CHAPTER XVII.

POLITICAL QUESTIONS.NO. IV. BRITISH AND AMERICAN VIEWS.-THE BEST SOLUTION.

Mr. Frelinghuysen follows Mr. Blaine's arguments.-Lord Granville s exposition of the British views. -Weakness of the American position in the correspondence and strength of its case on general grounds.—A second canal under American exclusive control the best solution for a difficult position.

ON May 8, 1882, Mr. Frelinghuysen replied to Lord Granville's despatches to Mr. Blaine, dated January 7 and 14, already sketched in Chapter XVI. He repeats the previous American declarations that for the United States it is " unnecessary and unwise, through an invitation to the nations of the earth, to guarantee the neutrality of the transit of the isthmus, or to give their navies a pretext for assembling in waters contiguous to our shores, or to possibly involve this Republic in conflicts from which its natural position entitles it to be relieved." Treaties are harmless or useless in time of peace; but when wars come it is impossible to enforce them. Such agreements, moreover, would lead to political intervention in American affairs, "which," says Mr. Frelinghuysen, "the traditional policy of the United States makes it impossible that the President should either consent to or look upon with indifference. . . . The formation of a protectorate by European nations over the isthmus transit would be in conflict with a doctrine which has been for many years asserted by the United States . . . . which

opposes any intervention by European nations in the political affairs of American republics."

Entering upon the discussion of the questions concerning the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the Secretary writes at a very great length to show that the convention was made for a particular object which has since ceased to exist; that Great Britain to this day, and, contrary to its provisions, maintains a colony in Honduras, so that the treaty is voidable at the pleasure of the United States, as it has been broken by Great Britain; and, finally, that Art. VIII. refers merely to the lines of railway or canal which were proposed at the time of the treat should like to be able to dispose of space enough to transcribe at least ample extracts from this exceedingly able and cogent State Paper, which reminds one of the better days of American diplomacy. We must, however, content ourselves with only a few sentences which we quote in order to show the line of argument of Mr. Frelinghuysen.

We

He contends that the Clayton Bulwer treaty had for its primary object not only to aid the immediate construction of the proposed Nicaragua Canal, but also to dispossess Great Britain of settlements in Central America, whether under cover of Indian sovereignty or otherwise.

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And yet, he says, "Great Britain exercises dominion over Belize or British Honduras, the area of which is equal to that of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island." Such dominion seems to be inconsistent with the treaty of 1850. At that time the English privileges on Belize, conferred by treaties with Spain, were confined to a right to cut wood and establish saw-mills," in a defined territory. Even if the so-called "declarations' of Sir Henry L. Bulwer, acknowledged by Mr. Clayton, regarding British "settlements" in Honduras were valid, the British Government has unlawfully ex

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tended a settlement to cut wood into a regular colony. But, says Mr. Frelinghuysen, the Bulwer declaration after the conclusion of the treaty was not made nor accepted by the President and the Senate. That declaration is not considered as part of the treaty. According to Mr. Frelinghuysen, the solemn declaration of President Buchanan in 1860 referred to the dispossession of Great Britain from one of the ends of the canal route through Nicaragua, which was accomplished by means of the treaties of 1859 and 1860. Those treaties had nothing to do with the colonization of British Honduras.

The Clayton-Bulwer treaty was entered into in view particularly of the construction of the Nicaragua Canal, for which American citizens held a concession, upon which it was meant to act when they were confronted with the British occupation of one of its ends. Mr. Frelinghuysen calls attention to the significant fact that one of the most important alterations made in the draft that Sir Henry Bulwer sent to Lord Palmerston was the addition to Art. VII. referring particularly to "any persons or company" which should at the time have made a contract for the construction of the canal with the State through which it might pass. The provisions of the first article of the treaty, regarding fortifications, control, &c., and of the second and the third up to the sixth article, refer only to that particular canal.

And here Mr. Frelinghuysen calls attention to Art. VII. of the treaty wherein it is said to be understood that "if at the expiration of the aforesaid period" (a year after ratification)" such persons or company be not able to commence and carry out the proposed enterprise, then the Governments of the United States and Great Britain shall be free to afford their protection to any other persons that shall be prepared to commence and proceed

with the construction of the canal in question." Mr. Frelinghuysen interprets this provision in this way: “If under .... the seventh article the claims of the holders of this particular concession should be set aside, then each Government reserved to itself the right to determine whether its interests required it to afford protection to the holders of any other concession."

The Nicaragua concession was acted upon: surveys were made by Childs, and were then submitted to a commission of Royal Engineers, and only afterwards through the lack of money the concession expired. The treaty, therefore, has, it may be argued, become obsolete.

Before the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was negotiated the United States had already the treaty of 1846-48 with Colombia. That treaty, says the late Secretary, "created a relation that cannot be superseded. . . . . A protectorate of this kind is necessarily exclusive in its character." Great Britain cannot join that protectorate, created years before the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, without the consent both of Colombia and of the United States. And should Great Britain claim the right to join in the protection of the existing railway company, or in any future Panama Canal, "the United States would submit that experience has shown that no such joint protectorate is requisite," and "that the ClaytonBulwer treaty is subject to the provisions of the treaty of 1846 with New Granada, while it exists, which treaty obliges the United States to afford, and secures to them the sole protectorate of any transit by the Panama route."

In short, "the United States esteem themselves competent to refuse to afford their protection jointly with Great Britain," and, of course, as to inviting other nations to guarantee the canal. Mr. Frelinghuysen ends by declaring solemnly that "the United States would look

with disfavour upon an attempt at a concert of political action by the other Powers in that direction.”

Lord Granville answered these arguments in a despatch, dated December 30, 1882. He denies that the treaty refers only to the particular route or routes then proposed, and points out once more the "general principle" of Art. VIII., wherein protection is promised to "any other practicable communications," and then specially" to those "which are now proposed to be established by the way of Tehuantepec, or Panama.”

As to the treaty of 1846-48 between the United States and Colombia, there is nothing in it that confers on the United States any exclusive right of protection, or which is inconsistent with the joint protection of Great Britain and the United States. The treaty means no more than the treaties of Great Britain, France, and the United States with Honduras and Nicaragua.

Lord Granville then refutes the arguments of Mr. Frelinghuysen on the violation of the treaty of 1850 on account of the British colony of Belize. British Honduras, he says, was acquired by conquest before 1850, and the United States have formally recognized the colony in 1869 as a dependency of Great

Britain.

That is so; but we hardly think that Lord Granville makes good his case. The recognition of that fact does not mean that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty has not been violated by Great Britain, which seems to be the undoubted fact. It is not unintentionally that Lord Granville does not dwell long on the subject.

In his dispatch to Mr. West of August 17, 1883, Lord Granville returns to that point, and this time he cannot see with what justice the United States claim that the arrangement as to Honduras is a violation of the treaty