refusing to answer in every case, even in matters respecting sin and duty let the design of the que. rist be what it will, be accounted criminal, in what point of light will the objector view the Lord Jesus Christ, when he finds him actually refusing to answer a question respecting sin and duty, in the case of his own authority? Mark xi. 27, 33. "Neither do I tell you (says he) by what authority I do these things.' It would be well if men would consider the awful consequences of some of their objections before they make them.

But, supposing that Christ, in both the instances alluded to, had commanded tribute to be paid to Cæsar, what does it prove? Unless he com. manded it to be paid as a tessera of loyalty, it proves no more the morality of Cæsar's right, than a minister of the gospel's advising one of his hearers to give the robber part of his property, to secure the remainder, would, that the minister considered the robber morally entitled to it.

Obj. 8. "But you make use of the money which receives its currency from their sanction; and you support them by paying tribute, &c. Why not swear allegiance, hold offices?" &c.

Ans. We make use of the money, to be sure; but when we give an equivalent for it, by industry or otherwise, it is our own property; and, another man's stamping his name upon our coats, is no reason why we should throw them away.

It must be granted, also, that we do support them by paying tribute, &c. So do we the robber, unto whom we give a part to save the remainder. But will it therefore follow that I may legally swear allegiance to him, or become one of his officers, in the business of robbery and plunder? Obj. 9. "You swear oaths administered by

them, and hold deeds of land, &c., whose validity rests entirely on their sanction."

Ans. Administration is not essential to an cath. It is no part of it. An oath is a solemn appeal to God, in which we call him to witness the truth of what we assert or promise, and to be an avenger, in case of perjury. Administration is nothing more than arranging the matter and expression of the oath into due form. This may be done, either by the person himself who swears, or proposed by another; and, if in itself equitable, may be adopted by the juror, be the proposer whomsoever he may.

Should a robber meet me on the highway, and upon finding that I had no money, put his bayonet to my breast; and should it appear evidently that he intended to kill me unless I would solemnly engage to take or send him a certain sum of money in a given time, say fifty dollars, ought I not to comply? If I do, the oath is the result of mutual stipulation, which existing circumstances render eligible. It seems to me immaterial whether the overture originates with him or with me. In either case, I consider it lawful to give fifty dollars to save my life. Would swearing this oath, if proposed by the robber, be any recognition of his right to my property ? Where would be the difference, should my life be saved, by another coming under similar engagements for me with my consent? Whatever difference there is between this illustration, and appearing in common courts of justice, to plead, or be impleaded, where oaths are necessary to a decision, is in favour of the position contended for; inasmuch as the persons before whom the affair is transacted are considered as possessing honour and respectability.

With respect to the other allegation, viz., "The holding land by tenures whose validity depends upon their sanction," it is also unfounded.

Does bargaining with a man for any article, in all cases, recognise the morality of the means whereby he became possessed of the said article ? If it does so, then, should any foreign power conquer America, (which God forbid,) and declare all tenures of land null and void, which did not proceed from the new order of things, it would be criminal to hold them thus, and so the land must be vacated, and its planters flee somewhere else for an asylum. But, supposing they found things similar wherever they go, must they leave this world altogether? They must neither eat nor drink of the produce of the land held by this immoral tenure; for, by the hypothesis, the cultivator holds it by an immoral tenure, and so, no bargain should be made with him, more than with the power from which the deed originally issues. Might I not rent a room of my own house, which a man has deprived me of, and now holds legally, though by an immoral tenure, without thereby recognising the morality of his right? If I may rent it, may I not give an article in writing, securing the payment to him and the tenure to me? If I may do so with one room, may I not do so with the whole house and tenement thereunto belonging? If I may rent the whole, may I not also purchase it, putting the bargain under similar se-, curities as above mentioned? If this be lawful, how can the case under consideration be unlawful?

Obj. 10. "But, when rulers are in possession, by the voice of the majority, have they not, therefore, a claim to conscientious obedience?" To this I

Answer. Nations, as well as individuals, are

bound to act agreeably to the divine law. If their conduct is repugnant thereto, it can confer no right, nor establish any obligation.

The act of a majority can never legitimate what God has prohibited under pain of his displeasure. If it could, then it would necessarily follow that all things usually called right or wrong, are, in themselves, indifferent; that the Bible has no definite meaning, in itself, but takes it altogether from the opinions of men, and so will equally authenticate two systems, though diametrically opposite to each other!

Neither possession, therefore, nor majority, can give a right, in opposition to the divine law. Possession may vest in one, and the right in another, as in the case of Solomon and Adonijah, 1st Kings i. 5. Both possession and majority may vest in one person, and the right in another, as in the case of David and Absalom, 2d Sam. xv. 10, and xvii. 14. The voice of the people is to be considered as the preceptive voice of God only when they act agreeably to this law; but, when the contrary, it neither establishes right nor constitutes obligation. Hence, Hos. viii. 4: "They have set up kings, but not by me: they have made princes, and I knew it not." The charge, here, must necessarily respect the neglect of the precept, for none could be advanced to civil dignity without his providence. A sparrow cannot fall to the ground without his providential per

mission.

Obj. 11. "The restraint and punishment of idolaters, blasphemers, and gross heretics, which you contend for, belonged to the Jewish theocracy, which was typical, and so ought not to be imitated."

Ans. This objection is extremely popular, and deserves minute attention.

It cannot be better answered, than in the words of the late Rev. John Brown, minister of the Seceding Church, in Haddington, North Britain, in his Treatise on Toleration, page 57. He defies his antagonist to prove that these instances of the restraint and punishment of idolatry, &c., by the Jewish rulers were merely typical. He goes on to observe, thus: "The typical magistrates of the Jewish nation also exercised laws relative to murder, theft, unchastity, treason, and other matters of the second table of the law." Ought, therefore, no magistrates now to do so? The laws respecting the duties of the second table pertained as much to the Jewish theocracy as those relating to the first. Must, therefore, the Christian magistrate, for fear of copying the Jewish theocracy, meddle with no morality at all? Must every thing that was once typical, be now, under the gospel, excluded from regulating authority? Must all the excellent patterns of Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Job, Mo-. ses, Aaron, Samuel, David, and other Hebrew saints, be rejected as typical and useless? Must all the laws directing to elect men fearing God, and hating covetousness, to be magistrates; or, directing men to judge justly, and impartially, and prudently, and to punish murderers, adulterers, thieves, robbers, &c., be discarded as typical? Must the weekly Sabbath, public fasts, and thanksgivings, be laid aside as typical, a mere sign between God and the Israelites? Must the ten commandments, and all the explications of them in the Old Testament be discarded, as published in a typical manner, and to a typical people, and used