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to fulfil a contract.-Upon an application to deprive the plaintiff of costs, it appeared that the defendant was a builder, who had been employed to fit up certain houses in the county court district, where a material part of the cause of action arose, and that for the purpose of performing the contract he had set-up workshops and counting-houses there: Held, nevertheless, that as the works there were only set up for the purpose of the particular job, and his permanent business was elsewhere, he did not carry on his business there within the meaning of the County Court Act. Gorslett v. Harris, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 75.

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES' ACT.-Jurisdiction of county court ousted where reference clauses.-Where the rules of a friendly society provide for reference of disputes to a committee of the society, the county court has no jurisdiction. Turner v. Scott, 28 Law Tim. Rep. 373.


APPEAL [vol. 2, p. 57].-Order to enter continuances - Appeal against rate - Respite of— Fresh grounds of appeal.-Where the Court of Queen's Bench has ordered a Court of Quarter Sessions to enter continuances and hear an appeal against a rate, the appellant must proceed upon the original notice and grounds of appeal which the Court of Queen's Bench has ordered the sessions to enter and hear. Reg. v. Eyre, 5 Week. Rep. 533.

APPEAL [vol. 2, p. 57].-Poor-rate [vol. 3, p. 382]-Costs-Notice of appeal against rate of reasonableness of-Entering and respiting of appeal.By the 17 Geo. 2, c. 4, notice of appeal against a poor-rate is to be given, and the appeal to be entered at the next practicable sessions; but if it appear to the justices that reasonable notice of appeal has not been given, they are to adjourn the appeal to the next quarter sessions, and then and there finally hear and determine the same. The Court of Quarter Sessions have no power to enter and respite an appeal against a poor-rate when such notice is a good and reasonable notice, and has been given in proper time; therefore, where upon an appeal against a rate where reasonable notice of appeal has been given in due time: Held, that the sessions were right in refusing to enter and respite the appeal, and in ordering the appellant to pay costs to the respondents: Held, also, the notice of appeal was a valid notice, although it contained a notice that the appellant did not intend to try at the next sessions, but would apply for a respite, the respondents having given notice that they should oppose such application. Reg. v. Eyre, 5 Week. Rep. 532.

BASTARDY [vol. 3, p. 96].—Affiliation order— Residence of applicant for affiliation summons-Juris

diction of magistrates—Perjury.-Under the 7 & 8 Vic. c. 101, s. 2, and the 8 & 9 Vic. c. 10, s. 10, it is not competent for the mother of a bastard child, fraudulently, or for an improper purpose, to go out of the jurisdiction of the district in which she resides in order to affiliate her child. On an indictment for perjury on an affiliation summons, it appeared that the woman returned from service to her parents to be confined, and then went to lodge at D. for the purpose of affiliating her child. The petty sessional division to which she applied did not include the residence of her parents, but included D., and she went there for her own convenience, and without any improper reason. After the order, she went into service without returning to her parents, and she stated that she meant to leave D. immediately after the order, and she did leave the next day. She lodged at D. three weeks before she applied for the summons. The jury found that she had no other home than D., and that she resided there, if in law she could be considered to do so: Held, that her residence was at D., and that the magistrates of the petty sessional division to which she applied had jurisdiction. Reg. v. Hughes, 5 Week. Rep. 526.


BURIAL BOARDS [vol. 2, pp. 127-129].General Burial Act, 18 & 19 Vic. c. 138-Select vestry under local act not a vestry within the meaning 15 & 16 Vic. c. 85; 16 & 17 Vic. c. 134; and 18 & 19 Vic. c. 128.-A select vestry established under a local act, which enacts "that it is to be deemed a board of guardians for the relief and management of the poor, and to be subject to the rules, &c., of the poorlaw board, and to exercise and perform the duties of guardians," is not a select vestry within the meaning of the 15 & 16 Vic. c. 85, s. 52, having the right to appoint a burial board. Reg. v. Gladstone, 5 Week. Rep. 530.

