notice; and on which, if I act with candour and caution, I may be supposed quite competent to decide?" Of these means we may specify experience; intuition, or common sense, which Dr. Beattie has shown is frequently the ultimate test of truth; and rational or moral calculation.

The analysis of subjects requires, as already stated, that the whole, and the parts, be viewed, as far as practicable, in all their aspects and bearings, their causes and consequences, and in every other light of explanation which can possibly be thrown upon them. By what other means, in this extreme diversity, than by those just mentioned, can we judge of their contrivance and consistency? "Experience," Locke observes, "is by far the best demonstration." It is, in fact, the great principle of the inductive philosophy, which has been so successfully applied, not only to matter, but also to mind. The same great author prefers intuition to the clearest demonstration, because its evidence is brighter and more concentrated; demonstration itself depending on it, yet requiring a succession of steps, which slightly tends, as he conceives, to dim the argument. As to calculation, that must be regulated by such principles and qualifying considerations, as must themselves, in regard to their propriety, be subject to the judgment of the mind, when properly examined.

The whole of these three several tests may sometimes be applied successively to the same relation. It is said, for instance, "Behold, how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity!" This truth is clearly seen and allowed, the moment it is mentioned. It is also matter of unquestionable experience. And we may add, it is a subject for moral calculation, as a final cause of the social affections, as consonant to the improved state of civilized society, and as the exact contrary of what is horrible in the extreme.

This converse of the proposition may itself be determined by a similar calculation. For should it be asserted, "Behold, how good and how pleasant it is for brethren' to cut each other's throats, from cruelty and revenge!" it would be evident at once, that this is contrary, not only to experience and our natural notions of propriety, but also to public laws, and the well-being, and even existence, of mankind.

If, then, among the multiplied relations involved in the scheme of Scripture, we find a certain number, fairly deter

minable as true or good; that is, just and proper combinations, or useful adaptations; it will then obviously follow, that the Book is not a fiction: For these may, from their own intrinsic character and bearing, prove the truth of all the others that remain to be known and ascertained. What, for instance, would prove the sincerity and competency of the writers,supposing this proof possible,—would of course demonstrate the truth of their general testimony. A certain number of relations would likewise, merely from their numerical weight, as implying super-human design and contrivance, prove the truth of the Book; and then all the rest, though unexamined, must be true. Nor is this reasoning in a circle. For though we thus prove the Book by the relations, and then the relations by the Book, still they are not the same relations in both parts of the process, but a totally different class in each.

In subjecting the Scriptures to this species of trial, neither experience, nor intuition, nor calculation, must be used incautiously. Other views must regulate and modify this use. A few of these will here deserve at least some transient notice.

It is evident, that, in pursuing this inquiry, such things only ought to be considered in relation to each other, as from their several natures may seem to warrant the association. To ascertain the fitness of a doctrine or precept, it would be folly to contrast it with a river or a mountain. Here, indeed, there would not be, what might properly be deemed, either a discrepance or a contradiction; and should the deist choose to attempt the interminable round of similar combinations, in order to demonstrate some absurdity in the sentiments of the Bible, we firmly believe he would altogether fail to accomplish his purpose. But in the instances just mentioned, there appears nothing feasible, no probable grounds of any proper relationship.

The doctrine, for example, must be examined with reference to the perfections of God; and our relation to him as his creatures, and the objects of his care; and with a view to learn, whether it accords with all the other doctrines, and with the fundamental facts, included in the scheme? We must look into its component parts and principles, to know if they consist with each other. We must inquire, What are the truths, or absurdities, resulting from it? and, should conflicts appear, whether we can reconcile them; or whether they be of sufficient

weight to deprive the other instances of agreement of their whole force? We must ask, What is the probable tendency, and what may be the results, of this doctrine, when practically realized? These, and similar questions, are rational, and may lead to important discoveries. Other subjects demand the same consistency of investigation.

The deist, therefore, ought to observe, that, in order to the proof which we wish to establish, it is not necessary to find a meditated harmony, or an instance of utility, in every imaginable combination of the details. The only thing indispensably required, in all the changes which might be produced, by way of experiment, is, that there be no real and undeniable discordance among them. The parts may have, perhaps, a mere numerical alliance with each other; but they must include, in a full view of all, as they modify and expound each other, no false or impossible relation, like that of one standing in the relation of two to any other number.

