, or have a writ of dum fuit infrà ætatem, or a writ of right, before their abolition. In the mean time, if D. obtains a release from A., and afterwards B. brought a writ of right (before its abolition) he should have been barred by the release from A. to D. For in a writ of right, the question was of the mere right, and the words modo et formâ prout are words of form only, and not of substance. And thus the original disseisee, having more mere right than the demandant, might have granted a release which should have enured per mitter and vester that right in the releasee, notwithstanding he had no longer a right of entry. (Co. Litt. 278 b). Since the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, when a person ceases to have a right of entry, his right of action is gone; indeed, the act extinguishes his right, and transfers the estate to the person who has gained a title by possession (9 Jur. 414; 1 Dru. and W. 258; 3 Id. 388; Browell, 21).

Releases per mitter le droit, and extinguishment.— Secondly, I apprehend that the releases which are here described (no. 3), per mitter le droit, and (no. 5), by way of entry and feoffment, are not exactly different species of releases, but only one and the same species, differing no otherwise than in circumstance. For every release which operates by way of entry and feoffment, is in fact a release per mitter le droit; and if the disseisee releases, whether to one disseisor alone, or to one of two disseisors, it operates equally, in both cases, per mitter and vester le droit of the disseisee, and by way of entry and feoffment; that is to say, the releasee has the same title in both cases as if the disseisee had actually revested his

former estate by his entry, and afterwards made a feoffinent with livery of seisin to the releasee, and he shall now hold out every other. And, thirdly, I object that there is another distinct species of release of which no notice whatever is here taken; namely, a release per extinguisher le estate; as from the grantee of a rent charge to the owner of the land, or a release of the services from the lord to the tenant, or a release of common of pasture, &c. (Co. Litt. 280 a, 307 b). If the lord sells the freehold of the inheritance of the copyhold to another, and afterwards the copyholder releases to the purchaser, this also is a release per extinguisher le estate, and the copyhold interest becomes extinct (1 Leon. 102, Wakeford's case).

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Release of title.-The release of a title, as used in contradistinction to a droit, has also its peculiar operation; for this enures only by way of extinguishment. Suppose, for instance, A. infeoffs B. upon condition, and afterwards the condition is broken, and afterwards B. is disscised by C., and afterwards A. releases to C. A.'s release shall enure by way of extinguishment; so that if afterwards B. enters upon C., as he may lawfully do, he shall hold the land discharged of the condition (Co. Litt. 277 b). But supposing a droit to have been released, under the same circumstances, it would have enured for the reasons already mentioned, not per extinguisher, but per mitter and vester, or, which has been shown to be in effect the same thing, by way of entry and feoffment. And as of a title of entry for condition broken, so it is of all other titles, by escheat, by forfeiture, &c.

Distinction between right and title.-There is a distinction, in law, between a right and a title properly so called for, in the first place, rights are indifferently by descent or purchase; but titles, on the contrary, though subsequently completed by the entry or other act of the party, are always vested, in the first instance, by act and operation of law. Of this kind is a title of dower, title of entry for condition broken, title by escheat, by mortinain, and so forth (Co. Litt. 215 b). Secondly, a right includes not only a right for which a writ of right would have lain, but also any title or claim by force of a condition, mortmain, or the like, for which no action was given by the law, but only an entry (Co. Litt. 265 a). And hence it is said, that every right is a title, but every title is not a right; that is to say, not such a right for which an action will lie (Co. Litt. 345 b, 347 b). Again, in the case of a right, the entry of him that hath the right might, prior to the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 39, have been taken away by a descent; but in the case of a title it was otherwise (Co. Litt. 240 b). Another general distinction is, that rights are transferable, whether

by release or otherwise; but titles, on the contrary, are not transferable (Co. Litt. 214 a; see 8 & 9 Vic. c. 106, s. 6).

Releases of estates and rights.—I have ventured to offer these few remarks, upon the nature of the operation of releases, by way of specimen of the sort of loose, inaccurate, superficial kind of professional instruction which is to be picked up from Blackstone's Commentaries. The apparent propriety with which he distinctly enumerates the five several species of releases, leaves us no room to suspect that anything material has been omitted. And yet, when we come to make the application of what we know upon the subject, we find our ideas unsettled, our information incomplete and unsatisfactory; and more particularly so, from no notice being taken of the distinction between releases of estates and of droits; a most important distinction, and which pervades the whole doctrine of the law of releases.

Of the distinction between releases of estates and of droits.-The release of an estate is, where there is already a vested estate at the time of the release made, both in the releasor and the releasee, and privity between the parties; that is to say, the releasee's estate must be immediately derived out of the releasor's estate, so that the two estates, together, make but one and the same estate in law. But the release of a droit is, where the releasor's estate has been previously divested or turned to a right, as in the case of abatement, intrusion, disseisin, discontinuance, or deforcement; and, consequently, where no privity is required, nor indeed can, from the nature of the case, exist between them (Co. Litt. 266 a, Ibid. 275 a). By the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 39, no descent cast, discontinuance or warranty after the 31st December, 1833, shall toll or defeat any right of entry or action for the recovery of land. Rights of entry and rights of action are now co-existent and defeasible only by lapse of time.


