more clearly we should ascertain the uses of the whole, and its just and beautiful accordance with the general system into which it had been interweaved.

In like manner, we will fearlessly aver, that no man, or number of men, on earth could have învented the great scheme of revelation. If we say nothing of its truth, yet its extreme originality, (for it has itself without a model-been the perverted platform of all corrupt religions,) and the unexampled multitude and grandeur of its details, must have rendered this impossible. But now, when we are told that it is no fiction,that it is, indeed, the invention of an infinite Intelligence,—and intended, not for idle speculation, but for practical purposes, it is the duty of men to examine whether it coalesces with the existing machinery of nature. If it be nothing but a dream or falsehood, the monstrosity at once of its character and pretensions will glare upon the observant mind at every experiment. If, however, it really answers to nature, the harmony of both with each other, through all their multifarious counterparts, will break forth like the sun from a cloud at noon-day. And this is precisely the principle of argumentation, which it is the chief design of this essay to point out and recommend, rather than to prosecute by a nice and lengthened application.

This principle of proof is as legitimate as that of poetical invention, by which we form ideas of a more perfect and beautiful world than the present, with no tempestuous seas, burning sands, and horrid caverns; and by which we sometimes draw a character beyond the measurement of real life, yet obviously true

to nature.

The objection, therefore, seems to have no force. The suppositions of our argument are warranted by the clearest intimations. For example: Is the Scripture-doctrine of repentance the subject to be tested? It is evident, apart from all religious considerations, that men are often faulty, that they ought to be sorry for it, and, in many cases, candidly to acknowledge it. This is the uniform sense of mankind, and demanded, if even he were a deist, by the pistol of the duellist. This leads us to the notion of a perfect repentance, while the fact is evident, that contrition is often seen to be ineffectual, or altogether wanting. But in Scripture a peculiar species of this virtue is enjoined. Here it is professed to be sanctioned by the most. powerful motives, to be assisted by supernatural inspirations,

and thus to be formed to a character the most complete and sanative. And all that is transcendent in the case is as manifestly suited to the nature and condition of the sinner, and as just in itself, as is the ordinary penitence which the deist expects from any one who commits a crime.

It is hoped the reader now perceives, that this mode of argumentation need not be confined to a fanciful supposition, and the starting of the mind to a hasty conclusion.

II. METHOD OF THIS REASONING AS APPLIED TO THE

PRESENT QUESTION.

THE transcendent excellence of revelation would be readily allowed, and, by consequence, its truth admitted, were evidence adduced to show its vast usefulness;-that it amply provides the proper means of accomplishing the present improvement, and ultimate perfection and happiness, of mankind. And this provision, we conceive, it does hold forth, with an evidence which ought more fully to determine our acceptance of the gift, than the allowed probabilities of health, connected with the unquestioned prescription of an accredited physician, are expected to determine us to act upon its dictates.

The adaptation of the scheme of Scripture to effect these great designs could not be perfectly ascertained without a perfect knowledge, not only of the scheme itself, but of the system of nature for which it is intended. This knowledge

is, however, unattainable in the present life. One rapturous employment of eternity, perhaps, will consist in the everdeepening contemplation of this astonishing subject. Yet enough may now be known to prove, that revelation bears as striking characters of noble and beneficent design, as are every where displayed in the frame of the visible world.

We would affectionately entreat the sceptical reader to familiarize himself with the Scriptures throughout, for the purpose of acquiring the necessary grounds of this argument; else how should he be capable of knowing the actual characters of the scheme, and of judging whether it be suited to its design? In this careful and comprehensive survey, he will also, probably, be saved from yielding to the common fallacy of judging from a part,—seemingly incongruous,—against a whole; and against reserved proofs, which prejudice, of course, would refuse to examine.

The very incongruity, so called, may be found to be an instance of admirable propriety. A rash critic, in the near examination of some statue which ornaments a cathedral, blames it as unshapely and extragavant; but a view from the proper distance would, perhaps, have smoothed it into beauty, and shown its perfect accordance with the body of the building; —a proof, in fact, of the excellent taste and judgment of the architect.

Thus, in the Mosaic institutes, it is commanded not to seethe a kid in its mother's milk. "Ridiculous!" exclaims the infidel. “What a pitiful instance of Divine legislation!" And all that is more obviously excellent in that economy, is sunk in the ignorant triumph over this one precept. "Ignorant," we say, because he ought to know, that the practice referred to was a magical rite of Pagan origin, and tended to idolatry. The precept, therefore, was highly moral and religious.

