III. PART Two things are required to make an effect necessary: first, that it be produced by a necessary cause, such as fire is; secondly, that it be necessarily produced. Protagoras, an atheist, began his book thus,-"Concerning the Gods, I have nothing to say, whether they be, or they be not;"-for which his book was condemned by the Athenians to be burned". The fire was a necessary agent; but the sentence or the application of the fire to the book, was a free act; and therefore the burning of his book was free. Much more the rational will is free; which is both a voluntary agent, and acts voluntarily. [Distinction of im elicit acts not improper.] My second reason against this distinction of liberty, from perate and compulsion but not from necessitation, is new; and demonstrates clearly, that to necessitate the will by a physical necessity is to compel the will so far as the will is capable of compulsion; and that he, who doth necessitate the will to evil, after that manner is the true cause of evil, and ought 703 rather to be blamed than the will itself. But T. H., for all he saith he is "not surprised," can be contented upon better advice to steal by all this in silence. And to hide this tergiversation from the eyes of the reader, he makes an empty show of braving against that famous and most necessary distinction between the 'elicit' and 'imperate' acts of the will: first, because the terms are improper;' secondly, because they are obscure.' What trivial and grammatical objections are these, to be used against the universal current of divines and philosophers! "Verborum ut nummorum"-it is "in words, as it is in money:" use makes them proper and current. A "tyrant" at first signified a lawful and just prince; now use hath quite changed the sense of it, to denote either an usurper or an oppressor. The word "pramunire" is now grown a good word in our English laws by use and tract of time; and yet at first it was merely mistaken for a "præmonere." The names of Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, were derived at first from those heathenish deities, the sun, the moon, and the warlike god of the Germans; now we use them for distinction' sake only, without any relation to their first original. He is too froward, that will refuse a piece of h [Cic., De Nat. Deorum, lib. i. c. 23; -Sext. Empir., Adv. Mathem., lib. viii. p. 319. B.; Diog. Laert., lib. ix. § 51.] i [See above, T. H. Numb. ii. p. 26.] I. coin that is current throughout the world, because it is not Discourse stamped after his own fancy. So is he that rejects a good word, because he understands not the derivation of it. We see foreign words are daily naturalized, and made free denizens in every country. But why are the terms improper? Because, saith he, it "attributes command and subjection to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a commonwealth or family among themselves, and could speak one to another." Therefore he saith, "they who invented this term of actus imperatus,' understood not any thing what it signified." No? Why not? It seemeth to me they understood it better than those who except against it. They knew there are 'mental terms,' which are only conceived in the mind, as well as vocal terms,' which are expressed with the tongue. They knew, that howsoever a superior do intimate a direction. to his inferior, it is still a command. Tarquin commanded his son by only striking off the tops of the poppies, and was by him both understood and obeyed. Though there be no formal "commonwealth" or "family," either in the body or in the soul of man, yet there is a subordination in the body of the inferior members to the head, there is a subordination in the soul of the inferior faculties to the rational will. Far be it from a reasonable man, so far to dishonour his own nature, as to equal fancy with understanding, or the sensitive appetite with the reasonable will. A power of command there is without all question, though there be some doubt in what faculty this command doth principally reside, whether in the will or in the understanding. The true resolution is, that the directive command for counsel is in the understanding, and the applicative command, or empire, for putting in execution of what is directed, is in the will. The same answer serves for his second impropriety, about the word 'elicit.' For, saith he, "as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured or drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance; so it is absurdly said, that to will or choose is an act drawn out of the power to will." His objection is yet more improper than their expression. The art of dancing rather resembles the understanding, than the will. That "drawing," which the schools intend, is clearly of another nature k [Tit. Liv., i. 54.] III. PART from that which he conceives. By "elicitation," he understands a persuading or enticing with flattering words, or sweet alluring insinuations, to choose this or that. But that "elicitation," which the Schools intend, is a deducing of the power of the will into act; that "drawing," which they mention, is merely from the appetibility of the object, or of the end; as a man draws" a child after him with the sight of a fair apple, or a shepherd "draws" his sheep