14. PART leave the shore. It is time that floweth and moveth, not "Non tellus cymbam, tellurem cymba relinquit.” To conclude this point of eternity, and this section, God Exod. iii. gave Himself this name, "I am that I am," to shew the truth, the simplicity, the independence, and immutability of His essence; wherein there is neither "fuit” nor "erit”"hath been" nor "shall be," but only present, "I am." Eternity, only eternity, is, truly, simply, independently, immutably. What a judge judgeth to be indelibe CASTIGATIONS OF THE ANIMADVERSIONS;-NUMBER XXV. His first contradictions have been handled before, whither I refer the reader'; but because he expresseth his sense more rate, is im- clearly here than there, I will take the liberty to add a few pertinent. words. I charged him with contradictions, in making vo And his assertion false. luntary to presuppose deliberation, and yet making many voluntary acts to be without deliberation. He distinguisheth "between deliberation and that which shall be construed for deliberation by a judge;"-some voluntary acts are "rash and undeliberate" in themselves, yet the judge judgeth them to be deliberate, "because they ought to have deliberated, and had time enough to deliberate, whether the action were lawful or not." First, this answer is a mere subterfuge. The question between us is not, what actions are punishable by law, and what are not, but what is deliberation in its own nature, and whether all voluntary actions be deliberate or not; not in order to a trial before a judge, but in order to the finding out of the truth. Secondly, many of these rash actions do imply no crime; nor are cognoscible before a judge, as tending only to the agent's particular prejudice, or perhaps no prejudice but advantage. In all these cases, the sentence of the judge cannot help to reconcile his contradiction. Thirdly, the ground of his distinction is not true. The judge doth not always judge of such rash acts to be de y [Castig. of Animadv.] Numb. viii ; [above pp. 296-300.] 2 [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxv. p. 272.] II. liberate acts, but judgeth them to have been indeliberate DISCOURSE acts, whensoever he findeth them to have been justly destitute of all manner of deliberation from whence did arise the well known distinction between manslaughter and wilful murder in our law. Murder committed upon actual deliberation is held to be done maliciously—“ ex malitið suâ ;” but if it proceed out of sudden passion, it is found only manslaughter. The same equity is observed in the judicial law. He who did kill another "suddenly without enmity," Numb. was allowed the benefit of the city of refuge. Lastly, in xxxv. [22.] many cases the judge cannot judge, that the agent had sufficient time to deliberate, nor that it was his fault that he did not deliberate, for really he had not sufficient time to deliberate. cannot pre contingent And where he talketh, that the judge supposeth "all the A man time" after the making of the law to have been "time of deli- deliberate beration," he erreth most pitifully. There needeth little or perfectly of no time to deliberate of the law. All the need of delibera- events. tion is about the matter of fact, and the circumstances 832 thereof. As, for example, a sudden affront is put upon a man, which he did not expect nor could possibly imagine, such as he apprehendeth that flesh and blood cannot endure, and conceiveth himself engaged in honour to vindicate it forthwith. This is that which required deliberation; the nature and degree of the affront, the best remedies how to procure his own reparation in honour, the inconveniences that may arise from a sudden attempt, and the advantage which he may make of a little forbearance, with all the circumstances of the accidents. How could he possibly deliberate of all these things, before any of these things were imaginable? He could neither certainly divine, nor probably conjecture, that ever such an accident should happen. And therefore it remaineth still a gross contradiction in him, to say, that voluntary always supposeth deliberation, and yet to confess, that many voluntary acts are undeliberate". Whereas he saith, that he always used the word sponta- [Spontaneity.] PART III. [Liberty.] Endeavour is not of neous in the same sensed, he must excuse me if I cannot assent unto it. In one place he telleth us, that "by spontaneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding, or else nothing is meant by it." In another place he telleth us, that to give out "money for merchandize" is a "spontaneous" action'. All the world knoweth, that to buy and sell doth require consideration. He defineth "liberty" to be "the absence of all extrinsecal impediments to action:" but extrinsecal causes are extrinsecal impediments, and no man is free (according to his grounds) from the determination of extrinsecal causes; therefore no man is free from extrinsecal impediments. His answer is, that "impediment or hindrance signifieth an the essence opposition to endeavour,...and consequently extrinsecal causes of liberty. that take away endeavour are not to be called impediments"." He is very seldom stable to his own grounds, but is continually interfering with himself. Now he telleth us, that an impediment signifieth an opposition to endeavour;" elsewhere he telleth us, that a man "that is tied" is not free to walk, and that his bonds are "impediments," without any regard to his endeavour. It