BURIAL.-Misdemeanor-Removal of corpse from a burial ground belonging to a congregation of dissenters. -It is a misdemeanor at common law to remove, without lawful authority, a corpse from a grave in a burying ground belonging to a congregation of Protestant Dissenters, although the motive of the person so acting may be pious and laudable. Reg. v. Sharpe, 28 Law Tim. Rep. 295.

COLLECTORS OF POOR RATES.-VestryRemoval of poor-rate collector-Majority of vestrymen present must vote-Effect of insufficient removal of officer.-The 18 Geo. 3, c. 74, s. 14, enacts that the churchwardens, overseers, and vestrymen of Christchurch, or the major part of them, may from time to time appoint and remove collectors of the poor-rates, and appoint others in the room of the collectors removed: Held, that a majority of the vestrymen present at a meeting for the dismissal of a collector must concur in voting for the dismissal, and that a

majority of those voting, if not a majority of those present, was not sufficient: Held, also, that a collector who had been removed from his office by a majority of votes only, such majority not being a majority of the vestrymen present (some declining to vote), was still legally the collector, and entitled to collect the rates, and to have the rate books for that purpose. Reg. v. The Overseers of Christchurch, Middlesex, 28 Law. Tim. Rep. 355.

COSTS OF CROWN [vol. 2, pp. 58, 121, 227]. -Privilege of the Crown as to costs-Effect of 18 & 19 Vic. c. 90-Excise information-Stage carriagesAppeal to quarter sessions against acquittal.-Secs. 1 and 2 of the 18 & 19 Vic. c. 90, do not apply to informations laid by excise officers before magistrates, or to proceedings at quarter sessions upon appeal from their decision. Where, therefore, an excise officer had laid an information under the 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 120, s. 27, against the driver of a stage carriage for plying without a licence, and the defendant being acquitted, the excise officer appealed to the quarter sessions, where the acquittal was confirmed: Held, that that court had no jurisdiction to order that the costs of the appellant should be paid by the excise officer. Reg. v. Beadle, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 76.

CORONER.-Allowance by justices of fees.-The justices are the proper persons to decide whether an inquest has been duly held. Under the 25 Geo. 2, c. 29, the justices at quarter sessions have a discretion to disallow the coroner his fee of 20s. for holding an inquest, if they are of opinion that such inquest was not duly taken-i. e., unnecessarily taken. Semble, that under the 7 Will. 4 and 1 Vic. c. 68, s. 3, they are bound to allow the coroner his fee of 6s. 8d., if an inquest has in fact been taken. Reg. v. Justices of Gloucestershire, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 180; 5 Week. Rep. 655.

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FALSE PRETENCES [vol. 3, pp. 21, 23, 289; vol. 2, pp. 12, 166].—Misrepresentation of quality not indictable-7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 53 Puffing-Sule of goods-Contract.-By the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 53, "if any person shall, by any false pretence, obtain from any other person any chattel, money, or valuable security with intent to cheat or defraud any person of the same, every such offender shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." The Crown Court has lately been called on to give a construction to this statute, in a case of Reg. v. Sherwood (5 Week. Rep. 577), and the following case. The questions turned upon this, whether a misrepresentation (of a very gross character) made, during a bargain for the purchase of a commodity, of the quality of that commodity, was a false pretence within the statute. The decision of the majority of the judges was, that it was not such a false pretence, the transaction resolving itself into a mere representation of the quality

of the article sold, the article sold being really of the species it was represented to the purchaser to be

