we must consider, whether they are such as may be conceived to have been the result of a supposed divine origin. We must put ourselves in the imaginary situation of persons who are not in possession of the effect produced; and argue what would be the effect, on the supposition that the alleged revelation were really from God, in the events belonging to it. And thus, our inquiry is satisfied on finding the concluded event coincident with the real and known effect. As, for instance, the rapid propagation of the gospel at its outset, is a known fact in its history;-but, before we can apply this fact to the proof of its divine origin, we speculate concerning the probable effect in a case where the hand of God is supposed to be immediately exerted; and the conclusion from such an assumption is, that the truth so supported would be rapidly propagated, in spite of all opposition from the world; -agreeably to the known fact.

There being, accordingly, a means of substantiating by facts the internal econo

my of revealed truth, it follows, that there is an intimate and proper philosophy of religion; and not merely an external philosophy, or application of the general laws of evidence to the particular evidence adduced in favour of any religion,—as is implied in those statements which rest the credibility of a religion solely and exclusively on the testimonies to its existence as an historical event.

At the same time, it will readily be acknowledged, there is a strong prima facie objection to the assertion of a philosophical theology. We appear, in holding such language, to be exceeding our proper limits, as the simple recipients of a gracious illumination from the Divine wisdom; and to be presumptuously reducing into system and order, where we ought rather to be devoutly ascribing, not only our measure of divine knowledge in general, but every particular matter revealed, both in its substance and method, to the good pleasure of God. We seem to be theorising, when we

ought to be obeying,—to be giving to knowledge the prerogatives of faith and love.The objection, it is trusted, will be found to apply rather to the name of philosophy, than to its right use in the study of religion. So far as the argument pursued in "The Analogy" is valid, there is a sound philosophy of religion; and it is only to that extent, and in that sense, that the assertion of it is here advanced.

Nor is it only in respect of its essential nature, that the Evidence here investigated has been underrated; but its importance has been limited to the purpose of invalidating objections against Christianity,—its positive subserviency, as an argument to the truth of the religion, being regarded as comparatively little. This disesteem of the Evidence is a result of that mistaken view of its nature already adverted to. For if it be considered merely as an argument à priori, it may still be triumphantly employed against an adversary, who brings objections against the religion drawn from

speculations of a similar kind; but no real evidence can be obtained from it of the internal truth of the religion to which it may be applied; since it then has no foundation in nature. It is then only an argumentum ad hominem.

This limitation, however, of the service of the Evidence, whether it proceed from a wrong estimate of its nature, or not, is certainly very common among even professed admirers of "The Analogy". Probably it has arisen, in some degree, from the method pursued by Bishop Butler himself, in directing the attention of the reader, throughout the work, to the force with which the Evidence repels speculative objections. To remove this misapprehension, as well as the former, a full investigation of the merits of the Evidence appeared to be demanded; that the various ways, in which it administers to the cause of the Christian Revelation, might distinctly be placed before the view.

An additional motive to this inquiry suggested itself in a conviction of the injustice

of that prejudice, with which the admirable work of Bishop Butler is regarded by some, as a work full of intricacy and obscurity. If there be no ground for accusing a writer of confusion of thought, the apparent obscurity of his writings may, in that case, be ascribed to a want, in the reader, of a previous due acquaintance with the subject of which they treat. Now, all ground of the former charge must be entirely removed when we apply our criticism to such a writer as Butler; and it may, therefore, be concluded, that a preliminary consideration of the nature and grounds of the argument pursued in the work is what is required, for some readers, to dissipate that appearance of obscurity with which it is overcast. The student, indeed, who has not conceived just notions of the nature of the Evidence, is not immediately aware, as he reads, that the right prosecution of the argument essentially precludes all theories concerning the subjects discussed, and, consequently, all modes of expression, as far as is

pos