66

"quale."

nify a certain ject is not one, as the primary substance, but "man" and "animal" are predicated in respect of many. Neither do they signify simply a certain quality, as "white," for "white" signifies nothing else but a thing of a certain quality, but the species and the genus determine the quality, about the substance, for they signify what quality a certain (substance possesses: still a wider limit is made by genus than by species, for whoever speaks of "animal," comprehends more than he who speaks of "man.”

21. Primary
substance ad-
mits no con-
trary.

22. Other in

stances.

lity

greater nor less.

It belongs also to substances that there is no contrary to them,1 since what can be contrary to the primary substance, as to a certain "man," or to a certain "animal," for there is nothing contrary either at least to "man" or to "animal?" Now this is not the peculiarity of substance, but of many other things, as for instance of quantity; for there is no contrary to "two" cubits nor to "three" cubits, nor to "ten," nor to any thing of the kind, unless some one should say that "much" is contrary to "little," or "the great" to "the small;" but of definite quantities, none is contrary to the other. Substance, also, appears not to receive greater or less;2 23. Neither the I mean, not that one substance is not, more or less, substance, than another, for it has been already said that it is, but that every substance is not said to be more or less, that very thing, that it is; as if the same substance be ". man" he will not be more or less " man;" neither himself than himself, nor another "man" than another, for one man" is not more "man" than another, as one "white thing" is more and less "white" than another, and one "beautiful" thing more and less "beautiful" than another, and "the same thing" more or less than "itself;" so a body being white," is said to be more "white" now, than it was before, and if "warm" is said to be more or less "warm." Substance at least is not termed more or less substance, since "man" is not said to be more 66 man" now, than before, nor any

66

66

This, says Simplicius, is doubted by some, and indeed in his Physics, lib. i., Aristotle apparently contradicts his own statement above by instancing Form as the contrary to Privation, both being substantial; but Form is but partly, substance, and partly, habit, and only in so much as it is the latter, is it contrary to Privation, not "quoad substantiam."

2 This is true, discrete quantities being unchangeable, and definite in quantity.

1

24. Individu

ally it can re-
ceive contra-

ries, in which

it differs from

66

one of such other things as are substances: hence substance
is not capable of receiving the greater and the less.
It appears however, to be especially the pecu-
liarity of substance, that being one and the same
in number, it can receive contraries, which no one
can affirm of the rest which are not, substances, those which are
as that being one in number, they are capable of not substances.
contraries. Thus "colour," which is one and the same in
number, is not "white" and "black," neither the same action,
also one in number, both bad and good; in like manner of other
things as many as are not substances. But substance being
one, and the same in number, can receive contraries, as a
certain man being one and the same, is at one time, white,
and at another, black, and warm and cold, and bad and good.
In respect of none of the rest does such a thing appear, ex-
cept some one should object, by saying, that a sentence and
opinion are capable of receiving contraries, for the same sen-
tence appears to be true and false; thus if the statement be
true that some one sits," when he stands up, this
very same statement will be false. And in a si-
milar manner in the matter of opinion, for if
any one should truly opine that a certain person
sits, when he rises up he will opine falsely, if he still holds
the same opinion about him. Still, if any one, should even
admit this, yet there is a difference in the mode.
For some things in substances, being themselves
changed, are capable of contraries, since cold, be-
ing made so, from hot, has changed, for it is
changed in quality, and black from white, and
good from bad: in like manner as to other things, each one
of them receiving change is capable of contraries.
The sen-
tence indeed and the opinion remain themselves altogether
immovable, but the thing being moved, a contrary is pro-
duced about them; the sentence indeed remains the same,
that some one sits," but the thing being moved, it becomes
at one time, true, and at another, false. Likewise as to opinion,

66

25. Reply to

objection by a
reference to the

mode.

26. Inherents

in substances
are, when

changed, capa

ble of contra

riety.

He does not mean that contraries exist in substance at one and the same time, as may be perceived from the examples he adduces. Archytas, according to Simplicius, admits the capability of contraries to be the peculiarity of substance; "thus vigilance is contrary to sleep, slowness to swiftness, disease to health, of all which, one and the same man, is capable." Simp. in Arist. Cat. Compare also Waitz, Organ. p. 291, Comment.

so that in this way, it will be the peculiarity of substance, to receive contraries according to the change in itself, but if any one admitted this, that a sentence and opinion can receive

27. Induction

of passion in

to sentence and

opinion.

contraries, this would not be true. For the sen

tence and the opinion are not said to be capable the example as of contraries in that they have received any thing, but, in that about something else, a passive quality has been produced, for in that a thing is, or is not, in this, is the sentence said to be true, or false, not in that itself, is capable of contraries.1 In short, neither is a sentence nor an opinion moved by any thing, whence they cannot be capable of contraries, no passive quality being in them; substance at least, from the fact of itself receiving contraries, is said in this to be capable of contraries, for it receives disease and health, whiteness and blackness, and so long as it receives each of these, it is said to be capable of receiving contraries. Wherefore it will be the peculiarity of substance, that being the same, and one in number, according to change in itself, it is capable of receiving contraries; and concerning substance this may suffice.2

1. Quantity two-fold, dis

CHAP. VI.—Of Quantity.3

thitimet ndindrally OF Quantity, one kind is discrete, and another continuous; the one consists of parts, holding

1 Simplicius alleges that certain Peripatetics asserted that matter itself was susceptible of πάθος. It must be remembered however that Aristotle's definition of ráon (Rhet. lib. i.) is, that they are certain things added to substance, beyond its own nature. Vide Scholia ad Categorias, ed. Waitz, p. 32. Leip. 1844.

