J. extrinsecally and inevitably predetermined to write this dis- DISCOURSE course, without any concurrence of mine in the determination, and without any power in me to change or oppose it, or I was not so predetermined. If I was, then I ought not to be blamed; for no man is justly blamed for doing that, which never was in his power to shun. If I was not so predetermined, then mine actions and my will to act are neither 654 compelled nor necessitated by any extrinsecal causes, but I elect and choose, either to write or to forbear, according to mine own will, and by mine own power. And when I have resolved and elected, it is but a necessity of supposition, which may and doth consist with true liberty, not a real antecedent necessity. The two horns of this dilemma are so strait, that no mean can be given, nor room to pass between them. And the two consequences are so evident, that instead of answering he is forced to decline them. [THE STATING Of the question.] ty, an uni munity tion to J. D.-And so to fall in hand with the question, without [True liberany further proems or prefaces. By liberty, I do understand, versal imneither a liberty from sin, nor a liberty from misery', nor a from all liberty from servitude, nor a liberty from violence, but I determinaunderstand a liberty from necessity, or rather from necessita- one.] tion, that is, an universal immunity from all inevitability and determination to one: whether it be of exercise only, which the Schools call a liberty of contradiction', and is found in God, and in the good and bad angels; that is, not a liberty to do both good and evil, but a liberty to do or not to do this or that good, this or that evil, respectively; or whether it be a liberty of specification and exercise also, which the Schools call liberty of contrariety', and is found in men endowed with reason and understanding; that is, a liberty to do and not to do, good and evil, this or that. Thus the coast being cleared, &c. T. H.-In the next place, he maketh certain distinctions of [Answer.] liberty, and says, he means not "liberty from sin," nor 1 ["Est namque libertas arbitrii triplex, scz. a necessitate, a peccato, et a miseriâ." Pet. Lomb., Sent., lib. II. dist. xxv. qu. i. art. 5. For the distinction BRAMHALL. D of liberty of exercise, &c., see Bellarm., PART [Reply.] senses of It "from servitude," nor " from violence," but "from necessity, J. D.-It is a rule in art, that words which are homonymous, of various and ambiguous significations, ought ever in the first place to be distinguished. No men delight in confused generalities but either sophisters or bunglers. 'Vir dolosus versatur in generalibus'-' deceitful men do not love to descend to particulars;' and when bad archers shoot, [Different the safest way is to run to the mark. Liberty is sometimes the word opposed to the slavery of sin and vicious habits, as Rom. vi. liberty ex- 22,-"Now being made free from sin ;"-sometimes to misery and oppression,-Isai. lviii. 6,-"To let the oppressed go free;"-sometimes to servitude, as Levit. xxv. 10,-In the year of jubilee "ye shall proclaim liberty throughout the land;"-sometimes to violence, as Psalm cv. 20,-" The prince of his people let him go free." Yet none of all these are the liberty now in question, but a liberty from necessity, that is, a determination to one, or rather from necessitation, plained.] 1. (Ps. cvii. that is, a necessity imposed by another, or an extrinsecal DISCOURSE determination. These distinctions do virtually imply a description of true liberty, which comes nearer the essence of it than T. H. his roving definition; as we shall see in due place. And though he say that he "understands never the more what" I "mean by liberty," yet it is plain by his own ingenuous confession, both that he doth understand it, and that this is the very question where "the water sticks" between us;whether there be such a liberty, free from all necessitation and extrinsecal determination to one. Which being but the stating of the question, he calls it amiss the "taking of the question." It were too much weakness to beg this question, which is so copious and demonstrable. It is strange to see, with what confidence now-a-days particular men slight all the schoolmen, and philosophers, and classic authors of former ages, as if they were "not worthy to unloose the [Mark i. 7. 