that is, spoons with silver on them, though not of the same quality as was represented: it was a mere seller's exaggeration of the quality of the article he was endeavouring to sell. In the indictment (which was for obtaining money by false pretences) the pretences charged were, that certain spoons were of the best quality, equal to Elkington's A.; that the foundation was of the best material; and that they had as much silver on them as Elkington's A. The misrepresentations were made to a pawnbroker for the purpose of procuring advances on the spoons, which were of inferior quality, and not worth the sum advanced. He stated that he was induced by the prisoner's declaration of quality, and by nothing else, to advance the moneys obtained; and that had he known the real quality, he would not have advanced money upon the goods at all. The jury found the prisoner guilty of fraudulently representing that the goods had as much silver on them as Elkington's A., and that the foundations were of the best materials, knowing that to be untrue; and that he thereby obtained the moneys: Held, by the majority of the court, that the conviction was wrong, as the spoons were of the same species they were represented to be, and the alleged false pretences amounted only to a misrepresentation of the quality of a commodity during the course of a bargain: Held (per Cresswell, J.), that the conviction was wrong; but that the law upon the subject of false pretences is in a state calculated to cause embarrassment: (per Willes, J., and Bramwell, B.), that the conviction was right. Reg. v. Bryan, 5 Week. Rep. 598.


FALSE PRETENCES [vol. 3, pp. 21, 23, 289]. -Knowledge by prosecutor at the time of parting with his money that the representation is untrue.-If a prosecutor parts with his money upon a representation by the prisoner, which the prosecutor knows to be untrue, the prisoner cannot be convicted of a false pretence. An indictment for obtaining money by false pretences alleged that the money was obtained by the prisoner by the false pretence that he had cut sixty-three fans of chaff, when, in fact, he had only cut a smaller quantity-to wit, forty-five fans. It was proved that he was employed to cut chaff at 2d. per fan, and that he demanded 10s. 6d. from the prosecutor, stating that he had cut sixty-three fans; that the prosecutor had seen him remove eighteen fans from an adjoining chaff-house, and add them to the heap which he pretended he had cut; and that, notwithstanding this knowledge, he had paid the prisoner the 10s. 6d. : Held, that a conviction could not be supported. Reg. v. Mills, 5 Week. Rep. 528.


Attempting to steal in dwelling-house-Goods specified in indictment not in dwelling-house at time of breaking, &c.-By the 14 & 15 Vic. c. 100, s. 9, it is provided that where on a trial the proof falls short of the principal offence, the accused may be convicted of an attempt. An attempt to commit a felony is distinguishable from an intention to commit it. An attempt must be to do that which if successful would amount to the felony charged. In order to prove an attempt to steal in a dwelling-house, there must be proof that some of the articles charged in the indictment were there. Upon the trial of an indictment for breaking and entering a dwelling-house, and stealing therein certain goods specified in the indictment, it appeared that at the time of breaking and entry, the goods specified were not in the house, but that there were other goods there of the prosecutor. The jury acquitted the prisoner of the felony charged, but found him guilty of breaking and entering the dwelling-house of the prosecutor and attempting to steal his goods therein: Held, that the conviction could not be supported. Reg. v. M'Pherson, 5 Week. Rep. 525.

JUDGE INTERESTED.-Appeal-Judge owner of shares in company.—Where the judge presiding at the trial of an appeal, was registered owner of five shares in a company, which was a party to the appeal, it was held that such judge was interested in the appeal, and that the order of sessions in such appeal must be quashed. Reg. v. Storks, 5 Week. Rep. 563.

LARCENY BY ADULTERER [vol. 1, p. 95]. -Carrying bundle containing wife's apparel.-The prisoner, who lodged at the house of the prosecutor having agreed with his wife to go away and live in adultery, left the house; the wife followed, and the prisoner was overtaken on the road in her company, carrying a band-box containing her wearing apparel: Held, that a conviction for larceny of the property so found on him, the indictment stating it to be the property of the husband, must be quashed. Reg. v. Fitch, 5 Week. Rep. 527.

MALICIOUS TRESPASS [vol. 2, p. 316].— Decision of magistrate not reviewed-Habeas corpusClaims of ownership-Malicious act of trespass.— Where a person convicted under 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, of a malicious trespass, admitted the act complained of before the justice, but said that he did it as an act of ownership, the Court of Queen's Bench will not grant a writ of habeas corpus upon an affidavit setting forth this fact, for otherwise the court would be reviewing the justice's decision upon the facts. —, 5 Week. Rep. 607.