Leases by husband seised in right of wife.-As for example if A. seised in fee, in right of his wife B., makes a lease, for forty years, to D., and afterwards A. dies, and afterwards B. releases to D. generally, this is the release of an estate, and operates per elargir le estate of D. from a chattel to a freehold. But if A. being so seised, makes a lease for life to D. and afterwards A. dies, and afterwards B. releases to D. generally, this is the release, not of an estate, but of a droit, and operates per extinguisher le droit of B. in confirmation of D.'s lease for life, and also of the reversion which is in the heir of A. Why? Because, in the first instance, the lease was not void, but voidable. It divested not the estate of the wife; but, on the contrary, until avoided, it binds her estate. For the husband, who made the

lease, had the jus possessionis, or right of possession of the inheritance in the right of his wife, and now, the husband being dead, the possession of the lessee of the term is, in construction of law, the possession of the wife as tenant of the freehold, out of which the term is derived. It may be here observed that a lease is considered as a covenant real, that binds the possession of lands into whose hands soever it comes, if the lands be not evicted by a superior title; yet the termor has not the freehold in him, but holds the possession as bailiff of the freeholder, nomine alieno, by virtue of the obligation of the covenant (see the note 188 to Co. Litt. 249 a). But it is a maxim of law, that the estate which I may defeat by my entry, I may equally make good by my confirmation (Co. Litt. 300 a); and, therefore, the wife, upon the death of the husband, as above-mentioned, may confirm the estate of the lessee for years if she will, and not only by her express, but also by her implied confirmation, as by acceptance of rent, or any other act by which she tacitly admits the lessee to be her tenant. The acceptance of the rent is a sufficient declaration, that it is her will to continue the lease, for she is not entitled to the rent, but by the lease (see the note 117 to Co. Litt. 215 a). It follows, that the release from B. to D. is, in its first operation, an implied confirmation of D.'s estate; and, secondly, being made generally, it operates per elargir son estate, from a chattel to a freehold. Indeed, in a note in Saunders (see vol. 3, case 32, n. 9) it is suggested, that there is no privity between the wife and the lessee of the husband (but see 1 Bac. Ab. 302; 3 Bac. Ab. 305; Plowd. 137; and Cro. Jac. 332). The lease was not void by the death of the husband, but only voidable, and now being made good by the confirmation of the wife, the law supplies the required privity between the parties (see Co. Litt. 272 b). But, in the latter example, in which the husband is supposed to have leased to D. "for life," he has thereby divested or displaced the wife's estate, and turned it to a droit. He has also created a new reversion "in fee," which upon his death descends to his heir-at-law; and the wife could not avoid these estates by her entry at the common law, but only under the statute (stat. 32 H. 8, c. 33; and see Co. Litt. 297 b, 326 a, 333 b, 339 b). By the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 29, no discontinuance after the 31st December, 1833, takes away or defeats any right of entry or of action.

Qualification of releases.-There is also a further distinction to be observed between releases of estates and of droits; viz., that the release of an estate admits of being qualified at the will of the releasor. Thus, the lord may release his seigniory to the tenant of the land, whether in fee, or in fce tail, or

for life, or for term of years. But the release of a droit admits of no such qualification; for, if released but for an hour, it is extinguished for ever (Co. Litt. 274 a, 280 a).


(Continued from p. 164.)

(By an accident the heading at p. 154 states the recent statutes to be the "19 & 20 Vic.," instead of "20 & 21," which subscribers will please to alter.) JOINT-STOCK BANKING COMPANIES ACT, 1857 (20 & 21 Vic. c. 49).

This is a very important statute in relation to banking companies, and as it will for the future be the law by which they are regulated, we shall give it in extenso, prefacing, however, a short statement of its provisions for the guidance of our readers. It repeals the 19 & 20 Vic. c. 47, s. 2 (the Limited Liability Act, 1846), so far as it relates to banking companies, but in other respects, except as otherwise provided, it incorporates that act and the previous one of 1856, and no existing or future banking company is to be registered as a limited company (s. 3). Every banking company consisting of seven or more persons, and formed under the 8 Vic. c. 113, or 10 Vic. c. 75, shail, on or before the 1st of January, 1857, register itself as a company under this act (sect. 4). The penalty for not so registering isfirst, that the company shall be incapable of suing, but not of being sued at law and in equity; secondly, no dividend shall be payable to a shareholder; thirdly, each director or manager incurs a penalty for every day that the company is in default, of £5, recoverable and applicable by any person to his own


No other penalty can be imposed (sect. 5). Banking companies consisting of seven or more persons with a capital of fixed amount divided into shares of fixed amount, which also carry on business legally, and are not required to be registered under the act, may avail themselves of its privileges at any time by the consent of a majority of shareholders (sect. 6). This registration will not affect the previous liabilities and rights of the company and its members as shareholders (sects. 8, 9). New banking companies may be formed by seven or more persons registering themselves under the act as a company other than with limited liability; but the shares of such companies must be severally not less than of the value of £100. Not more than ten persons can form a banking partnership unless registered as a company under the act (sect. 13); and the company's affairs may at any time be investigated by inspectors appointed by one-third in number and value at least of the shareholders (scct. 14). If a banking com

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