istences; the synthetic is more properly the method that ought to be pursued in the application of knowledge already acquired. It is for this reason it has been called the didactic method, as being the shortest way of communicating the principles of a science. But even in teaching, as often as we attempt, not barely to inform, but to convince, there is a necessity of recurring to the tract in which the knowledge we would convey was first attained. Now the method of reasoning by syllogism more resembles mathematical demonstration, wherein, from universal principles, called axioms, we deduce many truths, which, though general in their nature, may, when compared with those first principles, be justly styled particular. Whereas, in all kinds of knowledge wherein experience is our only guide, we can proceed to general truths solely by an induction of particulars.

Agreeably to this remark, if a syllogism be regular in mood and figure, and if the premises be true, the conclusion is infallible. The whole foundation of the syllogistic art lies in these two axioms: "Things which coincide with the same thing, coincide with one another;" and "Two things, whereof one does, and one does not coincide with the same thing, do not coincide with one another." On the former rest all the affirmative syllogisms, on the latter all the negative. Accordingly, there is no more mention here of probability and of degrees of evidence, than in the operations of geometry and algebra. It is true, indeed, that the term probable may be admitted into a syllogism, and make an essential part of the conclusion, and so it may also in an arithmetical computation; but this does not in the least affect what was advanced just now; for, in all such cases, the probability itself is assumed in one of the premises: whereas, in the inductive method of reasoning, it often happens that from certain facts we can deduce only probable consequences.

I observe, secondly, that though this manner of arguing has more of the nature of scientific reasoning than of moral, it has, nevertheless, not been thought worthy of being adopted by mathematicians as a proper method of demonstrating their theorems. I am satisfied that mathematical demonstration is capable of being moulded into the syllogistic form, having made the trial with success on some propositions. But that this form is a very incommodious one, and has many disadvantages, but not one advantage of that commonly practised, will be manifest to every one who makes the experiment. It is at once more indirect, more tedious, and more obscure. I may add, that if into those abstract sciences one were to introduce some specious fallacies, such fallacies could be much more easily sheltered under the awkward verbosity of this artificial method, than under the elegant simplicity of that which -has hitherto been used.

H

My third remark, which, by-the-way, is directly consequent on the two former, shall be, that in the ordinary application of this art to matters with which we can be made acquainted only by experience, it can be of little or no utility. So far from leading the mind, agreeably to the design of all argument and investigation, from things known to things unknown, and by things evident to things obscure, its usual progress is, on the contrary, from things less known to things better known, and by things obscure to things evident. But, that it may not be thought that I do injustice to the art by this representation, I must entreat that the following considerations may be attended to.

When, in the way of induction, the mind proceeds from individual instances to the discovery of such truths as regard a species, and from these, again, to such as comprehend a genus, we may say, with reason, that as we advance, there may be in every succeeding step, and commonly is, less certainty than in the preceding; but in no instance whatever can there be more. Besides, as the judgment formed concerning the less general was anterior to that formed concerning the more general, so the conviction is more vivid arising from both circumstances; that being less general, it is more distinctly conceived, and being earlier, it is more deeply imprinted. Now the customary procedure in the syllogistic science is, as was remarked, the natural method reversed, being from general to special, and, consequently, from less to more obvious. In scientific reasoning the case is very different, as the axioms or universal truths from which the mathematician argues are so far from being the slow result of induction and experience, that they are self-evident. They are no sooner apprehended than necessarily assented to.

But, to illustrate the matter by examples, take the following specimen in Barbara, the first mood of the first figure: "All animals feel;

All horses are animals;

Therefore all horses feel."

It is impossible that any reasonable man, who really doubts whether a horse has feeling or is a mere automaton, should be convinced by this argument; for, supposing he uses the names horse and animal as standing in the same relation of species and genus which they bear in the common acceptation of the words, the argument you employ is, in effect, but an affirmation of the point which he denies, couched in such terms as include a multitude of other similar affirmations, which, whether true or false, are nothing to the purpose. Thus, all animals feel, is only a compendious expression for all horses feel, all dogs feel, all camels feel, all eagles feel, and so through the whole animal creation. I affirm, besides, that the procedure here is from things less known to things bet

ter known. It is possible that one may believe the conclusion who denies the major; but the reverse is not possible; for, to express myself in the language of the art, that may be predicated of the species which is not predicable of the genus; but that can never be predicated of the genus which is not predicable of the species. If one, therefore, were under such an error in regard to the brutes, true logic, which is always coincident with good sense, would lead our reflections to the indications of perception and feeling given by these animals, and the remarkable conformity which in this respect, and in respect of their bodily organs, they bear to our own species.

It may be said, that if the subject of the question were a creature much more ignoble than the horse, there would be no scope for this objection to the argument. Substitute, then, the word oysters for horses in the minor, and it will stand thus: "All animals feel;

All oysters are animals ;
Therefore all oysters feel."

In order to give the greater advantage to the advocate for this scholastic art, let us suppose the antagonist does not maintain the opposite side from any favour to Des Cartes's theory concerning brutes, but from some notion entertained of that particular order of beings which is the subject of dispute. It is evident, that though he should admit the truth of the major, he would regard the minor as merely another manner of expressing the conclusion; for he would conceive an animal no otherwise than as a body endowed with sensation or feeling.

