kings of Israel were obliged to govern their subjects, are more expressly, more explicitly particularized than in any other of the books of the Old Testament, as the circumstances of the command do plainly evince. Wherefore, my prince, the same cause does no less exhort you than the kings of Israel, that you ought to be a studious enquirer into those laws, whereby you may be hereafter qualified to govern your subjects. For, what is said to the kings of Israel must be figuratively intended to be spoken to every king who bears rule over a people, who know and worship the true God. Upon the whole, could any thing be more fitly or more usefully offered to your consideration, than this command enjoined to the kings of Israel, to read and study their law? Since, not only the example, but the typical authority thereof instructs and obliges you to behave conformably to the laws of that kingdom, to the crown whereof, with the permission of Divine Providence, you are in due course of time apparently to inherit.

CHAP. IV,

THE Laws, my dear Prince, do not only, with the Prophet, saying, "Come, ye children, hearken unto me, I will teach you the fear of the Lord,” (Ps. xxxiv. 11.) call on you to fear GoD, whereby you may become wise; but the same laws also invite you to be exercised in them, that you may attain to felicity and happiness (as far as they are attainable in this life.) For all the philosophers, who have argued so differently about happiness, have agreed in this, that happiness is the end of all human desires, for which reason they call it the summum bonum, the greatest or chief good: the Peripatetics placed it in virtue; the Stoics in what is honest; and, the Epicureans in pleasure : but, inasmuch as the Stoics defined that to be honest which is done well and laudably, according to the rules of virtue; and the Epicureans asserted that nothing is or can be pleasant without virtue; all those sects, according to Leonardus Aretinus, in his Introduction to Moral Philosophy, have concurred in this, that it is virtue alone which procures and effects happiness, wherefore Aristotle, (Lib. 7. Polit.) defining happiness, says, "That it is the perfect exercise of all the virtues. This being granted, I desire you to consider what will follow from these premisses. Human laws are no other than rules whereby the perfect notion of justice can be determined: but that justice, which those laws discover, is not of the commutative, or distributive kind, or any one particular distinct virtue, but it is virtue absolute and perfect, and distinguished by the name of Legal Justice, which the same

L. Aretinus affirms to be therefore perfect, because it utterly rejects and discountenances whatever is vicious, and teaches an universal virtue, for which it is deservedly called, simply, by the name of virtue in the general; concerning which thus Homer and Aristotle, It is the most excellent of all the virtues, and that nor morning nor evening star is so bright or lovely as this. This justice is the subject of the royal care, without which a king cannot act in his judicial capacity as he ought to do, and without which he cannot justly engage in any war: but this being once attained and strictly adhered to, the whole regal office will, in all respects, be adequately and completely discharged; so that (to sum up what we have said) happiness consists in the perfect exercise of all the virtues; and since that justice which is taught and acquired by the law, is universal virtue, it follows, that he who has attained this justice, is made happy by the laws, consequently has attained the summum bonum, or beatitude, since that and happiness in this fleeting life mean the same thing. Not that the law itself can do this exclusive of divine grace: nor will you be able to learn either what is law or virtue without it, not so much as in the inclination to it. For, as Parisiensis says, "The internal appetitive virtue of man is so vitiated by original sin, that vicious practices relish pleasantly, and the works of virtue seem harsh and difficult." Wherefore, that some give themselves up to admire and follow virtue, is owing to the grace of GoD, and not their own natural strength or uprightness of disposition. May I not now ask the question, Whether the laws, which through the divine concurrence work such good effects, as I have laid before you, are not to

aThat justice is an indispensible qualification in a Sovereign, was impressively inculcated by Burnet, on a very suitable occasion, in his sermon at the coronation of William and Mary, from the text 2 Sam. ch. xxiii. ver. 3 and 4.

be studied with the utmost application? since he, who hath a just notion of them, is in the way to arrive at that felicity, which, according to the philosophers, is the end and completion of all human desires, and the chief good of this life. Though what I have hitherto offered is of general consideration only, and therefore may not seem to concern you, as you are heir apparent to a Crown; yet, the words of the Prophet lay an obligation on you, even in that capacity, to apply yourself to the study of the law, when he says, "Be instructed, ye judges of the earth," (Ps. ii. 10.) The Prophet does not here persuade to the learning of any mechanical art or trade, nor yet of any science in theory, how proper or beneficial soever to mankind; for he does not say in general, Be instructed, ye inhabitants of the earth, but addresses himself in a particular manner to the kings, or rulers of this world; and exhorts them to the study of the law, according to which they ought to administer justice and judgment to their people: "Be instructed, ye judges of the earth."-It follows, "lest at any time the LORD be angry, and ye perish from the right way." Neither, great Sir! do the Scriptures only oblige you to be instructed in the laws, by which justice is to be learned and attained, but in another place gives it you in charge to love justice herself, saying, "Love righteousness, ye that be judges of the earth.” (Wisd. Solomon i. 1.)

CHAP. V.

66

BUT, Sir! how will you love righteousness, or justice, unless you first acquire a competent knowledge of the laws, by which justice is to be learned and known for, as the philosopher says, Nothing is admired or loved unless it be known," which made the orator Fabius say, "That it would be well with the arts and sciences, if artists only were to make a judgment of them." What is not known, is so far from being loved, that it is usually despised, as saith a certain poet,

The Rustic what he knows not always slights.

Nor is this the way of the clown only, but of men of learning and skill in the liberal arts and sciences. Suppose (for instance) a natural philosopher, who had never studied either the Mathematics, or Metaphysics, should be told by a Metaphysician that his science considers things abstracted from all matter and motion, both as to their essence or reality, and as to our conception of them: the Mathematician asserts, that his science considers things in reality conjoined to matter and motion, but separated from them in our conception: it is certain that our Naturalist, who was never acquainted with any thing separated from matter and motion, either in reality or conception, would not forbear laughing at both of them, and would be apt to despise their respective sciences, though of a sublimer nature than his own; and that for no other reason, but because he is perfectly unacquainted with them. So (my Prince) would you in like manner be surprised at a lawyer