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Succession Duty Act, 18 & 19 Vic. c. 51, came into operation, but fallen into possession upon the death of the tenant for life, after the time appointed for the commencement of the act, but before the time when it received the royal assent, is liable to succession duty. Wilcock v. Smith, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 235.

SURETY [vol. 3, pp. 88, 212].-Difference between giving time to debtor and releasing debt, with reservation of rights against surety.-The following case shows the great difference existing in equity between giving time to a debtor to pay, and releasing the debt where there has been a surety, and there is a reservation of the creditor's rights against him. It was there decided by V. C. Wood that where a creditor gives time to his debtor, and at the same time reserves his right against his debtor's sureties, they are not discharged; but where there has been an actual release of the debt, no such right can be reserved against the sureties. The plaintiff entered into a bond as surety for a debtor, conditioned for the repayment of moneys advanced and to be advanced to the debtor by his creditor. The moneys were advanced by the creditor. The debtor and creditor afterwards entered into a written agreement, in consideration of the debt then due, of other payments made and to be made, and of a general release to be executed by the creditor, for the surrender and assignment to the creditor of certain premises demised to the debtor. The surrender and assignment were duly made, but no general release was ever executed: Held, that although there was no discharge of the surety at law, in equity he was released from his liability on the bond. The court refused to admit evidence on the part of the defendant, dehors the written agreement and repugnant to it, to show an intention to reserve a right against the surety. Webb v. Hewett, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 225.

TENANT FOR LIFE.-Order to produce cestui que vie—6 Anne, c. 18—To whom application made.— The application for the production, under the 6 Anne, c. 18, of a cestui que vie in the case of a tenancy for life is to be made to "the Lord Chancellor, keeper or commissioner for the custody of the Great Seal of Great Britain for the time being," and therefore the Master of the Rolls has no jurisdiction under the statute. Meyrick v. Lawes, 5 Week. Rep. 746.

TRUSTEES.-Devise upon trust for sale-Mortgage, not a compliance-Trust for sale does not authorise mortgage. The case of Stroughill v. Anstey, (1 De Gex. M. and G. 635), established that as a general rule, a mortgage is not a due execution of a trust for conversion. In the following case, property was devised upon trust for sale as soon as might be after the decease of the testator, and the trustees mort

gaged the property for payment of debts and certain legacies, but took no steps to sell the estate for five years after the death; it was held that they were liable for a loss which accrued in consequence of their neglect to execute the trust, from the property having become depreciated in the meantime. Devaynes v. Robinson, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 244.

WILL.-Probate-French domicil-Authorisation of the Emperor.-The following is the decision respecting the validity of the will of a person domiciled in France about which so much has lately been said, and which has occasioned the introduction of a bill into Parliament to remedy the difficulty for the future. A testamentary instrument duly executed according to English law by a British subject, whose legal domicil was at Paris both at the time of the execution of the instrument in question and at the time of her death, cannot be admitted to probate if the party propounding the alleged will fails to prove that the law of the domicil was such as to authorise a will in that form. The authorisation of the Emperor of the French is not necessary in order to establish a domicil to give the rights of testacy, and regulate the succession of property. Breemer v. Freeman, 5 Week. Rep. 618.

EQUITY PRACTICE.

ANSWER.-Witness-Privilege-Question tending to criminate-Exceptions to answer.-A defendant is not, as a general rule, at liberty to dagline to answer interrogatories, upon his mere statement upon oath that such answer might subject him to prosecution. The court will decide whether, under the circumstances, such a statement ought to be considered conclusive. V. C. Stuart declined to follow the decision in Fisher v. Ronalds (17 Jur. 393), to the effect that it is enough for the person interrogated to state upon his oath that he considers, or has been advised, or that it is his opinion, that his answering a particular question would tend to criminate him, and that the witness is the sole judge upon the neglect. Sidebottom v. Adkins, 3 Jur. N. S. 631; 5 Week. Rep. 743.

