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One word more respecting the verse quoted from Timothy-" who will have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth." Few, if any, passages are quoted to sustain Universalism more frequently than this; and yet, as we have seen, it not only does not afford any proof in support of that theory, but it really furnishes an argument against it. It was the will of God then that all men should be saved; but all men were not saved then, nor have they been since, though, as my friend would have it, his will has been absolute during the whole intervening period. Here is a palpable fact. The will of God does not produce the salvation of all men. We need not go back to the Antediluvians -nor to the heathen world, for examples-they are around us in every direction, they are in this assembly. If that view of the will of God contended for by my opponent, be correct, why are we not all saved now? If our only dependence is on the will of God, our conclusion must be, that God does not will or desire our salvation now, or, that the will of God does not unconditionally assure us of salvation in the future. And this latter is the correct conclusion, agreeing as well with conscience and reason, as with the word of God, which makes human salvation depend on faith in Christ, who is the author of eternal salvation" to all such as believe. Christ said to the Jews, "Ye will not come to me, that ye might have life." If men miss of salvation here, by resisting the will of Christ, they may miss of heaven for the same reason: indeed, this agrees with his own words-" he that believeth not, shall be damned." To harmonize with the gentleman's doctrine, these passages ought to read-" Ye will not come to me that ye might have life-nevertheless, ye shall have life, whether you will come to me or not"-" he that believeth shall be saved, and he that believeth not, shall be saved." What will my friend do with these plain cases of resistance offered to the will of Christ, and the consequent forfeiture of spiritual blessings? Will he take the ground occupied by Mr. Skinner, that Christ was liable to mistake, and hence his will is not to be depended on, as the will of God? This ground he must take, or admit the will of God is not absolute. The foregoing may suffice as an answer to the argument from the will of God, until something more shall be presented by Mr. Austin.

The gentleman says, that though men were "subjected to vanity, not willingly," yet it was not necessary that they should sin. In this my friend has placed himself in a position, anything but enviable. He is under the necessity of doing something to extricate himself from a serious difficulty, and the very effort he makes, only entangles him more. He comes in contact, first, with the standard writers on Universalism. Ballou's Lectures, page 74-on Atonement, pages 31, 32, 34, 35. Balfour's 2d Inquiry, page 27. Roger's Pro and Con of Universalism, page 255, affirms that "sin proceeds wholly and altogether from our animal nature." Such is the doctrine taught by all these writers, and Mr. Ballou ridicules

the idea that man was brought into a state of subjection to vanity by sin, but maintains that it was the result of the divine arrangement. Page 64, on Atonement, he says, "man is dependent in all his volitions, and moves by necessity." Secondly, in this disclaimer my friend contradicts himself. He has taught, in this discussion, and elsewhere, that God created man in an imperfect and impure state -that all sin arises from causes inherent in "the bodily portion of our nature, which exists in this life." If this be true, men are necessarily the subjects of sin and misery. In the third place, he contradicts the theory he has been at so much pains to rear on the passage in Romans viii. 20. The theory of progression, introduced by him, was intended, he tells us, to save men from that to which they were subjected that is from sin and misery. But if men were not subjected to sin and misery unwillingly, then it follows they might have maintained their freedom, and thus rendered his theory unnecessary, so far as it was intended to deliver men from "subjection to vanity."