were mere folly for him to endeavour to walk, who can neither stir hand nor foot. This is not all. He telleth us further, that an inward impediment is not destructive to liberty, as a man is free to go though he be "lame;" and men do "not say, that the river wants liberty to ascend, but the power," because the water cannot ascend*. And is not want of endeavour intrinsecal as well as lameness? Or did he ever hear of a river that endeavoured to ascend up the channel? It is not true, therefore, that endeavour is of the essence of liberty, or that impediment always "signifieth opposition to endeavour." Lastly, "extrinsecal causes" do not always "take away endeavour," but many times leave men free to endeavour to obtain those things, which they never do obtain. If extrinsecal causes do take away all endeavours but such as are successful, then there should never d [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxv. p. 273.] e [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb. [Ibid., Numb. viii; [above p. 45.] h [Qu., Animadv. upon Numb. xxv. p. 274.] i [In the Defence, T. H.] Numb. xxix; [above p. 167.] [Ibid.] 833 II. be any labour in vain. It remaineth, therefore, upon his DISCOURSE own grounds, that extrinsecal causes whensoever they do not take away endeavours are extrinsecal impediments and destroy liberty. beration be He saith, one "may deliberate of that which is impossible There may be impedifor him to do." True, if he apprehend it as possible, and ments bejudge it to be possible; or, otherwise, he is stark mad to de- fore deli liberate about it. The shutting of the door of the tennis- done. court' is "no impediment to play, until a man have a will to play, and that is not until he have done deliberating." Yes, even in the act of deliberation, the finding of the door of the tennis-court shut determineth the deliberation, changeth the will, and may be the only impediment which hindereth a man from playing. One may have a will to play before deliberation, sometimes more absolute, out of humour, than after. Many times the last judgment is conditional; as, to play if the door be open, and if the court be not taken up beforehand; and if it be shut, or the place taken up, then to go to bowls, or some other exercise. ty when it Wheresoever the judgment is indifferent, to do either And liberthis or that, or conditional, to do this upon such conditions, is ended. it is not the deliberation or the last judgment that doth determine the liberty of the free agent, but leaveth him free to choose either part, or to suspend his consent to both parts, pro re nata. So liberty may remain after deliberation is done. Although he did not use these words, "sensitive appetite-rational hope-rational fear-irrational passions," nor "confound" the terms of "sufficiency" and "efficiency," or "beginning of being" and "beginning of working"," yet he might confound the thing whereof these terms are but notions; and so he doth. sympathies All men do understand well enough what secret sympa- [Secret thies and antipathies are, except such as are captious; though and antimen understand not usually why they are, as why one man pathies.] gapeth at a custard rather than at a pie, and runneth away from a cat rather than from a mastiff. When I say, "it is thus far true, that the action doth follow the thought necessarily" (namely in antipathies and violent passions, which admit no PART deliberation °), he demandeth, "how far it is false"." I answer, III. it is false in ordinary thoughts, which are not accompanied with such violent passions. A man thinketh a thousand things in a day accidentally, which he never putteth in execution; nor so much as thinketh them worthy of deliberation. [Habits facilitate actions.] Some undeliberat able. No man would have denied, that habits do facilitate actions, and render them less difficult and cumbersome, and consequently more easy and more free, but he that meant to make himself ridiculous. He might even as well tell us, that he who gropeth in the dark for every step, is as free to walk as if it were fair day-light; or that a foundered horse, that is afraid to stumble every foot, is as free to go, as he which is sound and goeth on boldly without fear. But all this abuse groweth from the misunderstanding of liberty. I take it for a power to act or not to act, and he taketh it for "an absence of outward impediments." This confounding of words, and the heaping together of Scholastical terms with scorn, because he never understood them, are the chiefest ingredients in his discourse. I am not ashamed of "motus primo primi," or "judicium practice practicum," or "actus elicitus" and "imperatus"." But he hath great reason to be ashamed of his slighting them; which he would not do, but that he never learned them, and so would make a virtue of culpable necessity. He saith, he "will not contend with one who can use 'motus primo primi,'" &c. He is the wiser, to have as little to do with scholars as he can. His best play is in the dark, where there is no fencing. We both agree, that some sudden undeliberated acts are ed acts may justly punished. His reason is, because the agent "had time be punish to deliberate from the instant that he knew the law to the instant of his action." But I have shewed the vanity of this reason, and that it was impossible to deliberate of sudden affronts and injuries which could not be expected or foreseen. But if the occurrences or accidents were such as were |