COSTS.-Trustees appearing separately [vol. 2, p. 162]-Costs, double set allowed.-In general trustees should join in defending proceedings in equity, otherwise they will be allowed one set of costs only (see 2 Chron. p. 162). A hostile claim was filed for an account and administration against three trustees, only one having ever acted, and the acting trustee resided in a different part of England from the other two. No unreasonable conduct was proved against the acting trustee: Held, that he was justified in appearing separately from his two cotrustees; and a double set of costs was allowed, Cummins v. Bromfield, 3 Jur. N. S. 657.

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-Outstanding term-Ejectment.-Where a plaintiff in equity claims as heir-in-tail, it has been held that he has a right to have the deeds creating the entail, and also the deeds leading up to the creation of the entail, produced by any opposing claimant, who seeks to obtain possession, denying the heirship, but admitting the entail, because the deeds creating the entail and the documents on which it rests, are assumed to be the common title of both parties. But upon consideration, it is plain that the decision in such a case would have no application to a case where the heir claims as heir general. In the following case, it appeared that a person claiming to be heir-at-law brought ejectment, to which the defendant was about to set up as a defence an outstanding term. The heir thereupon filed his bill for a production of the instrument creating the term: Held, that he was not entitled to the production, except as to so much (if any) of the deed as showed or tended to show the plaintiff's pedigree, and that the rest of the deed might be sealed up. Rumbold v. Forteath, 3 Jur. N. S. 657.

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DISMISSAL OF BILL.- Reversal of decided cases · Amendment · ·Dismissal of bill by plaintiff— Costs. If a plaintiff files a bill on the authority of decided cases, and those cases are afterwards reversed, he is entitled to move to dismiss his bill without costs. The court gave leave to a plaintiff to amend his bill on payment of costs to the defendant. The plaintiff, accordingly, amended the bill, and proceeded with the suit. It was afterwards discovered that there was an express clause in a statute which rendered the bill unsustainable. The plaintiff was allowed to dismiss his bill without costs, on the ground that the prosecution of the suit was caused by a mistake of the court. Lister v. Leather, 5 Week. Rep. 666.

DISMISSAL OF BILL.-After decree-Waiving relief—Preliminary inquiries.—Where after decree, in consequence of a previous technical irregularity, the bill is dismissed against a party having a reversionary interest under a settlement sought to be impeached, and preliminary inquiries are directed, the court under the special circumstances will order the decree to be prosecuted against the other parties only, the plaintiff waiving all relief against the party dismissed. Chaffers v. Baker, 5 Week. Rep. 515.

ELECTION.-Infant-Reference to chambers.— An infant heir-at-law may elect with the sanction of the court, without a reference to chambers. Lamb v. Lamb, 5 Week. Rep. 772.

EVIDENCE [vol. 3, pp. 127, 298].-Time for closing evidence Leave to file further affidavits— 15 & 16 Vic. c. 80, s. 38.-After the time for closing the evidence in a cause has expired, the court may,

under 15 & 16 Vic. c. 80, s. 38, allow affidavits to be filed in reply to an affidavit filed immediately before the time for closing evidence, impugning the character and credibility of the witnesses of the party in whose behalf the application is made. Scott v. Corporation of Liverpool, 5 Week. Rep. 641, 669; 29 Law Tim. Rep. 223.

FEME COVERT.-Marriage after replication— Separate estate-Revivor-Next friend.-A., a feme sole entitled to property, which in the event of her marriage would be settled for her separate use, filed a bill for purposes connected with such property. After replication, but before decree, she marries. The Court made an order, giving leave to the plaintiff to name A. B. her next friend, and reviving the result against her husband. Semble, such an order is not an order of course. Trezevant v. Broughton, 5 Week. Rep. 517.