2 The union between ovoía and λn is laid down in the treatise de Animâ, lib. ii. 1, sec. 2: the latter term was used by the schoolmen to signify the subject matter upon which any art was employed, in which sense, it was tantamount to primal substance.

Some say that quantity, is considered in juxta-position with substance, because it subsists together with it, for after substance is admitted, it is necessary to inquire whether it is one or many; others, because among other motions, that which is according to quantity, viz. increase and diminution, is nearer to the notion of substance, viz. generation and corruption, than "alliation is, which is a motion according to quality. Taylor. Vide ch. 8, and Sulpicius, concerning the nature of this last. See also, Arist. Phys. lib. iii. et v., also cf. Cat. ch. 14.

Conf. Metaphy. lib. iv. cap. 13, Hoσòv λéyeraι Tò diαipetòv eiç ¿VVπáρXOVтa, K. T.λ. The reader will do well to compare the above chapter, throughout, with that quoted from the Metaphysics, where these terms are all used equivocally.

crete and conti

nuous; cf parts
occupying rela-

tive position,

and the con-
trary.
2. Examples
discrete.

1. Number.

2. Oratio.

3. Examples

position with respect to each other, but the other
of parts, which have not that position. Dis-
crete quantity is, as number and sentence, but
continuous, as line, superficies, body, besides
place and time. For, of the parts of number,
there is no common term, by which its parts con-
join, as if five be a part of ten, five and five, conjoin at no
common boundary, but are separated. Three, and seven, also
conjoin at no common boundary, nor can you at all take a
common limit of parts, in number, but they are always separ-
ated, whence number is of those things which
are discrete. In like manner a sentence, for
that a sentence is quantity is evident, since it is measured
by a short and long syllable;1 but I mean a sentence produced
by the voice, as its parts concur at no common limit, for there
is no common limit, at which the syllables concur, but each is
distinct by itself. A line, on the contrary, is
continuous, for you may take a common term, at continuous.
which its parts meet, namely, a point, and of a
superficies, a line, for the parts of a superficies coalesce in a
certain common term. So also you can take a common term
in respect of body, namely, a line, or a superficies,
2. A superficies.
by which the parts of body are joined. Of the
same sort are time and place, for the present time is joined
both to the past and to the future. Again, place 3. Time and
is of the number of continuous things, for the place.
parts of a body occupy a certain place, which parts join at a
certain common boundary, wherefore also the parts of place,
which each part of the body occupies, join at the same bound-
ary as the parts of the body, so that place will also be con-
tinuous, since its parts join at one common boundary.
Moreover, some things consist of parts, having
position with respect to each other, but others of sition of some
parts not having such position; thus the parts of parts as to the
a line have relative position, for each of them lies

1. A line.

4. Relative po

above.

1 Aristotle means by λóyos, a sentence subsisting in voice, not in intellect. Sulpic. He adds also, that Archytas, Athenodorus, and Ptolemy condemn the division of quantity into two kinds, and prefer that of number, magnitude, and momentum, but the reply is, that the last is a quality, the same as density.

2 Plotinus, in his first book on the Genera of Being, says, if the continued, is quantity, discrete, cannot be; but he questions it as existing in

5. Parts have no relation in

ber or time.

some where, and you can distinguish, and set out, where each lies, in a superficies, and to which part of the rest, it is joined. So also the parts of a superficies, have a certain position, for it may be in like manner pointed out where each lies, and what have relation to each other, and the parts of a solid, and of a place, in like manner. On the contrary, in respect of number, it is impossible for any one to respect of num- show that its parts have any relative position, or that they are situated any where, or which of the parts are joined to each other. Nor as regards parts of time, for not one of the parts of time endures, but that which does not endure, how can it have any position? you would rather say, that they have a certain order, inasmuch as one part of time is former, but another latter. In the same manner is it with number, because one, is reckoned before two, and two, before three, and so it may have a certain order, but you can, by no means, assume, that it has position. 6. Oratio. A speech likewise, for none of its parts endures, but it has been spoken, and it is no longer possible to bring back what is spoken, so that there can be no position of its parts, since not one endures: some things therefore consist of parts having position, but others of those which have not position. What we have enumerated are alone properly termed quantities; all the rest being so denominated by accident, for looking to these, we call other things quantities, as whiteness is said to be much, because the superficies is great, and an action long, because of its time being long, and motion also, is termed, much. Yet each of these is not called a quantity by itself, for if a man should explain the quantity of an action, he will define it by time, describing it as yearly, or something of the sort; and if he were to explain the quantity of whiteness, he will define it by the superficies, for as the quantity of the superficies, so he would say is the quantity of the whiteness; whence the particulars we have mentioned are alone properly of themselves termed quantities, none of the rest being so of itself, but acthe intellect, and confounds the distinction between order, in discrete, and position, in continued quantities. The point is touched upon also in lib. vi. of the Physics. Compare also ch. 12, on Priority, in the Categories, as to the relation in respect of number and time.

7. The abovenamed are the only proper quanta-all others reducible to these.Examples.