655 shoe-strings" of some modern author, or did "sit in darkness &c.] and in the shadow of death," until some "third Cato dropped 10.] down from heaven"," to whom all men must repair, as to the altar of Prometheus, to light their torches. I did never wonder to hear a raw divine out of the pulpit declaim against school divinity to his equally ignorant auditors. It is but as the fox in the fable, who having lost his own tail by a mischance, would have persuaded all his fellows to cut off theirs and throw them away as unprofitable burdens. But it troubles me to see a scholar, one who hath been long admitted into the innermost closet of nature, and seen the hidden secrets of more subtle learning, so far to forget himself, as to style school-learning no better than a plain jargon," that is, a senseless gibberish, or a fustian. language, like the clattering noise of sabots. Suppose they did sometimes too much cut truth into shreads, or delight in abstruse expressions; yet, certainly, this distinction of liberty into "liberty of contrariety" and "liberty of contradiction," or (which is all one) of "exercise only" or "exercise and specification jointly," which T. H. rejects with so much scorn, is so true, so necessary, so generally received, that there is scarce that writer of note, either divine or philosopher, who did ever treat upon this subject, but he ["Tertius e cœlo cecidit Cato." Juv., ii. 40.] m PART useth it. Good and evil are contraries, or opposite kinds of III. things therefore to be able to choose both good and evil, is [Liberty of contradic- a liberty of contrariety or of specification. To choose this, and tion and of not to choose this, are contradictory, or (which is all one) an of exercise exercise or suspension of power; therefore to be able to do and of specification.] or forbear to do the same action, to choose or not choose contrariety, the same object, without varying of the kind, is a liberty of contradiction, or of exercise only. Now man is not only able to do or forbear to do gocd only, or evil only, but he is able both to do and to forbear to do, both good and evil; so he hath not only a liberty of the action, but also a liberty of contrary objects; not only a liberty of exercise, but also of specification; not only a liberty of contradiction, but also of contrariety. On the other side, God, and the good angels, can do or not do this or that good, but they cannot do or not do both good and evil. So they have only a liberty of exercise or contradiction, but not a liberty of specification or contrariety. It appears then plainly, that the liberty of man is more large in the extension of the object, which is both good and evil, than the liberty of God and the good angels, whose object is only good. But withal, the liberty of man comes short in the intension of the power. Man is not so free in respect of good only, as God, or the good angels; because (not to speak of God, Whose liberty is quite of another nature) the understandings of the angels are clearer, their power and dominion over their actions is greater, they have no sensitive appetites to distract them, no organs to be disturbed. We see, then, this distinction is cleared from all darkness. And where T. H. demands, "how it is possible for the liberty of doing, or not doing, this or that good or evil, to consist in God and angels without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil;" the answer is obvious and easy, 'referendo singula singulis,' rendering every act to its right object respectively. God, and good angels, have a power to do or not to do this or that good; bad angels have a power to do or not to do this or that evil; so both, jointly considered, have power respectively to do good or evil. And yet, according to the words of my discourse, God, and good, and bad angels, being singly considered, have no power to do good or evil, that is, indifferently, as man hath. DISCOURSE I. NUMBER V. of the argu J. D. Thus the coast being cleared, the next thing to be [Division done is to draw out our forces against the enemy. And bement.] cause they are divided into two squadrons, the one of Christians, the other of heathen philosophers, it will be best to dispose ours also into two bodies, the former drawn from Scripture, the latter from reason. T. H.-The next thing he doth after the clearing of the [Answer.] coast, is the dividing of his "forces," as he calls them, "into two squadrons," one of places of Scripture, the other of reasons; which allegory he useth, I suppose, because he addresseth the discourse to your Lordship, who is a military man. All that I have to say touching this, is, that I observe a great part of those his forces do look and march another way, and some of them do fight among themselves. J. D.-If T. H. could divide my forces, and commit them [Reply.] together among themselves, it were his only way to conquer 656 them. But he will find, that those imaginary contradictions which he thinks he hath espied in my discourse, are but fancies; and my supposed impertinencies will prove his own real mistakings. I. PROOFS OF LIBERTY OUT OF SCRIPTURE. NUMBER VI. 1.-[that power of and there J. D. First, whosoever have power of election have true Argument liberty, for the proper act of liberty is election. A sponta- men have neity may consist with determination to one: as we see in election, children, fools, madmen, brute beasts, whose fancies are fore true determined to those things which they act spontaneously; liberty.] as the bees make honey, the spiders webs. But none of these have a liberty of election; which is an act of judgment and understanding, and cannot possibly consist with a determination to one. He that is determined by something before himself or without himself, cannot be said to choose or elect: unless it be as the junior of the mess chooseth in Cambridge, |