But look at the logic of the gentleman. The human race is "subject to vanity, not willingly," and yet they might have avoided vanity. Perhaps my friend has made some new discoveries in the science of the human mind; if so, I would be glad to learn. Is there neutral ground for an intelligent being in regard to deeds really performed -a point at which he is neither willing nor unwilling? If he can make this out, it will go far towards relieving his disagreeable attitude. But until this is made to appear, I shall abide by the common sense view of the subject, viz: that the will cani ot be neutral -must be brought into action in reference to every thing that affects moral character. There is, and can be, no middle point between willingly and unwillingly. If, then, subjection to vanity was not unwilling, it was willing. If willing, it was not by the agency of God; if unwilling, the agency and will of man was not a party to the transaction, and God alone is responsible for the moral condition of the human race. This latter conclusion is unavoidable, from the premises of Universalism, and the positions taken by Mr. Austin. It is taught in the writings of leading Universalists, that a temporary state of sin and misery is brought in, for the purpose of making men more holy and happy hereafter. And this is what they mean by being "subject to vanity, not willingly." Mr. Austin has contended for the same doctrine here, most stoutly. It is on this ground, mainly, that he rests his defence of the character of God, as Father of the human family. I have urged upon my friend this difficulty-if men are not moral agents, governed according to the principles of moral law, and hence responsible for the final results of their conduct, why does not God now, by his infinite wisdom and power, in the most direct and immediate way, make all his children holy and happy. If he has wisdom and power to do it, he must be wanting in goodness, to allow their present condition to continue. But if his goodness would prompt him to do it, he must

certainly be deficient in wisdom or power, or both, since he does not effect their deliverance. To this, the answer of Universalism, and of Mr. Austin is, that the design of our heavenly Father in continuing men so long in a state of sin, with all its consequences, is that he may make them more holy and happy hereafter-that is, for it amounts to just this-God has neither wisdom nor power to make men sufficiently holy and happy, without taking them through a state of moral depravity, degradation and misery.

The doctrine set up and contended for by Mr. Austin, represents Almighty God in a light, which has more than once reminded me of the Dutch Physician who was called to see a sick child. He felt his pulse, and looked at his tongue, as doctors generally do. What ails the child? enquired the anxious mother. The Doctor, shaking his head, frankly confessed he did not know. Again examining the symptoms with no better success, he seemed in much perplexity; when suddenly, starting up as though he had made a discovery that would at once relieve the case, he exclaimed: I will tell you what I can do, I can give the child something to throw it into fits, and then I am death on fits!! Messrs. Moderators, is not this precisely the light in which the gentleman holds up the character of the Infinite Jehovah? He could not make men holy and happy at first; here was a difficulty he could not obviate. But there was one thing he could do: he could throw the world into a state of sin and misery, and then he is death on sin, and in this way will manage to secure the final holiness and happiness of all men. How this view honors Almighty God! Or rather, how it dishonors him. It is the old atheistic notion of certain heathen Philosophers, who taught that evil arose from a perverse principle in matter, which the omnipotence of God could not overcome. Mr. Austin has quoted from Dr. Clarke, on the love of God, and carries the idea that there is a contradiction between the Doctor and myself on this point. As he has quoted Dr. Clarke a number of times, and probably may do so many times more, I wish to call the attention of the audience to the manner in which it is done. I can have no sort of objection to his quoting Clarke, or any other Methodist author, when he does it correctly and fairly. But I will convince this audience, that in quoting Clarke, he has thus far been anything but fair. For exampie, in the discussion of the first question, he quotes from Clarke's Preface to Galatians," to prove there were Jews at Galatia, (a fact not disputed,) and then draws the inference necessary to his argument, that it was Clarke's opinion, that the redemption mentioned in Gal. iii. 13, was from the curse of the ceremonial law; whereas, Dr. Clarke expressly says otherwise in his comment on this verse, where he makes the redemption referred to, Christ's work of atonement, in which he bore the punishment due to sin." Again, when the chastening of God's people, as distinguished from penal inflictions upon the the ungodly, was under discussion, Mr. Austin quoted Clarke to support him in his views of chastening.