MASTER AND SERVANT.-Absenting from service [vol. 2, p. 53]-Apprentice-Second conviction

-Punishment-Power to inquire by affidavits into jurisdiction of justices-6 Geo. 3, c. 25, s. 4-4 Geo. 4, c. 34, s. 3.-We have before noticed a decision in the following case in the Court of Queen's Bench, and we now give the decision of the Court of Exchequer, conflicting on some points, but agreeing as to others. B., a working potter, was convicted before a magistrate of having unlawfully absented himself. from his service, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for one month: Held (per Pollock, C.B., Martin, B., and Bramwell, B.), that the conviction was bad for not awarding as to the abatement of B.'s wages during his imprisonment, as required by 4 Geo. 4, c. 34, s. 3, which authorises a justice of the peace in such a case "to commit every such person to the House of Correction, there to remain and be held to hard labour for a reasonable time, not exceeding three months, and to abate a proportional part of his or her wages for and during such period as he or she shall be so confined." Per Watson, B., dissentiente, that the 6 Geo. 3, c. 25, s. 4, empowering the magistrate to sentence to imprisonment simpliciter, was not repealed by 4 Geo. 4, and that the conviction was good under the earlier statute. A warrant of commitment recited that complaint upon oath had been made that W. B. did agree to serve as a potter under a written agreement for a certain time, and having entered upon and worked under such agreement, and the term of his agreement being unexpired, he did unlawfully misdemean himself in his service by absenting himself from his service, &c.; the magistrate did adjudge the said complaint to be true, it appearing to him, as well upon the examination on oath of J. S. in the presence of the said W. B. as otherwise, that the said W. B. having contracted to serve as a potter, and the term of his contract being unexpired, did, on, &c., misdemean and misconduct himself in his said service by neglecting and absenting himself, &c.: Held, first, that the facts of the contract being made, the service entered upon, and W. B. having absented himself, were sufficiently stated. Secondly, that the warrant was not open to the objection that evidence not on oath or not in the presence of the prisoner had been received, as it must be presumed that the words as otherwise " referred to other legal evidence. A servant or artificer, within 4 Geo. 4, c. 34, s. 3, who absents himself a second time from his service under the same contract, may be punished by virtue of that statute for such second absenting, notwithstanding he was committed to prison for the prior absenting; and a neglect and refusal to return to his work after the expiration of the period of imprisonment, if the time during which he contracted to serve has not then expired, is a fresh absenting. Dissentiente, Pollock, C.B., and per Pollock, C.B.,


and Martin, B., that if such servant or artificer absent himself under a claim of right to treat the contract as at an end, and with an avowed determination of never again returning to his service, and is punished by imprisonment for such absenting, the contract can no longer be treated as subsisting so as to subject the workman to punishment for neglecting to return to his employment at the expiration of his sentence. The court may, on an application for a habeas corpus, inquire by affidavit into facts which were necessary to give the magistrate jurisdiction. Dissentiente, Bramwell, B.; dubitante, Martin, B. Exparte Baker, 5 Week. Rep. 661.

QUARTER SESSIONS [vol. 2, pp. 215, 305].— Municipal borough-Appeal against conviction-Byelaw--Certiorari taken away [vol. 2, p. 20].-Where the certiorari is taken away, a case from the sessions may be up brought for the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench by consent of the parties. The court will entertain a special case stated by consent, on an appeal at a municipal quarter sessions, to ascertain whether a conviction under a bye-law was right on the merits, although the certiorari to remove the case is taken away by the Municipal Corporation Act, 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 132. Reg. v. Dickenson, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 180; 5 Week. Rep. 654.

