morning. They knew not the number of the enemy opposed to them, they only knew the woods were full of them, for it was ablaze with their volleys. The artillery was hurried forward, a part taking position in the road, and the rest in an adjoining field, the two batteries placed so as to pour a concentric fire into the timber. Griffin's terrible guns were there, and soon the green arcades were alive with the hurtling storm. The infantry, coming up on the double-quick with cheers, filled the space between the batteries, and blended their steady volleys with the roar of the guns. It was five o'clock when the action began, and it was kept up without cessation till darkness began to gather over the landscape, when the rebels abandoned the contest, and the field was

won.

The sun went down behind the green trees without a cloud, and the tranquil stars came out one after another upon the sky, shedding their gentle light upon field and wood, all unconscious of the dead and dying who had looked their last on the blue heavens.

The loss of the enemy, as usual, could only be guessed at, while ours amounted, in killed, wounded, and missing, to three hundred and forty-five, chiefly from Butterfield's and Martindale's brigades, on which the heaviest of the fighting fell. We took one gun, several trophies, and seven hundred and seventy-one prisoners.

Porter had conducted this hazardous expedition with great skill, in which he was nobly sustained by Butterfield, Martindale and McQuade.

Now, if ever, seemed the time for government to send forward McDowell to close up McClellan's right wing, and add that force without which it would be madness to move on Richmond, and attempt to take it by assault. It was only a little over fifty miles from Fredericksburg to Hanover Court House, and the whole army expected him to advance at

420

MCDOWELL EXPECTED TO ADVANCE.

once. It was because the enemy expected this movement, that Richmond was in such consternation, and the inhabit ants preparing to leave. In fact, they supposed at first, that the attack on Hanover Court House was made by McDowell.

Apart from the troops left to keep open his communica tion and protect his supplies, McClellan had not a hundred thousand men with whom to advance on the rebel capital, while it was known that Davis had on his lines of defense or within call, at least a third more. With his inferior force, and his right wing unprotected, to move on strong fortifications, so heavily defended, would have been madness, and sure to end in disaster. Neither he nor his corps commanders ever proposed to do any such thing. Though their united plan had been broken up, yet relying on the promise of the government, that when they arrived before Richmond, McDowell should join them from Fredericksburg, they had carried forward the tedious siege of Yorktown, and fought their way gallantly to the gates of the rebel capital. Farther than this they never expected to go, without the co-operation of the other portion of the army, unless some blunder of the enemy gave an unexpected advantage. Neither they nor McClellan ever proposed to do, with a little over half the army, what the whole had been gathered, drilled and prepared to accomplish. The army had not been divided for the purpose of leaving half of it idle, while the other half did all the work. It would seem that the public might have seen this, but did not. So possessed had it become with the idea that Richmond must fall, that it would not listen to reason nor take into account the relative strength of the forces in the field. It made no difference whether McClellan had fifty or a hundred and fifty thousand men, and the enemy two hundred thousand, he should take Richmond, or be disgraced. The people expected it and that was enough.

Perhaps there never was another instance on record, in

IMPATIENCE OF THE PEOPLE.

421

which popular impatience exhibited itself in such an unreasonable and unjust manner. Το every man who was capable of understanding the situation of things, it was just as plain now that without the co-operation of McDowell's, or a similar corps, Richmond would not be taken, as it was two months after. McClellan and his brave corps commanders had fought their way to this point on a promise, and if that promise was not fulfilled, they knew they had fought in vain. The appeals of their chief to the government for its fulfillment were most moving, but to the public, not a word of complaint, not an explanation was given. A cloud, dark as death, began to settle around that devoted army.

The popular feeling soon after became clamorous and vindictive-on the one hand denouncing McClellan and demanding his disgrace-on the other upbraiding the government and accusing it of wantonly perilling the country to effect the ruin of McClellan. Sweeping, unjust, irrational accusations filled the press and the streets-on the one hand making McClellan unfit to command a regiment, on the other the President and Secretary of War little better than traitors.

The truth can be told in a few words, McClellan never proposed, or promised, or expected to take Richmond with the forces given him. The government withheld the requisite force for reasons which at the time unquestionably seemed right and proper, and demanded by the public safety.

It does not follow that because McClellan's plans were broken up, they would have been successful if they had been carried out. In the execution of them, defects may have been discovered which rendered their abandonment necessary, or at least apparently so. Whatever blame is attached to him, must be attributed to the theory of his plan, not to its failure practically, for it never had a trial.

This much, however, may be said: the government tried an experiment in this campaign, which we believe no other

422

A SERIOUS MISTAKE.

government of modern times ever dared to make. Having an army of over two hundred thousand men, designed to act against a common center, Richmond-and thus occupy in fact one great battle field-it divided it up into independent corps, with no Commander-in-Chief to direct the movements of the whole, except the Secretary of War, who knew less of military science than any regular colonel in the field. It is not necessary to condemn this or that commander to get at the cause of failure. It will always come under such an arrangement-if not to day, then to morrow. It was one of the most stupendous blunders ever committed by a great nation.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

MAY-JUNE, 1862.

A FLOOD IN THE CHICKAHOMINY-MC CLELLAN'S FORCES SEPARATED BY ITTHE ENEMY RESOLVES TO ATTACK THE PORTION ACROSS THE RIVER AND DESTROY IT-BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS-ROUT OF CASEY'S DIVISION--HEINTZELMAN COMES TO THE RESCUE-KEARNEY'S DIVISION-BERRY'S BRIGADE -SUMNER SUCCEEDS IN CROSSING THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE-BAYONET CHARGE OF THE SECOND EXCELSIOR-THE VICTORY-APPEARANCE OF THE FIELD-MC CLELLAN'S DISPATCH.

THE

HE brilliant victory at Hanover Court House, proved the prelude to the most desperate battle thus far of the warthat of Pittsburg Landing perhaps alone excepted. Three days after, a terrible storm, accompanied with fearful exhibitions of lightning and explosions of thunder, broke over the Union camps. The water came down in floods all night, completely inundating the valley through which the Chickahominy flowed, turning the narrow stream into a broad and mighty river, converting the adjacent swamps into expansive lakes, and carrying away one bridge and rendering another unsafe.

McClellan, in pushing forward towards Richmond, had crossed the river with part of his forces, when this sudden and unprecedented flood came. Casey's division, numbering, when it left Washington, thirteen thousand men,-now reduced to about half that number-occupied the advance within about six or seven miles of the rebel capital. The Williamsburg stage road runs west, direct from Bottom's bridge across the Chickahominy to Richmond; nearly parallel to it, and varying in distance from a mile to two and a half or three miles, is the West Point rail road. On and between these, beyond Fair Oaks, lay his division, forming the advance of the left wing, his pickets extending nearly to the