HEARING.-Last cause in list not privileged.— Formerly, the last cause in each day's list of causes for hearing was considered privileged, so that it could not be taken in the absence of counsel; but this rule of practice has been abrogated, and now the last cause in the paper is not privileged, but the plaintiff is entitled, in the absence of the defendant's counsel, to a decree or order on affidavit of service. Flower v. Gedye, 5 Week. Rep. 747.

INFANT.-Infant suing in formâ pauperis by next friend [vol. 3, pp. 45, 318].-An order for an infant to sue by next friend in farmâ pauperis is irregular. Lindsey v. Tyrrell, 5 Week. Rep. 617.

MORTGAGE.-Solicitor-Costs.-A mortgagee is entitled, as against his mortgagor, to have taken into account, in a suit to redeem him, any costs which he has incurred in protecting his title to the mortgaged property. On the other hand, though a mortgagee may be entitled to certain expenses properly incurred in relation to the mortgaged property, as the expenses of employing a collector, yet he cannot himself charge for his own trouble. Where a mortgagee acts as his own solicitor in a suit in defence of his own title, he will be allowed, as against a second mortgagee, his costs out of pocket, but no other costs—that is, the mortgagee is entitled to what he has disbursed, but not to that which is the remuneration for his own personal trouble. Sclater v. Cottam, 3 Jur. N. S. 630.

PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.-Privileged communications-Co-defendants.-In general every thing and document within the knowledge or in the possession of a party to a suit in equity must be disclosed. But in order that there should be free communication between the parties to a suit and their legal advisers, such communications are privileged from production, and this has been extended to the legal advisers and the witnesses in the suit

(Curling v. Perring, 2 Myl. and Ke. 380; Holmes v. Baddeley, 1 Phil. '476). But it has been decided by V. C. Wood, that communications between codefendants in reference to the matters in question in the suit are not entitled to protection. Betts v. Menzies, 5 Week. Rep. 767.

PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS [vol. 3, pp. 35, 127, 375, 398].-Applying immediately after filing answer. By the 19th sect. of the 15 & 16 Vic. c. 86, it is provided that it shall be lawful for the defendant in any suit, whether commenced by bill or claim, but in suits commenced by bill, which the defendant is required to answer not until after he shall have put in a sufficient answer, to file interrogatories for the examination of the plaintiff. A defendant after filing his answer, may apply for production of documents under the above statute, although the six weeks during which the answer is open to exceptions has not elapsed. Walker v. Kennedy, 3 Jur. N. S. 481.

PUBLIC COMPANY.-Costs-Application respecting payment of dividends on purchase-money to tenant for life.-Where a tenant for life might, but for disputes between himself and his incumbrancers, have obtained an order for payment of dividends to himself of a fund in court on a former occasion, he will not be allowed as against the company the costs of an additional application relating to the dividends. A public company having purchased lands for the purpose of their act, and paid the money into court, it is competent for the court, the whole matter being before it, not only to order the transfer into the separate account of the landowner having a limited interest, but also by the same order to direct payment of the dividends according to the rights of parties. Re Joliffe, 3 Jur. N. S. 633.

SETTLED ESTATES ACT [ante, p. 24].19 & 20 Vic. c. 120-Examination of married woman -Scotland, writer to signet.—The Settled Estates Act is giving rise to many applications, and several points have been decided on the practice, and among others the following:-The examination of a married woman applying to the court under 19 & 20 Vic. c. 120, may be taken after the presentation of a petition at any time before it is heard. A writer to the signet will not be appointed to take the consent of a married woman residing in Scotland. Re Hooper's Settled Estates, 5 Week. Rep. 670; but see Id. 726.

SETTLED ESTATES ACT [ante, pp. 22, 24]. -19 & 20 Vic. c. 120-Examination of married woman [ante, pp. 22, 24].-The examination of a married woman applying to the court under the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act (19 & 20 Vic. c. 120) should be taken immediately after the presentation of the petition. Re Foster's Settled Estates, 5 Week. Rep. 726.