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TOWNS IMPROVEMENT CLAUSES ACT, 1847.-Cleansing district-Removal of dust, ashes, and rubbish Manufactory - Birmingham Improvement Act, 1851 (14 & 15 Vic. c. 93), 10 & 11 Vic. c. 34, s. 87.-By s. 50 of the Birmingham Improvement Act, 1851, the clauses of the Towns Improvement Act, 1847, "with respect to cleansing the streets," are incorporated therewith. By s. 87 of the Towns Improvement Act, the commissioners are required to 66 cause all the dust, ashes, and rubbish to be carried away from the houses and tenements of the inhabitants of the town or district within the limits of the special act, at convenient hours and times:" Held, that the commissioners were not bound to remove dust, ashes, and rubbish, arising from coal, slack, and other combustible materials consumed, and used in a process of manufacture of iron tools, carried on in a building used as a factory, and in which a servant of the occupier resided with his family. Quare, whether an action will lie against commissioners for neglect of duty in not removing dust, ashes, and rubbish, which they are required by the 87th section of "The Towns Improvement Clauses Act, 1847," to remove. Lyndon v. Standbridge, 5 Week. Rep. 590.

VAGRANT ACT [vol. 3, p. 330].—Commitment -Frequenting public place-Railway station-Platform-5 Geo. 4, c. 83, s. 4-Stating offence.-The 4th section of the Vagrant Act (5 Geo. 4, c. 83), enacts, that "every suspected person or reputed

thief frequenting any river, canal, or navigable stream, dock, or basin, or any quay, wharf, or warehouse, near or adjoining thereto, or any place of public resort, or any avenue leading thereto, or any street, highway, or place adjacent, with intent to commit felony, may be committed as a rogue and vagabond." D. was convicted as a rogue and vagabond, the warrant of commitment describing his offence to be that he being a suspected person 66 at the railway station in the parish of D., in the said county, the same being at the time a place of public resort, did frequent the platform of the said station, with intent to commit felony:" Held, a sufficient statement of an offence within the 4th section of the 5 Geo. 4, c. 83. Exparte Davis, 5 Week. Rep. 522. WINE LICENSE.-Sale of sweet wines by retail to be consumed on the premises-Excisable liquors.— British made wines are not excisable liquors within the meaning of the 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, s. 18, so as to require a license for selling them by retail for consumption on the premises of the retailer within that section, provided the retailer has the license required by the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 77, for the sale of them. Reg. v. Lancashire, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 181; 5 Week. Rep. 658.


June 10.-Moot Point, No. 224.

A., describing himself as an agent, but having, in fact, no principal, enters into a contract with B.; can B. bring an action on the contract treating A. as the principal?

This point occasioned a very spirited discussionthe law of agency being well developed, the rules applicable to the subject carefully considered, and many logical deductions made; in short, without being the least egotistic, our society manifests a decided tendency towards improvement, and whatever its result may prove, we have the deep satisfaction of knowing and feeling that debating societies are of the greatest possible importance to articled clerks, and that it is the duty of such, in every town mustering two or three, to promote the study of the law by association and discussion. It is unquestionably an indispensable element of success.

The three leading cases generally cited in connection with agency cases, are to be found in Smith's Leading Cases, vol. 2-Paterson v. Gandasequi, Addison v. Gandasequi, and Thompson v. Davenport; and they chiefly decide in respect of the liability of an unnamed principal when discovered. This is one point: the liability of the principal, when discovered, is settled. The next view will establish the liability of the agent, where, believing himself