With a proper knowledge, then, of the details of the question, let him proceed to examine their more latent characters and connexions. But here a difficulty rises to obstruct our path. It will be said, that the whole is mere matter of opinion;-that while one sees a fitness in any given portion of the Bible, to promote a certain end, another, of equal penetration, discerns just the contrary.

The same evidence, no doubt, will not equally affect the several minds who may examine it, nor equally, at all times, the same individual. And some persons are much more convinced, by certain kinds of evidence, than by other kinds, which are frequently admitted as still stronger. Nay, perhaps, some persons are so strangely constituted, as to pronounce a strict demonstration as only matter of opinion.. Is there then no test of truth? no means of producing a rational and steadfast conviction in the minds of men in general?

It is true, that in the analysis of a watch, for example, we need no rules to guide us to the conclusion. We instantaneously perceive the fitness of the wheels, and of all the other portions, for the purposes of the machine. In moral subjects it is somewhat different. The relations are not always so clearly discernible. Nor, when most obvious, are they in all cases perceived to be complete. We say "perceived," because, though a full conviction may be felt of this completeness, still the whole extent of the case is not open to inspection. The

relations are, so to speak, not seen to touch in all points. But perfect exactness in the reasoning is not necessary. It is sufficient that the great masses of the subject stand out to view in general proportions. The definitions in geometry are not absolutely true. Nor in working, can a perfectly straight line be obtained. Yet this does not invalidate the accuracy of the operation. In like manner we must plead, that the want of extreme closeness in the present argument be not considered as, by any means, fatal to its issue.

There are, however, some general rules to be observed in attempting a partial analysis of the great plan of redemption, by which we may with good satisfaction determine the grand and leading relations of the case. On these rules we will

venture a few observations

The particulars which compose the universality of things; the parts and principles of the physical world; powers of mind; ideas, and emotions; verbal propositions, whether true or false, including those of a God, revelation, and Divine influence in man; and every other existence, real and imaginary, may be subjected, in thought, to endless combinations, presenting to the mind an infinite variety of contrasts, adaptations, and harmonies; discrepancies, discordancies, absurdities, and conflicts.

Is man, thus placed, incapable of finding his way through the labyrinth? Is he born under the absolute necessity of erring fatally, and for ever? Is there no redeeming principle to be found in any class of this immense multitude of things? Or, if such a principle exist, may it not be expected to unfold itself to the diligent examination of every candid inquirer?

But where, in the above enumeration, shall we find it? Not in nature, not in reason. These are themselves perverted, and stand in need of renovation from some other and superior power. They have filled the earth with impiety, and invented a vast multitude of religions, the most absurd, and wicked, and conflicting. Yet each pretends to truth, and a supernatural origin. Now we may fairly conclude, that all these, if untrue, will be clearly unsupported by any proper testimony to their truth and authority; and totally unsuited to harmonize with the universal system; and irrelevant to answer the capital designs of a genuine scheme of religion. There is abundant proof of this in the history of such systems.

None is asked

by the deist. His own opinions are as opposite to the religions of mankind in general, as they are to the Christian religion in particular. They must, therefore, be classed amongst those wild and hurtful fancies of the mind for which no prototype is found in truth, and the just demands of nature.

But the principle in question is avowedly contained in a Book, which calls itself "divine." In the light of either truth or fiction, this is the most extraordinary volume the world ever saw: The immense extent, and variety, and singular character of its conceptions must, if false, furnish the most ample means of detection; especially as it boldly demands the most severe test of its pretensions,-that of both actual and hypothetical experiment, most rigidly examined. Thus, it may be tried upon a scale, in myriads of its instances; and it risks its reputation on the joint result of the whole. The details of this Book, then, may be judged by their relation to each other, and to whatever exists besides, both in fact and in fancy.

All relations are either proper or improper. Things may be said to be related simply as existences and numbers; and in this respect, an unit stands in the relation of one to all the myriads of units which compose the universe. This, for the sake of distinction, may be termed, "an improper relation." But one does not stand in the relation of two to all the rest. This is an impossible relation, and exists merely as an untruth in the train of our ideas. There are also relations of utility,―things jointly contributing to certain requisite and useful purposes,-agreeably to an express arrangement of some regulating mind. If a burning coal be thrown into the sea to quench it, the combination is a proper one, for it answers its intention. But should we flood a fire with water to increase the flame, the relation or connexion between these substances would neither be one of truth, nor of usefulness. It would be what we have called "improper;" the materials standing, indeed, in a true relation to each other, simply as numbers; but just as one part of an absurdity is related to the other. A proper relation, then, is a relation of truth, or of utility. Whether those resulting from the contents of the Bible be of this description, or merely improper, is the point now at issue.

Here the question forcibly recurs, "By what means shall I determine the character of such relations as come under my