parties concerned may safely be trusted, to avoid any violent or unpleasant collision. But did it never occur to Your Lordship to inquire, whether the very evil anticipated, as an insuperable objection to the new system, does not disfigure and annually occur under the old? What else were the Executive Councillors in Upper and Lower Canada doing for a series of years but "proposing certain measures," to be as certainly rejected by the popular branch? What else are they about now in Newfoundland? What but this were they doing in New Brunswick, down to the close of Sir Archibald Campbell's administration? In all these Provinces a state of constant collision between the Executive and the popular branch, which could by no possibility arise under the system I contemplate, would answer the objection, even if the difficulty suggested could be fairly taken into account. If it be said that the Councillors now do not refuse to propose measures, I answer, But if the Legislatures invariably reject them, does government gain anything, or is public business advanced by the system? What a figure did the Executive cut in Nova Scotia, in 1838, when the Councillor who brought down from the Governor a grave proposition, led the opposition against it? And how stand things in this Province now? Are not all the Councillors selections from a lean minority of the commons, in which "ody almost every debate terminates in a vote of implied want of confidence in them; and where the Governor they surround has, on several occasions, only been saved from an insulting vote of censure, by the good temper and moderation of the majority? This is a state of things too ridiculous to be long continued. To me it seems essential that Her Majesty, in every Colony, should be represented by an Executive not only willing "to attempt" but "able to carry" any measures that it may be necessary to propose.

The next objection taken by Your Lordship to the introduction of Provincial responsibility, one eminently calculated to have weight with the body you addressed, and to alarm the timid every where, was drawn from an application of the principle, to the management of foreign affairs. "If," says Your Lordship, "the Assembly of New Brunswick nad been disposed to carry the point in dispute with the North American States hostilely, and the Executive Council had been disposed to aid them, in my opinion the Governor must have said that his duty to the crown of this country, and the general instructions which he had received from the minister of the crown, did not permit him to take that course, and, therefore, he could not agree with the Executive Council to carry into effect the wish of the Assembly. That is allowed. Does not, then, its very exception destroy the analogy you wish to draw, when,

upon so important a point as that of foreign affairs, it cannot be sustained?" Your Lordship, in delivering this passage, of course was not aware that, without the alteration of a single syllable, you answered the very objection that yourself had raised. If the Executive Council of New Brunswick advised Sir John Harvey to declare war upon the State of Maine, "he must have said that his duty to the crown, and his instructions, did not permit him to take that course." Most certainly he would, if a measure so ridiculous had been attempted in New Brunswick, which no body who knows anything of that Province, could for a moment imagine. I do not believe that there are ten men in it, certainly there are not fifty in all the lower Provinces put together, who do not know that the sovereign alone has the right to declare war upon foreign powers; and who are not willing that, upon all the relations of the Colonies with these, and with each other, the Imperial government shall decide. A few of the New Brunswickers blamed Sir John Havey for not acting upon Her Majesty's instructions, to maintain exclusive jurisdiction over the disputed territory, notwithstanding the advice received from the Minister at Washington; but, if those instructions had not existed, and had not been positive, no one would have been idiot enough to suppose that Sir John Harvey would have been bound to make war, on a point of honor or policy newly discovered by his Executive Council, and upon which Her Majesty's government had had no opportunity to decide. Suppose, when Parliament was granting a charter to Hull, it was objected that the Mayor might be advised to make war upon Sweden, (and, in the case of an elective officer, the danger would be greater than if he were appointed by the crown,) would not the same House of Commons that thought it unsafe to let a Colony manage its internal affairs for fear it would engage in foreign wars, laugh at the possibility of such an absurdity being committed by any body of Englishmen out of Bedlam? Why then should it be taken for granted that we are not English in our habits and opinions, our education and training, our capacity to discern the boundaries of authority; and that therefore it would be unsafe to depend upon our wisely exercising powers, which, in the British Islands, millions exercise for their own security and without danger to the State? In the case of Hull, if the objection were gravely urged, the ready answer would be, "No greater powers can be exercised than are granted in the bill; and if there is the least danger of the city authorities doing any thing so ridiculous, put in a clause that shall restrain them." And I say-after soberly protesting that the very suspicion of such an attempt is an insult to the understanding, and an imputation upon the character of our population, which they

do not deserve - that if you wish "to make assurance doubly sure," put a clause into the bill which concedes the principle of responsibility so far as relates to domestic affairs, and by which all such belligerent Councillors shall be expressly restrained.