invested with authority to contract for a principal, it transpires that his authority has ceased, or that he has exceeded such authority. Here his liability arises to the vendor for all damage sustained by reason of the breach of contract (see Randell v. Trimen, 25 L. J. R., C. P., 307; Collen v. Wright, and others, executors, 26 L. J. R., Q. B., 147; see also Jenkins v. Hutchinson, 18 L. J. R., Q. B., 274; Lewis v. Nicholson, 21 L. J. R., Q. B., 311). These cases will illustrate the second proposition. The next proposition is contained in the moot point. Where A., describing himself as agent, without disclosing the name of any individual as principal, or specifying the name of any individual as such, but, in point of fact, in both instances, having no principal whatever, enters into a contract with B.; here we hold that A. is the real principal in the case, and can be sued on the contract in that capacity; for to contend that the fictitiously created principal is to be sued, is to override all reason and authority. In support of the proposition on the moot point, see Schmeltz v. Avery, 16 Q. B. 556; 20 L. J. R., Q. B., 229; Cane v. Jackson, 7 Ex. 382; 21 L. J. R., Ex., 137; Jones v. Downman, 4 Q. B. 235; same case on appeal, 14 L. J. R., Q. B., 226, on special circumstances, and whether agent contracted as principal or not. Agent, describing himself as such, may so contract as to make himself principal (see Turner v. Christian, 24 L. J. R., Q. B., Lennard v. Robinson, 24 J. R., Q. B., 276).


From the above propositions we may collect the following inferences:-1. That where A. contracts with B. without stating himself to be an agent, B. may, on discovering his principal, elect between them; and that the rule is the same where he states himself to be an agent, but does not name his principal. 2. Where, not having in fact authority to make the contract as agent, he yet does so, under the bonâ fide belief that such authority is vested in him, a personal responsibility arises. 3. That if he state himself to be an agent, but have really no principal, he is in law himself the principal, and may be sued as such.

The meeting decided in support of the third inference being the affirmative of the moot point.

A. FEREDAY, Corresponding Secretary.


GENTLEMEN,-In a short editorial article under the above head, at p. 342 of your present month's publication (vol. 3, p. 342), in commenting upon the case of Exparte Williams, and the construction thereby placed upon the statute 19 & 20 Vic. c. 81,

you remark that the judgment of Mr. Justice Erle "has completely nullified the utility of it (the act), inasmuch as his Lordship decided that before articles can be inrolled they must be stamped-so that the statute has just effected this change, that if by any accident the officer of the court should permit articles to be inrolled without being stamped, the act might be brought into operation," &c. Now it appears to me that the case you put is not the only instance in which the healing powers of the act may be applied, and that the judgment in the above case, so far from mollifying the statute, is in precise accordance with the spirit as well as with the letter of it. For, I take it, the principal or only object of the statute is to confer a power on the Commissioners of Inland Revenue to stamp articles which had been omitted to be stamped within the time allowed by law, and that the invariable course which any gentleman desiring to avail himself of the provisions of the act would pursue, would be, in the first place (and before taking out a rule under the 6 & 7 Vic. for inrolment of the articles), to get the stamp affixed, which, I apprehend, will be allowed almost as a matter of course, for we cannot suppose that the Commissioners would demur to exert their newly-acquired power on payment of the proper penalty imposed by the act.

Perhaps, upon reconsidering the matter, you may incline to my view, in which case I shall feel obliged if, in conformity with your well-known readiness to correct occasional inadvertent errors, you will find space in your next number for this communication, . as I should exceedingly regret, as I am quite sure you would, that anything in your widely-circulated and much-esteemed periodical should be at all calculated to mislead any one of your numerous readers, who may be accustomed to accept your articles with pure faith and simplicity.

I remain, &c.,

CHARLES J. Fox. P.S. The above was received some time since, but was accidentally omitted. We now insert it, with the remark that we still remain of the opinion before expressed. It seems not to be understood that if the articles are not inrolled within six months, the service will, unless the court shall otherwise order, reckon, not from the date of the articles, but merely from the time of their inrolment. Now, if the articles be not stamped and inrolled within the six months, there will be two applications necessary, in order to endeavour to obtain the benefit of the articies from the time of their date-namely, first to the Treasury, for leave to have the articles stamped, and next to the court, to allow the service to reckon from the execution of the articles (vol. 3, pp. 111, 112). Then comes the

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