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And how did he do it? Why, strange as it may appear, he takes Clarke's remarks on scourging criminals, to explain the nature of ciastening; while Clarke himself says, on the word chastisement (Heb. xii. 8,) the very word under consideration, "the original word prideia' does not imply stripes and punishments, but the discipline of a child," thus directly confuting Mr. Austin, and affirming my view of the distinction between the punishment of the sinner, and the chastening of the children of God. Such are the methods by which the advocates of Universalism obtain concessions to their views. This course is pursued by Whittemore, and by Paige in his "Selections," who deliberately takes the comment of Doddridge, on John v. 25, and transfers it to John v. 28, 29, and thus makes Doddridge utter a sentiment he never intended. He also takes Dr. Whitby's note on 1 Peter iv. 6, and places it under John v. 28, 29, as proof that Whitby sustained the Universalist exposition of that passage. Let me ask this audience-is this fair? is it honest? can a cause founded in truth and righteousness need such measures of defence? I was not expecting this course to be taken by my friend of the opposite side, but the examples already adduced, with the one under immediate consideration, give lamentable evidence of the perverting influence of error, upon a mind, which might otherwise, under all circumstances, preserve a strict regard for propriety. I do not wish to lose my confidence in the argumentative fairness of my opponent. It gives me no pleasure to think he intends to be uncandid in his representations. But certainly, this looks like it. Dr. Clarke's remarks on the love of God, have no reference to the subject in dispute between Mr. Austin and myself: they refer to the doctrine of unconditional reprobation of men to damnation. That this notion is inconsistent with the love of God, is a point in which I fully coincide with Clarke. This doctrine, however, is not more inconsistent with the character of God, than that of unconditional, universal salvation. If this is the way my friend quotes authorities, we shall be obliged to take his assertions, hereafter, with some grains of allowance. The gentleman refers again to the verse quoted from Genesis: "it repented the Lord that he had made man." What does my friend intend to make out of this? I simply quotel the language, without note or comment. Hence, if he cavils, it must be with the words of scripture-not with my exposition of them. I do not wonder, however, that he has such aversion to these words, as they stand. They completely overthrow his theory of human progression, and his notion of the absoluteness of the divine will, by proving man did not answer the benevolent design of God in creation-but strayed from the path of duty and rectitude; hence, in view of his corruption and wickedness, he declared, "the end of all flesh has come before me."

My friend says, God never punishes men but to reform them. Did he destroy the generation before the flood, to reform them?

Did he overthrow the host of Pharaoh, to reform them? Did he burn the Sodomites with fire and brimstone, to reform them? Was the destruction of Korah and his company, a measure adopted for their reformation? There are a thousand similar instances on the pages of sacred and profane history. These are most remarkable methods for promoting reformation!! That reformation is often an end of punishment, is true-but that God never punishes, except to reform the punished, is irreconcilable with scripture and fact.

Mr. Austin is also wide of the mark, in what he says of my views of justice and mercy. What I hold is, that justice is not an original attribute of God, but a form of the divine holiness, assumed towards transgressors. Its province is to guard the administration of God from moral imperfection, and visit the incorrigible offender with deserved punishment. Mercy is a form of divine goodness, which aims at the relief of transgressors, by providing the way and means of their return to divine favor. Its province is to treat sinners better than they deserve, on principles reconcilable with the purity and stability of moral government. And in the harmonious action of justice and mercy, only, is to be found the great balance wheel which regulates the affairs of the moral universe. When these agree, the attributes of God cannot clash. There is harmony in the divine nature, and dignity, stability, and order, throughout the moral world. During this whole discussion, thus far, Mr. Austin has taken a one-sided and distorted view of the divine character. He has said but little of the attributes, but has insisted mostly, upon the influence of certain relations and affections, which may or may not exist, without disturbing the perfection and harmony of God.'

The next argument Mr. Austin presents, to prove all men will be saved, is drawn from the foreknowledge of God. He argues, what God foresees, must certainly come to pass; or that to foreknow a thing, is the same as to ordain it. It is true that God knows all things. But it is not true that all things do therefore occur of necessity. This would make him directly responsible for all sin, simply because he foreknows it. The argument is built upon two fallacies. The first consists in supposing divine foreknowledge determines the character of events. An event may be either contingent or necessary-but it is not rendered the one, or the other, by the fact that God knows it. Knowledge in itself is passive, and exerts no influence on the event known, by which its character is determined or modified. There is nothing in mere knowledge, that affects an event in any way, though the occurrence of an event does affect knowledge. I know the sun shines, but the sun does not shine because I know it; but rather, I know it, because it shines. And so an event flowing from human agency, does not occur because God knows it—but rather, God knows it, because it occurs. Such an event is not therefore any the more certain, or necessary, because God knows it will occur, than it would be, if we could sup

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