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TRUSTEES.- Appointment of new trusteesDisclaimer-Costs Jurisdiction Trustee Act.-A stranger who, in a case involving no risk or responsibility, obstructs the true owner, by refusing to claim or disclaim will be made to pay the costs of any consequent proceedings. On a petition, under the Trustee Act, 1850, for appointing a new trustee, the court has no jurisdiction to make the respondents pay the costs of the application. Re Primrose's Settlement, 5 Week. Rep. 508. TRUSTEE.-Cestui que trust Appeal-Trustee of appellants the respondent-Indemnity - Costs.

using name of

solicitor also of

A trustee cauhot,

upon receiving a proper indemnity, refuse the use of his name to his cestui que trust for the purpose of prosecuting an appeal in the House of Lords. A defendant in a suit was the trustee of appellants from a decree pronounced in it, and also the solicitor of a respondent on the appeal. The defendant gave the appellants an authority to use his name in their appeal, but subsequently withdrew that authority, on the grounds that he thought the appeal unreasonable, and that he was the respondent's solicitor. The appellants offered to indemnify him against the costs of the appeal on a claim filed by them, claiming to be allowed to prosecute their appeal in the name of the defendant: Held, that they might use his name on a complete and sufficient indemnity being given, the indemnity to be settled in chambers; and that the defendant must pay the costs of the claim. Pakington v. Benbow, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 194; 5 Week. Rep. 670.

TRUSTEE RELIEF ACTS.-Costs-Party served with petition and appearing.—A party served with a petition under the Trustee Relief Act, 1847, does not necessarily get his costs of appearing at the hearing of the petition. Re Smith, exp. Fisher, 3 Jur. N. S. 659.

COMMON LAW.

AGENT [vol. 3, pp. 49, 298, 310].—Damages— Contract by unauthorised agent.-An unauthorised agent assumed to enter into a contract on behalf of R. for the purchase of a ship then building, and he required certain extra work to be done which came to £250. Afterwards R. repudiated the contract, and the ship was resold at a loss of £250: Held, that the damages resulting from the breach of the defendant's engagement that he had authority to make the contract for R. were, as well the £250 loss on resale as the £250 for the work which the agent specially required to be done. Simons v. Patchett, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 88.

ATTORNEY.-Witnesses' expenses— Experiments -Liability of attorney for expense of surveys by witness to qualify himself.-It is a well-established rule of

law that where a person is presumably acting as agent for another, the principal is bound and not the agent; an attorney is certainly in that position; he is the agent of his client, and is acting in pursuance of instructions. The authorities to that effect are Robins v. Bridge, 3 M. and W. 114; Walbank v. Quatermaine, 3 C. B. 96; and Hartup v. Jukes, 2 M. and S. 438. Upon the authority of these cases it has been decided that an attorney who employs a surveyor to make surveys and valuations in order to qualify himself to give evidence at a trial on behalf of his client, is not liable to the surveyor for the expense of the surveys and his attendance to give evidence. The witness must, in the absence of express stipulation, look to the client for payment. Lee v. Everest, 5 Week. Rep. 759.

BILLS OF SALE [ante, p. 25].-Execution creditor-Jus tertii-Prior invalid bill of sale.-An interpleader issue is merely to satisfy the conscience of the court whether the execution creditor or the claimant is entitled to the goods. In an interpleader issue to try the right of the plaintiff as assignee under a bill of sale, to goods claimed by the defendant as execution creditor, the defendant will not be allowed to set up, as a bar to the plaintiff's claim, a prior bill of sale, which, though good as against the assignor, is void as against the defendant on account of a non-compliance with the Bills of Sale Registration Act. Edward v. English, 5 Week. Rep. 507.

BILL OF EXCHANGE.-Indorsement on face of a bill.-The writing of his name by an indorser on the face of a bill of exchange, is a good indorsement. Young v. Glover, 3 Jur. N. S. 637.

