in righteousness, if we examine in the sequel of this dis

course.

I. The various powers of our minds, and the mode of their operation.

II. The religious and moral discipline, by which they should be regulated.

III. The obligations under which we are to cultivate and improve our intellectual character. And then,

IV. Make some application of the subject.

I. The powers of our minds are various, but for the sake of classification may all be reduced under those of the understanding and those of the will. To the first belong all those principles by which we are enabled to acquire useful knowledge; by the last those which prompt us to active pursuits. The faculties of both are strengthened and invigorated by experience and exercise. When we come into the world, we are ignorant of almost every thing which afterwards becomes the subject of our investigation, and know little of what is good or evil. By de grees, however, we begin to take cognizance of various objects, and to form judgments and opinions respecting them. For this purpose, the soul is furnished with five external senses, viz. seeing, hearing, taste, touch, and smell. These are the organs of perception, and the inlets of all the knowledge we obtain by means of our corporeal sensations. In process of time, our internal powers are capable of exerting themselves in thinking and combining ideas of different things according to their qualities, relations, and effects.

The first mental faculty which we exert in early life, is attention, or the capacity of directing our thoughts exclusively to some individual thing, for a longer or shorter time, according to pleasure. But attention to one object of thought is a difficult attainment, and can only be improved by a greater command of our mental operations, as we advance in life. This difficulty is increased by the constant recurrence of a train of ideas which present themselves to the youthful mind.-The faculty by which these are united has been called by philosophers the ima

gination and it is lively in youth to a high degree, from its tendency to be roused by every external object. It is regulated by a certain law, denominated the association of ideas, or the capacity which our thoughts have to succeed each other, according to those casual or contiguous relations observable among the subjects of our cogitation. As our knowledge is thus increased by observation and reflection; hence we are endowed with another faculty, by which we retain the recollection of what has occurred during the course of our lives, This is the memory, or mental repository, wherein is treasured up the ideas we acquire, and whereby we are supplied with materials for judging and acting according to the deductions of experience. These faculties are capable of exertion at a very early period, and gradually improve by discipline and exercise. When we arrive at years of understanding, we begin to consider the objects and persons by which we are surrounded with a more discerning view, to judge of their nature, value and utility; to determine that one thing is desirable, another detestable; that one action is right, another wrong; that one man is virtuous, another vicious. Such a conclusion is the result of those original dictates of the human mind which judgment suggests from evidence adduced; and when unperverted by prejudice or education, enables us to form such an opinion as serves to direct our future conduct.-Accordingly, the next faculty which we exert is that of reasoning. By this we reflect on the various subjects of enquiry which the world and its inhabitants furnish to our discursive mind. By it we infer that the pleasures and riches and honours of life are not so valuable as they appear, because those who enjoy them are not happier than those who want them; that as men are esteemed for virtue and abhorred for vice, therefore we should pursue the former and avoid the latter; nay, by it we carry our researches beyond the present scene, and represent to our view an invisible God, and an unseen world; and conclude that as God is our Creator, Preserver and Benefactor, he deserves our homage, gratitude and obedience; as Christ is our Saviour, he is entitled to our love, our confidence and trust; as

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heaven is our place of final destination, it should be the object of our anticipation in this house of our pilgrimage. In such a manner do we exercise our reasoning power when we apply it to the purpose for which it was intended.-Next in order among our intellectual capacities may be placed that mental taste which distinguishes one man from another. Thus we find that some have a disposi tion for mean and sordid pleasures, others for noble and dignified pursuits; some are pleased with trifling and idle amusements, others with the occupations of business or science; some are gratified by luxuries which pamper the body, others with discoveries which enlighten the mind; some have no other wish than to see themselves and their families enjoying affluence of fortune; others are desirous to grow in grace and increase in holiness. In short, the tastes of men are as different as their complexions; and it requires no small pains to give them that direction which is suitable to a rational and accountable being. It is evident, that the pursuits of many are degrading and pernicious, and that they tend to deprave the character by habitual indulgence. It is no less discernible, that the employments of the wise and the virtuous are honourable and becoming, that they improve their nature, and impart a relish for every thing that is honest, lovely, and of good report. Therefore it is of the highest importance, that the principle which leads us to adopt such opposite modes of conduct, should be regulated with the most assiduous

care.