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I say, a full view of all;" for of this subject we must judge from extended considerations, including the principal parts and general characters of the whole; otherwise the mind may refuse to admit the miracles, and prophecies, and some of the more mysterious doctrines, of the Bible. And this is another regulating view, as referred to above. Should we single out some case from these, and compare its parts with each other, we might deem it to be false, as quite beyond our comprehension, and the common experience of mankind. But let us view this whole case as itself a part of another more essential and comprehensive relation,-like the architectural ornaments already mentioned, and the agreement will be obvious. Let prophecy, for instance, be considered in connexion with the attributes of God, with the nature and design of a supernatural revelation, and all will seem proportionate and proper. Still, the apparent impossibility of the limited and insulated case is only analogous to certain difficulties which we meet with in the natural world. What conflicting theories have been offered to explain the Aurora Borealis, or Northern Lights! Nay, it seems quite opposed to reason, that a magnet should impart its virtue to ten thousand bars of iron, without at all diminishing its magnetic power. Yet these are cases which we are sure exist, and are perfectly accordant with the system of nature.

We must also judge of moral relations, according to the

character and office of the moral agent. If there were no differences in this respect, the entire class of obligations which belong to a prince would equally fall on the peasant. What morally belongs to man does not always belong to God. It is our duty, for instance, as far as possible, to prevent and destroy moral evil. But He who has all power permits its existence ; and we are sure that this is perfectly consistent with his holiness. It would be wrong for us, however, to plead this as our example for allowing what is criminal.

On the contrary, what morally belongs to God does not always belong to us. He determined and predicted the destruction of the Roman power; and nothing, therefore,―admitting its continued corruption,-could prevent the accomplishment of that fatal purpose. In the course of its decline, its statesmen devised measures for its recovery, which only hastened its downfall. Now, suppose they had known that such was the decree of Heaven, would it then have been their duty to accelerate, in every possible way, the total ruin of their country? Certainly not. A proof that we must judge of moral relations by some rule, which determines who, and what, and where, is the moral agent.

But this rule leads us further to explain the difficult relations just adverted to; for may we not presume, that equal differences with those mentioned above exist between the infinite understanding of the Divine Mind, and the narrow and feeble conception of man? Though I cannot comprehend how it is, that, in the unity of the Godhead, there should be three distinct persons; must I therefore have the boldness to assert, that the thing is quite impossible? and that it is as impossible he should himself comprehend it, or reconcile it to the rule and order of his own eternal wisdom? It is not only above my reason, but perfectly at variance with it, that God should make something out of nothing; yet the fact of creation makes the consistency of the proposition absolutely certain.

Mr. Locke, with all his excessive dependence on reason as a judge of revelation, admits the greatest difficulties, nay, positive contradictions, as far as we can discern, contained in certain undeniable truths. "There is nothing," he observes, more perplexed, or nearer a contradiction, than the very notion of body includes in it; the divisibility, in infinitum, of any finite extension, involving us, whether we grant or deny it,

in consequences impossible to be explicated, or made in our apprehensions consistent; consequences that carry greater difficulty, and more apparent absurdity, than any thing can follow from the notion of an immaterial knowing substance." To our apprehensions, then, according to this passage, these consequences are inconsistent, or a positive contradiction.

This author is a great authority. But the perplexity itself he did not enter upon. The following, however, may be specified as one of the difficulties. If matter be divisible, in infinitum, then an inch of surface contains an infinite number of parts. Yet, in an instant, I can pass my finger over the whole of them. But the motion over each of these parts must require some point of time. Therefore, an infinity of such points, that is, an eternity, may be included in a moment! Must we, then, deny all motion?

The greatest philosophers might be confounded by this very instance. A true sceptic may, perhaps, be obtained, who would kindly offer to relieve their embarrassment, by affirming, that not a single truth is advanced, in the whole of this reasoning; which, of course, would involve the greatest absurdity of all.

These observations are designed to show, that, in the scheme of Scripture, difficulties connected with particular facts and sentiments, singly considered, do not invalidate the force of the relations which subsist among the great and leading portions of the whole. That extraordinary difficulties should occasionally appear in a work divinely inspired, and which treats of supernatural and eternal subjects, is only what might be reasonably expected; and forms, in fact, a presumption in favour of the Bible. But such extreme cases are by no means numerous; and the great and practical relations are happily more obvious than others which, in some respects, are merely notional. All men know the adaptation of bread to nourish life; few, the chemical principles and properties of its composition.

Much useful, though reflected, light, in regard to the fitness between nature and revelation, may also be obtained by a connected series of steady and discriminating comparisons of the one with the other.

On any subject, or branch of a subject, we may first inquire, What are the facts and suggestions of nature respecting it? Let us, then, refer to the same topic, as treated by the inspired