CLUB.-Liability of member-Authority of secretary.—According to the law laid down in Flemyng v. Hector (2 M. and W. 172), the members of the club are not responsible for goods supplied on the order of the secretary, each member having previously made payments into his hands sufficient to pay for the goods supplied to him; but it is very different where the secretary is merely directed to order the goods of a particular person who is to be paid at a particular time. Thus, where a coal club entered into a contract with a merchant to supply them with coals, and authorised their secretary to order the coals for them, and by a rule of the club the coals were to be paid for out of the funds of the club, in the hands of the treasurer, by means of an order given to the merchant on the next Thursday night after each delivery of coals, signed by the secretary and chairman of a meeting of the club: Held, that as the members of the club did not furnish the secretary with funds to pay for the coals, but authorised a contract on credit, the contract so made must have been on their credit, and not on that of the

secretary, and they were consequently liable to pay for the coals. Cockerell v. Aucompte, 5 Week. Rep. 633.

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DECLARATION OF WAR.-Effect of on contracts-Neutral vessels.-It is established that inasmuch as the presumed object of war is as much to cripple the enemy's commerce as to capture his property, a declaration of war imports a prohibition of commercial intercourse and correspondence with the inhabitants of the enemy's country, and that such intercourse, except with the licence of the Crown, is illegal. Doubt was, indeed, thrown upon the law on this subject by Bell v. Gilson (1 Bos. and P. 345, A.D. 1798), where Buller and Heath, JJ., held that the insurance of goods purchased in Holland during hostilities between England and Holland, on board a neutral ship, was lawful. That case was, however, in the year 1800, overruled by the Queen's Bench, in Potts v. Bell (8 Term Rep. 548), which, together with the great case of The Hoop (1 C. Rob. 196, A.D. 1799), before Sir Wm. Scott, then restored and finally established the rule already mentioned-viz., that one of the consequences of war is the absolute interdiction of all commercial intercourse or correspondence between the subjects of the hostile countries, except by the permission of their respective sovereigns. Per Willes, J., in Esposito v. Bowden, 5 Week. Rep. 732.

EASEMENTS.-Water rights, natural and acquired ·Riparian proprietors — Usage - Diversion - Detention-Right of action.-As a general principle, the proprietor of lands on the banks of a natural stream has a right to use the water, so as not to work any material injury to the rights of proprietors above and below him, whether he does actually use it or Such a proprietor may, by usage, have a greater right, not justified by his natural rights. But an acquired right does not operate on the natural rights of a landowner above, unless the user by which it was acquired affected the power to use the water above, so as to raise the presumption of a grant. Simpson v. Addington, 26 Law Journ. 148, C. P.

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EQUITABLE DEFENCES [vol. 3, pp. 301, 324, 345]. Railway company - Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Vic. c. 16, s. 36-Shareholder-Equitable plea — False representation-Scire facias. It is a rule that no plea ought to be entertained as an equitable plea unless the court, in deciding on the points and merits of the plea, can do the entire justice between the parties that the case requires. To a scire facias against a shareholder in a railway company incorporated by statute, on a judgment obtained against the company, the defendant pleaded, for defence on equitable grounds, that he became transferee of the shares he held in the company as nominee of E. and M., for their benefit,