after him with the sight of a green bough; so the end "draws" the will to it by a metaphorical motion. What he understands here by an "ability to dance," is more than I know, or any man else, until he express himself in more proper terms, whether he understand the locomotive faculty alone, or the art or acquired habit of dancing alone, or both of these jointly. It may be said aptly without any absurdity, that the act of dancing is "drawn out" ("elicitur") of the locomotive faculty helped by the acquired habit. He who is so scrupulous about the received phrases of the Schools, should not have let so many improper expressions have dropped from his pen; as, in this very passage, he confounds the "compelling of a voluntary action" with the commanding of a voluntary action, and "willing" with "electing," which he saith, 704 "are all one." Yet to will properly respects the end; to elect, the means. [Nor unnecessarily obscure.] [T. H. entirely mistakes the author's His other objection against this distinction of the acts of the will into elicit and imperate, is "obscurity:"-" Might it not" (saith he) "have been as easily said in English a voluntary action." Yes, it might have been said "as easily," but not as truly, nor properly. Whatsoever hath its original from the will, whether immediately or mediately, whether it be a proper act of the will itself, as to elect, or an act of the understanding, as to deliberate, or an act of the inferior faculties, or of the members, is a voluntary action; but neither the act of reason, nor of the senses, nor of the sensitive appetite, nor of the members, are the proper acts of the will, nor drawn immediately out of the will itself; but the members and faculties are applied to their proper and respective acts by the power of the will. And so he comes to cast up the total sum of my second reason, with the same faith that the unjust steward did make I. his accounts. "The sum of J. D.'s distinction is" (saith he), DISCOURSE "that a voluntary act may be done on compulsion" (just words.] contrary to what I have maintained), "that is to say, by foul Luke xvi. [5-7.] means; but to will that, or any act, cannot be but by allurement or fair means." I confess the distinction is mine, because I use it; as the sun is mine or the air is mine; that is, common to me with all who treat of this subject. But his mistakes are so thick, both in relating my mind and his own, that the reader may conclude he is wandered out of his known way. I will do my duty to shew him the right way. First, no acts, which are properly said to be compelled, are voluntary. Secondly, acts of terror (which he calls "foul means"), which are sometimes in a large improper sense called compulsory actions, may be, and for the most part are, consistent with true liberty. Thirdly, actions proceeding from blandishments or sweet persuasions (which he calls "fair means"), if they be indeliberated (as in children, who want the use of reason), are not presently free actions. Lastly, the strength of consequent and deliberated desires doth neither diminish guilt, nor excuse from punishment; as just fears of extreme and imminent dangers threatened by extrinsecal agents often do: because the strength of the former proceeds from our own fault, and was freely elected in the causes of it; but neither desires nor fears, which are consequent and deliberated, do absolutely necessitate the will. [IV. THEORIES CONCERNING THE CAUSE OF A SUPPOSED NECESSITY.] NUMBER XXI. logy.] J. D.—The rest are umbrages quickly dispelled. First, [i. Astrothe astrologer steps up, and subjects liberty to the motions of heaven, to the aspects and ascensions of the stars. "Plus etenim fati valet hora benigni, "Quam si nos Veneris commendet epistola Marti'." I stand not much upon them, who cannot see the fishes 1 [Juv., xvi. 4, 5.] III. PART Swimming besides them in the rivers, yet believe they see those which are in heaven; who promise great treasures to others, and beg a groat for themselves. The stars, at the most, do but incline, they cannot necessitate. [ii. The complexion and Secondly, the physician subjects liberty to the complexion and temperature of the body. But yet this comes not home tempera- to a necessity. Socrates, and many others, by assiduous care have corrected the pernicious propensions, which flowed from their temperatures. ture of the body.] [Answer.] T. H.-In the rest of his discourse he reckoneth up the opinions of certain professions of men, touching the causes, wherein the necessity of things, which they maintain, consisteth. And, first, he saith, the astrologer deriveth his necessity from the stars. Secondly, that the physician attributeth it to the temper of the body. For my part, I am not of their opinion; because neither the stars alone, nor the temperature of the patient alone, is able to produce any effect without the concurrence of all other agents. For there is hardly any one action, how casual soever it seem, to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is "in rerum naturâ.” Which, because it is a great paradox, and depends on many antecedent speculations, I do not press in this place. [Reply.] J. D.-Towards the latter end of my discourse I answered But whereas he mentions a "great paradox" of his own,- m |