Whether this point were or were not thus defined, that any Executive Council, merely because they were responsible to the people, would, after receiving such an answer as Your Lordship admits a British Governor must give, proceed in defiance of his authority, to levy war upon a friendly State, I cannot for a momont believe. If they did, they certainly would so completely fail, and render themselves so supremely ridiculous, that the attempt would not be likely to be repeated, at least for a century to come. Let us suppose the case to have occurred in New Brunswick: that the Executive Council, being responsible, had advised Sir John Harvey to proceed hostilely; and that, on his declining, they had levied war. In the first place, as all the regular troops were at Sir John's disposal, as Commander-in-Chief within the Province, and not merely as civil Governor, they not only could not have moved a soldier, but would have had the whole military force of that and the adjoining Provinces against them. As the Governor's order to the Colonels and officers commanding the Militia is indispensible, before a single step can be taken, under the laws by which that force is embodied, of course no hostile order would have been given, nor could those laws have been modified or changed without Sir John's assent. And if it be urged, that volunteers would have flocked to the aid of the Executive Council, may I not enquire where they would have obtained arms and ammunition, when all the military munitions and stores were deposited in military warehouses, under the care of commissaries and officers o. ordnance responsible only to the crown? Oh! no, my Lord, whatever effect such imaginary cases as these may have upon men at a distance, unacquainted with the state of society in British America and the general intelligence which prevails; here they are laughed at, as the creations of a fertile imagination taxed to combat political, improvements that were feared without being understood. If, even under the federative government of the United States, in which each State is much more independent of the central authority than any Colony would be under the system I contemplate, this right of private war has only been once asserted, by a single State, in more than half a century, and then was scouted all over the Continent, is it to be supposed that British subjects will pay less respect to the authority of their Queen, than do Republican Americans to that of their President?

There is one bare possibility, which Your Lordship has not suggested,

in opposition to the new system, and yet it is scarcely more ridiculous than some that have been urged; that the Colonial Councillors might claim the control of the squadron upon the North American coast, as well as of the land forces, in their anxiety to engage in foreign wars. The danger in this case would be nearly as great as in the other; for, in modern warfare, a fleet is nearly as necessary as an army; and yet, it is certain that the Admiral upon the station would know how to treat such a claim, should it be preferred by a Council, who, in the wanton exercise of authority, were disposed to transgress all bounds?

The next objection which I am bound to notice, is thus given in the report: :-"Let us suppose that an officer of the militia in Upper Canada, after an action, was to order that the persons taken in that action should be put to death on the field. I can conceive it possible, in a state of exasperation and conflict with the people of the neighboring States, that the Assembly might applaud that conduct, and might require that it should be the rule, and not the exception, that all invaders of their territory should be treated in that manner, and that the parties should be put to death without trial. Supposing that to be the case; could the government of this country adopt such a rule? Could the Secretary of State for the Colonies sanction such a rule, and not decide, as my honorable friend, the under secretary has done, that the practice would meet with his decided reprehension?"

Now, my Lord, admitting that such a case might occur once in half a century, under the new system, let me remind Your Lordship that it has already occurred under the old. If it is to have any weight, the fact of its occurrence in a Province in which the Executive Council is irresponsible and the Colonial Secretary is in the exercise of his full powers, makes in favor of my argument; while I have a right to deny, until proof is furnished, that it could occur, if matters were more wisely ordered, and a more rational system established, by which all temptations to foreigners to make inroads into British Provinces, speculating upon the disaffection of the people, would be removed. But, my Lord, life has been taken under your system "death" has been inflicted "without trial," illegally, as you infer-and has any punishment followed? Have the laws been vindicated? No! Then why not? Simply, I presume, because your beautiful mode of government has produced such a state of things in a British Province, that the ministers of the Queen dare not bring the man charged with this high offence to trial. Under a system of responsibility, by which the population were left to manage their domestic affairs, I hold that no such violation of law would be likely to occur; and, that if it did, investigation would be as safe, and

punishment as certain, as though a crime had been committed in Middlesex, or Surrey.

I have thus disposed, my Lord, of the military questions; and, as I have left Her Majesty and her representatives in full command of the army and navy, and of the militia force of British America, and have asserted no claim of the Colonists to interfere with foreign treaties and diplomatic arrangements affecting the empire at large; I think, if peace be not maintained with foreign states, the punishment for offences strictly military be not awarded, the blame will not rest with the Executive Councillors, who are to exercise no jurisdiction over these matters, and cannot be responsible if others fail in their duty.

Let me now turn to another class of objections, arising out of our Colonial and foreign trade. "Again," says Your Lordship, "neither could this analogy be maintained with regard to trade between Canada and the mother country, or Canada and any other country. How then can you adopt a principle from which such large exceptions are to be made? If you were to do so, you would be continually on the borders of dispute and conflict; the Assembly and the Executive, on the one hand, requiring a certain course to be pursued, while the Governor, on the other hand, would be as constantly declaring that it was a course he could not adopt; so that, instead of furnishing matter of content and harmony in these Provinces, you would be affording new matter for dispute and discontent if you were to act upon this supposed analogy." Now, my Lord, I feel it my duty to state, that you may take from any part you please to select, of England, Ireland, or Scotland, two hundred thousand persons, and among them you will not find a larger number than are to be found in Nova Scotia, well informed as to the degree of authority in matters of trade, which, for the good of the whole empire and the preservation of the advantages in which all are to participate, it is necessary to confide to the care of the Sovereign and the wisdom of the Imperial Parliament. The great corporations of London, of Bristol, and of Liverpool, do not presume to interfere with these, except by petition and remonstrance, neither do we. Each of these cities has the right to levy small duties within their own limits, for matters of internal regulation, or to aid public improvements; and these rights they exercise, in common with us, when they do not contravene any British statute, necessary for the protection of the trade of the empire. But, if it can be shown that a law bears unequally upon London or Halifax, and that a flagrant case of hardship exists; or if the industry of any portion of the people, either in England or the Colonies, is taxed, while no corresponding advantage is reaped by any other portion; or that, if reaped, it is an