and not for his own, upon the representation of the plaintiff and others that he should incur no liability in respect of them; that he never was to derive or did derive any benefit from the shares of the company; that the company never commenced the railway, and the scheme was abandoned, and no benefit was ever acquired by the company; that the plaintiff knew the circumstances under which the defendant became transferee of the shares, and stood by and permitted him to become such, &c., and was then unjustly and inequitably, and contrary to that representation, and in fraud thereof, seeking to charge the defendant, and make him responsible as a shareholder: Held, bad on demurrer. Bell v. Richards, 3 Jur. N. S. 521.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT.-Estoppel - Arrest by sheriff of wrong person on misrepresentation.Though a sheriff may justify the arrest of a person representing himself to be the party against whom the writ is issued, yet he cannot justify the subsequent detainer of such person after information, even though given by such arrested person only, that he is not the party against whom the writ was issued. Action against the sheriff for false imprisonment. Plea, that the plaintiff represented herself to be a person against whom a writ of ca. sa. had issued to the defendant. New assignment, that the defendant detained the plaintiff in custody after she had informed him that she was not the person. Rejoinder, that the plaintiff was lawfully in custody in the first instance, and that the subsequent imprisonment was a continuation of that: Held, that the plaintiff was not estopped from denying that she was the person against whom the writ had issued. Dunston v. Paterson, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 199.

FRIENDLY SOCIETY [vol. 2, pp. 62, 136-9, 167, 269].—Appointment of trustees—13 & 14 Vic. c. 115; and 18 & 19 Vic. c. 63.-Where trustees of a friendly society, established under 13 & 14 Vic. c. 115, were appointed after 18 & 19 Vic. c. 63 (see 2 Law Chron. 62, 63) had become law: Held, that it was not necessary to send to the registrar the resolution appointing the trustees; and that such trustees were liable to be sued for the debts of the society incurred before their appointment. Beckett v. Willetts, 5 Week. Rep. 622.

ILLEGAL ARREST. Attorney and client Liability of attorney-Liability of client for illegal arrest upon ca. sa. where the sum recovered under £20 -7 & 8 Vic. c. 96, s. 57 [see vol. 1, p. 275; vol. 2, p. 224]. The following case is a very important one with respect to a client's liability for the act of his attorney. There is a great difference between the employing of an attorney who represents the parties in a suit, and the employing a contractor to do some other piece of work different to the carrying on a

suit at law-such as building a house, &c., where the employer is not liable for the acts of the person who contracts to do the work, but the contractor is; but it has always been held that a man is liable for the acts of his attorney in the conduct of a suit at law brought under his authority. He gives to the attorney the right to represent him, and for whatever the attorney does he is responsible. The following case was decided upon these principles :— An attorney issued a ca. sa. upon a judgment where the real sum recovered by his client upon that judgment was under £20. The judgment debtor-(the above-named plaintiff) was arrested, but subsequently, the writ was set aside, and he was discharged. Evidence was given to show that the judgment creditor (the above-named defendant) knew of the arrest, and was in communication from time to time with her attorney, who issued the ca. sa. Held (dubitante, Bramwell, B.), that the client (the judgment creditor) was liable for the act of her attorney in issuing the ca. sa. and arresting the plaintiff, in an action by him, against her, for false imprisonment. Collett v. Foster, 29 Law Tim. Rep.

229.

INTESTACY.—Administration-Widow and next of kin-Committee of lunatic widow.-Where a person dies intestate without child or parent, leaving a widow who is lunatic, it is the practice of the Prerogative Court Registry to make a grant of administration to the committee of the widow without citing the next-of-kin; the court, however, is not bound by that practice, but may, where the next-of-kin appears and shows sufficient reason, grant administration to them. A. died intestate without child or parent, leaving his widow, his brother, and others entitled in distribution, him surviving. The widow became lunatic, and a committee of her person and estate was appointed by the Court of Chancery. On the question of grant of administration, it was held that the ordinary preference by the discretion of the court in favour of the widow would extend to such committee, unless the next-of-kin could show special cause to the contrary. Alford v. Alford, 29 Law Tim. Rep.

284.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.- Damages for not quitting after notice and delivering up possession [vol. 3, p. 302].-A tenant who holds over after a notice to quit has expired, and after he has received notice from his landlord that the premises have been let to another, is liable, in an action by the landlord, for damages for the loss sustained by him in consequence of his being unable to perform the contract which he had entered into, to deliver possession to the in-coming tenant. Quære, whether an action of assumpsit could be maintained on the implied promise

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