That we may be warned against the seductions of vice however alluring, and induced to follow after righteousness however arduous, we are furnished with another faculty, which approves or disapproves of our conduct, according as it is good or evil. This is well known under the name of conscience, which is the supreme director of all our inferior principles, to whose dictates they are designed to be subservient. Our appetites and passions may urge us on to certain actions, and our mental taste may superinduce compliance with certain habits; but these ought not to be indulged without the concurrence of this inward monitor, which teaches us our duty with peremp

tory authority, and reproaches us bitterly when we transgress it. If, then, in all our actions we listen to the admonitions of this unerring guide, and, whenever prompted by the violence of temptation, we abstain till we have consulted the decisions of conscience, we obey the law of our nature by which we are constituted rational beings. Thus we act right by appealing from passion to conscience, by keeping the inferior principles subject to the superior, the sensitive to the moral; and we act wrong when we suffer appetite to prevail against conscience, our animal nature to direct us instead of our intellectual. All our propensities have a tendency to gratification; but it is the province of conscience to determine in what cases they may be indulged according to right reason, and to declare to us by its commanding voice, hitherto shalt thou come, but no farther. They may have strength, but it alone has authority; they may impel us, but it has a right to resist; they may break through its imposing restraints, but thereby we are guilty of transgressing the law of our nature, and our own heart condemns such unworthy conduct. But if our conscience declares, that in certain cases we may act according to a prevailing inclination and be blameless, then all our principles harmonize in maintaining their proper place in our mental constitution, and we approve ourselves to our own hearts, and to God, who is greater than our hearts and knoweth all things. Thus, it appears that by the supremacy of conscience over our other active principles, men are a law to themselves, as they shew the work of the law written on their hearts.Such, then, are some of the most important faculties included under the intellectual part of our nature, commonly called the understanding.

But there are others equally worthy of our investigation, comprehended under that other division of our mental constitution, denominated the will. The will itself is that determining power, by which we resolve to do, or abstain from certain actions, according as they appear to us desirable or not. It is influenced in its operations by considerations of pleasure, profit, or advantage; or by the opposite ones of pain, injury, or harm. It is often indeed

perverted by false appearances of good, and chooses what is hurtful to our true interest. It is also modified by certain principles, which have attained a predominating in, fluence, from a natural predisposition to indulge them, in preference to every other. Thus, the man who is fond of ease, cannot be induced, by any reasons however powerful, to rouse himself to action. The man who deems the chief good to consist in pleasure, is easily persuaded to pursue any object which will afford him gratification. The man who studies profit as the one thing needful, will readily engage in any course of action which may secure his purpose. Thus, the will is generally influenced by that particular disposition which prevails with the greatest force over our moral determinations.

But there are universal principles of human nature, which are found in every individual. These have been distinguished into mechanical, animal, and rational. Under the first of these may be comprehended those natural or acquired propensities, which incline us to act without deliberation or thought. Thus, we do many things by an instinctive impulse, from finding them necessary to our existence or comfort; we take sustenance and exercise to secure our health, we converse with our friends to enliven our spirits, we engage in amusements to recreate our minds. This is a mechanical principle which operates in all men, and is in itself neither virtuous nor vicious, unless when carried to excess.-Another principle of the same kind is habit, which produces a tendency to the same ac tion, and a facility in doing it from its frequent repetition. There are good and bad habits which we have acquired by degrees, and which it is not easy to alter when firmly established. Thus, we may by long usage have super induced habits of devotion and benevolence, meekness and contentment, or habits of impiety and unkindness, anger and peevishness, which actuate our conduct on ordinary occasions in spite of all inducements to the contrary. deed, the character is formed by the prevalence of those inclinations to certain modes of conduct which we have adopted from custom, and therefore it is of the most essential importance to take care that our habitual course of

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