III. PART another." Why not, I wonder. Nothing is more proper to a man than reason, yet a man is more rational than a child, and one man more rational than another; that is, in respect of the use and exercise of reason. As there are degrees of understanding, so there are of liberty. The good angels have clearer understandings than we, and they are not hindered with passions as we; and, by consequence, they have more use of liberty than we. His second reason is,-" He that can do what he will, hath all liberty, and he that cannot❞ do what he will, "hath no" liberty. If this be true, then there are no degrees of liberty indeed. But this which he calls liberty, is rather an omnipotence than a liberty;-to do whatsoever he will. A man is free to shoot or not to shoot, although he cannot hit the white whensoever he would. We do good freely, but with more difficulty and reluctation than the good spirits. The more rational and the less sensual the will is, the greater is the degree of liberty. [Liberty of exercise not necessarily accompanied His other exception, against liberty of exercise and liberty of specification, is a mere mistake; which grows merely from not rightly understanding what liberty of specification or by liberty contrariety is. A liberty of specification, saith he, is "a of specification.] liberty to do or not to do this or that in particular." Upon [T. H.'s ous censure better advice he will find, that this which he calls a liberty of specification, is a liberty of contradiction, and not of specification, nor of contrariety. To be free to do or not to do this or that particular good, is a liberty of contradiction; so likewise to be free to do or not to do this or that particular evil. But to be free to do both good and evil, is a liberty of contrariety, which extends to contrary objects, or to diverse kinds of things. So his reason to prove, that a liberty of exercise cannot be without a liberty of specification, falls flat to the ground; and he may lay aside his "Lenten licence" for another occasion. I am ashamed to insist upon these things; which are so evident, that no man can question them who doth understand them. And here he falls into another invective against distinctions, presumptu and scholastical expressions, and the "doctors of the Church," of the doc- who by this means "tyrannised over the understandings" of other Church.] men. What a presumption is this! for one private man, who tors of the will not allow human liberty to others, to assume to himself such I. a licence, to control so magistrally, and to censure of gross DISCOURSE "ignorance" and "tyrannising over men's judgments," yea, as causes of the troubles and tumults which are in the world, the "doctors of the Church" in general, who have flourished in all ages and in all places, only for a few necessary and innocent distinctions. Truly said Plutarch, that a sore eye is offended with the light of the sun". What then? Must the logicians lay aside their "first and second intentions," their "abstracts" and "concretes," their "subjects" and "predicates," their "modes" and "figures," their "method synthetic" and "analytic," their "fallacies of composition and division," &c.? Must the moral philosopher quit his "means" and "extremes," his "principia congenita" and "acquisita," his "liberty of contradiction" and "contrariety," his "necessity absolute" and "hypothetical," &c.? Must the natural philosopher give over his "intentional species," his "understanding agent" and "patient," his "receptive and eductive power of the matter," his "qualities," "infinite" or "influxæ," "symbole" or "dissymbole," his "temperament ad pondus" and "ad justitiam," his parts "homogeneous" and "heterogeneous," his "sympathies" and "antipathies," his "antiperistasis," &c.? Must the astrologer and the geographer leave their "apogeum" and "perigæum," their "arctic" and "antarctic poles," their "equator, zodiac, zenith, meridian, horizon, zones," &c.? Must the mathematician, the metaphysician, and the divine, relinquish all their terms of art, and proper idiotisms, because they do not relish with T. H. his palate? But he will say, they are "obscure" expressions. What marvel is it, when the things themselves are more obscure? Let him put them into as "plain English" as he can, and they shall be never a whit the better understood by those who want all grounds of learning. Nothing is clearer than mathematical demonstration; yet 699 let one who is altogether ignorant in mathematics hear it, and he will hold it to be, as T. H. terms these distinctions, plain fustian or "jargon." Every art or profession hath its proper mysteries and expressions, which are well known to the sons III. PART of art, not so to strangers. Let him consult with military men, with physicians, with navigators, and he shall find this true by experience; let him go on shipboard, and the mariners will not leave their "starboard" and "larboard," because they please not him, or because he accounts it gibberish. No, no; it is not the School divines, but innovators and seditious orators, who are the true causes of the present troubles of Europe. T. H. hath forgotten what he said in his book De Cive cap. xii,—that it is "a seditious opinion," to teach, that "the knowledge of good and evil belongs to private persons;"-and cap. 17,-that in "questions of faith" the civil magistrates ought to consult with "the ecclesiastical doctors," to whom "God's blessing is derived by imposition of hands," so as "not to be deceived in necessary truths," to whom "our Saviour hath promised infallibility"." These are the very men whom he traduceth here. There he ascribes "infallibility" to them; here he accuseth them of gross superstitious ignorance. There he attributes too much to them; here he attributes too little. Both there and here he [Numb.xvi. "takes too much upon" him. "The spirits of the prophets 1 Cor. xiv. are subject to the prophets." 