Sometimes, indeed, there is not in the premises any position more generic, under which the conclusion can be comprised. In this case, you always find that the same proposition is exhibited in different words, insomuch that the stress of the argument lies in a mere synonyma, or something equivalent. The following is an example :

"The Almighty ought to be worshipped; God is the Almighty;

Therefore God ought to be worshipped."

It would be superfluous to illustrate that this argument could have no greater influence on the Epicurean than the firstmentioned one would have on the Cartesian. To suppose the contrary is to suppose the conviction effected by the charm of a sound, and not by the sense of what is advanced. Thus, also, the middle term and the subject frequently correspond to each other; as the definition, description, or circumlocution, and the name. Of this I shall give an example in Disamis, as, in the technical dialect, the third mood of the third figure is denominated :

"Some men are rapacious;

All men are rational animals;

Therefore some rational animals are rapacious."

Who does not perceive that rational animals is but a periphrasis for men?

It may be proper to subjoin one example, at least, in negative syllogisms. The subsequent is one in Celarent, the second mood of the first figure :

"Nothing violent is lasting;

But tyranny is violent;

Therefore tyranny is not lasting."

Here a thing violent serves for the genus of which tyranny is a species; and nothing can be clearer than that it requires much less experience to discover whether shortness of duration be justly attributed to tyranny, the species, than whether it be justly predicated of every violent thing. The application of what was said on the first example to that now given is so obvious, that it would be losing time to attempt farther to illustrate it.

Logicians have been at pains to discriminate the regular and consequential combinations of the three terms, as they are called, from the irregular and inconsequent. A combination of the latter kind, if the defect be in the form, is called a paralogism; if in the sense, a sophism; though sometimes these two appellations are confounded. Of the latter, one kind is denominated petitio principii, which is commonly rendered in English a beginning of the question, and is defined, the proving of a thing by itself, whether expressed in the same or in different words; or, which amounts to the same thing, assuming in the proof the very opinion or principle proposed to be proved. It is surprising that this should ever have been by those artists styled a sophism, since it is, in fact, so essential to the art, that there is always some radical defect in a syllogism which is not chargeable with this. The truth of what I now affirm will appear to any one, on the slightest review of what has been evinced in the preceding part of the chapter.

The fourth and last observation I shall make on this topic is, that the proper province of the syllogistical science is rather the adjustment of our language, in expressing ourselves on subjects previously known, than the acquisition of knowledge in things themselves. According to M. du Marsais, "Reasoning consists in deducing, inferring, or drawing a judgment from other judgments already known; or, rather, in showing that the judgment in question has been already formed implicitly, insomuch that the only point is to develop it, and show its identity with some anterior judgment."*

* "Le raisonnement consiste à déduire, à inférer, à tirer un jugement d'autres jugemens déja connus; ou plutot à faire voir que le jugement dont il

Now I affirm that the former part of this definition suits all deductive reasoning, whether scientifical or moral, in which the principle deduced is distinct from, however closely related to, the principles from which the deduction is made. The latter part of the definition, which begins with the words or rather, does not answer as an explication of the former, as the author seems to have intended, but exactly hits the character of syllogistic reasoning, and, indeed, of all sorts of controversy merely verbal. If you regard only the thing signified, the argument conveys no instruction, nor does it forward us in the knowledge of things a single step. But if you regard principally the signs, it may serve to correct misapplication of them, through inadvertency or otherwise.

In evincing the truth of this doctrine, I shall begin with a simple illustration from what may happen to any one in studying a foreign tongue. I learn from an Italian and French dictionary that the Italian word pecora corresponds to the French word brebis, and from a French and English dictionary, that the French brebis corresponds to the English sheep. Hence I form this argument,

"Pecora is the same with brebis,

Brebis is the same with sheep;

Therefore pecora is the same with sheep."

This, though not in mood and figure, is evidently conclusive. Nay, more, if the words pecora, brebis, and sheep, under the notion of signs, be regarded as the terms, it has three distinct terms, and contains a direct and scientifical deduction from this axiom, "Things coincident with the same thing are coincident with one another." On the other hand, let the things signified be solely regarded, and there is but one term in the whole, namely, the species of quadruped, denoted by three names above mentioned. Nor is there, in this view of the matter, another judgment in all the three propositions but this identical one, "A sheep is a sheep."

Nor let it be imagined that the only right application can be in the acquisition of strange languages. Every tongue whatever gives scope for it, inasmuch as in every tongue the speaker labours under great inconveniences, especially on abstract questions, both from the paucity, obscurity, and ambiguity of the words on the one hand, and from his own misapprehensions and imperfect acquaintance with them on the other. As a man may, therefore, by an artful and sophistical use of them, be brought to admit, in certain terms, what he would deny in others, this disputatious discipline may, under proper management, by setting in a stronger light the inconsistencies occasioned by such improprieties, be renders'agit, a déja été porté d'une manière implicite; des sorte qu'il n'est plus question que de le déveloper, et d'en faire voire l'identité avec quelque juge ment antérieur."-Logique, Art. 7.