3, 7.] 32. [Election opposed to NUMBER XX. J. D.-Now, to the distinction itself, I say first, that the coarctation proper act of liberty is election, and election is opposed (not as well as to only to coaction but also) to coarctation or determination to coaction.] one. Necessitation or determination to one may consist with spontaneity, but not with election or liberty; as hath been shewed. The very Stoics did acknowledge a spontaneity. So our adversaries are not yet gone out of the confines of the Stoics. [Elicit will cannot be neces sitated.] Secondly, to rip up the bottom of this business. This I take to be the clear resolution of the Schools.-There is a double act of the will: the one more remote, called "imperatus," that is, in truth, the act of some inferior faculty, subject to the command of the will; as to open or shut one's eyes. Without doubt these actions may be compelled. The other act is nearer, called "actus elicitus," an "act drawn out" of the will; as to will, to choose, to elect". This may be DISCOURSE stopped or hindered by the intervening impediment of the understanding, as a stone lying on a table is kept from its natural motion; otherwise the will should have a kind of omnipotence: but the will cannot be compelled to an act repugnant to its inclination, as when a stone is thrown upwards into the air; for that is both to incline and not to incline to the same object at the same time, which implies a contradiction. Therefore, to say the will is necessitated, is to say the will is compelled so far as the will is capable of compulsion. If a strong man, holding the hand of a weaker, should therewith kill a third person, " hæc quidem vis est”"this is violence;" the weaker did not willingly perpetrate the fact, because he was compelled. But now suppose this strong man had the will of the weaker in his power as well as the hand, and should not only incline but determine it secretly and insensibly to commit this act, is not the case the same? Whether one ravish Lucretia by force, as Tarquin, or by amatory potions and magical incantations not only allure her but necessitate her to satisfy his lust, and incline her effectually and draw her inevitably and irresistibly to follow him spontaneously; Lucretia, in both these conditions, is to be pitied, but the latter person is more guilty and deserves greater punishment, who endeavours also so much as in him lies to make Lucretia irresistibly partake of his crime. I dare not apply it, but thus only;-take heed, how we defend those secret and invincible necessitations to evil, though spontaneous and free from coaction. These are their fastnesses. not incon T. H.-In the next place, he bringeth two arguments [Answer.] against distinguishing between being free from compulsion and free from necessitation. The first is, that "election is [Election opposite, not only to coaction" or compulsion, "but also to sistent with necessitation or determination to one." This is it he was to necessity.] prove from the beginning, and therefore bringeth no new argument to prove it. have already answered. And to those brought formerly, I b [Thom. Aquin., Summ., Prim. Secund., Qu. vi. art. 4. And see Taylor, Ductor Dubit., bk. II. c. iii. contin. § 1; Works, vol. xiii. pp. 1, 5.] III. PART election is opposite to either. For when a man is compelled (for example, to subject himself to an enemy or to die), he hath still election left in him, and a deliberation to bethink which of these two he can better endure. And he that is led to prison by force, hath election, and may deliberate whether he will be haled and trained on the ground, or make use of his feet. Likewise, when there is no compulsion, but the 700 strength of temptation to do an evil action, being greater than the motives to abstain, necessarily determine him to the doing of it, yet he deliberates; whilst sometimes the motives to do, sometimes the motives to forbear, are working on him; and, consequently, he electeth which he will. But commonly, when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge necessity; but when we see not or mark not the force that moves us, we then think there is none; and that it is not causes but liberty that produceth the action. Hence it is, that they think he does not choose this, that of necessity chooseth it; but they might as well say, fire does not burn, because it burns of necessity. [The distinction vain, between im parate and elicit acts of the will.] The second argument is not so much an argument, as a distinction; to shew in what sense it may be said, that voluntary actions are necessitated, and in what sense not. And therefore he allegeth, as from the authority of " the Schools" and that which "rippeth up the bottom" of the question, that "there is a double act of the will." The one, he says, "is ' actus imperatus,' an act done at the command of the will by some inferior faculty of the soul, as to open or shut one's eyes; and this act may be compelled." The other, he says, "is actus elicitus,' an act allured, or an act 'drawn forth' by allurement, out of the will, as to will, to choose, to elect; this," he says, "cannot be compelled." Wherein,-letting pass that metaphorical speech, of attributing command and subjection to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a commonwealth or family among themselves, and could speak one to another, which is very improper in searching the truth of the question,—you may observe, first, that to compel a voluntary act is nothing else but to will it; for it is all one to say, my will commands the shutting of mine eyes or the doing of any other action, and to say, I have the will to shut mine eyes. So that "actus imperatus" here, might as easily have been |