affect pregnancy and expedition, by an impatient and catching hearing of the Counsellors at the bar." So, in the Essay on Judicature, Lord Bacon says, "patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part of Justice, and an overspeaking Judge is no welltuned cymbal: it is no grace to a Judge first to find that which he might have heard in due time from the bar; or to shew quickness of conceit in cutting off evidence or counsel too short, or to prevent information by questions, although pertinent. Judges ought to be more learned than witty, more reverend than plausible, more advised than confident. Above all things, integrity is their portion and proper virtue." In a speech to the Judges, previous to the circuits, Lord Bacon declares that "a popular Judge is a deformed thing, and plaudites are fitter for players than for magistrates." In the letter in the Cabala, it is said that "an ignorant man cannot, a coward dare not, be a good Judge." An examination of the references which have been noticed, will not fail to convince the reader of the very different, perhaps the contrasted talents, which distinguish a favorite advocate, and a great Judge. Churchill has drawn a picture no less just than spirited, of that odious character, an advocate on the Bench.

"Who may enlarge, retrench,

Create and uncreate, and on the Bench

With winks, smiles, nods, and such like paltry arts
May work and worm into a Jury's hearts:

Or baffled there, may, turbulent of soul,

Cramp their high office and their rights controul.

Who may, though Judge, turn advocate at large,
And deal replies out by the way of charge;

Making interpretation all the way

In spite of facts his wicked will obey.

And leaving law without the least defence,

May damn his conscience to approve his sense.'

view to

The demeanor of a Judge off the Bench, and in the circles of private life, is subject to the same observations which Bolinbroke has made upon a patriot King, when not in the immediate exercise of his august functions. This part of the Judicial character has been touched upon, with great felicity, by that distinguished Judge Sir H. Grimston, when, with a pass a high panegyric upon his deceased friend and preceptor Croke, he applies to him a passage from Tacitus, in which that historian describes the manners of Agricola, Tempora curarum remissionumque divisa; ubi conventus ac judicia poscerent, gravis, intentus, severus, et sæpius misericors: ubi officio satisfactum, nulla ultra potestatis persona; tristitiam et arrogantiam exuerat; nec illi, quod est rarissimum, aut facilitas auctoritatem, aut severitas amorem diminuit."

66

CHAP. LII.

Prince. THERE remains but one thing, my Chancellor, to be cleared up, which makes me hesitate, and gives me disgust; if you can satisfy my doubts in this particular, I will cease to importune you with any more queries. It is objected, that the Laws of England admit of great delays in the course of their proceedings, beyond what the laws of any other country allow of: this is not only an obstruction to Justice but often an insupportable expence to the parties who are at law; especially in such actions where the Demandant is not entitled to his damages.

CHAP. LIII.

Chancellor. In personal actions, which do not arise within the cities and trading towns (where they proceed according to usages and liberties of their own) the proceedings are in the ordinary way. Though they admit of great delays, yet they are not so excessive. Indeed in cities and towns, especially when the necessity of the case so requires, the process is speedy, as it is likewise in other parts of the world. But neither yet are the proceedings hurried on too fast (as it sometimes happens in other countries) by means whereof one or other of the parties is a sufferer. In real actions, almost every where, the process goes on slow and tedious; but in England it is more expeditious. There are in France, in the Supreme Court of Parliament, some causes, which have been depending upwards of thirty years. I myself know a case of appeal prosecuted in the said Court, which has been depending now these ten years, and it is likely will be so for ten years more before it can be decided. While lately at Paris, my host shewed me his process in writing, which had been before the Court of Parliament for eight years, for four French Sols rent, which, of our money, makes but eight pence, and he had no prospect of obtaining judgment in less than eight years more. I have known other cases of the same nature and for what appears to me, the Laws of England do not admit of so great delays as the Laws of France. But it is really necessary there should be delays in

'legal proceedings, provided they be not too dilatory and tedious. By these means the parties, in particular the party prosecuted, is better provided with his proper defence, and advice of counsel, which otherwise neither of them could be, either to prosecute or defend. "Judgment is never so safe when the process is hurried on." I remember once at an assizes and gaol-delivery at Salisbury, that I saw a woman indicted for the death of her husband, within the year: she was found guilty, and burnt for the same: in this case the Judge of assize, after the whole proceedings before him were over, might have respited the execution of the woman, even after the expiration of the year. At a subsequent assizes I saw a servant of the man who was so killed, tried and convicted before the same Judge for the same murder: who made an ample public confession that he was the only person who was guilty of the said fact, and that his mistress, who had been executed, was entirely innocent of it: wherefore he was drawn and hanged, and at the time and place of his execution he lamented the case of his poor mistress, upon account of her innocence, and her being in no wise privy to her husband's death. The fact being thus, how may we suppose the Judge to be affected with a sense of conscience and remorse for being so hasty in awarding judgment of execution, when it was in his power to have stayed, for some time, further process against her: he often owned to me, with concern, that he should never be able to satisfy it to his conscience for such his precipitate behaviour. Deliberation often brings judgment to maturity, which seldom or never happens where the proceedings are too much hurried on. Where

fore the Laws of England admit of Essoins, a sort of practice not known in the laws of other countries. Are not the Vouchings to Warranty of some use? The same may be said of the Aids of those

to whom the reversion of lands belongs, who bring the title in question, and who have in their custody the evidences to make out the title of the lands. The same may be said of Coparcenors, who are to restore in proportion, if the estate allotted to one of them should be evicted and yet these are all delays, as I have formerly informed you even delays of this kind the laws of other countries do not allow neither do the Laws of England favour such delays and imparlances as are frivolous and vexatious. And if, at any time, delays happen in pleading, which are found to be mischievous and inconvenient, they may be abolished, or reformed, in every parliament; nay, and all other laws used in England, where they do not answer the intention, or labour under any defect, may be corrected and amended in Parliament. So that all the Laws of England, you will conclude from what has been said, must needs be very good, either in fact or possibility. They are either such already, or are easily capable of being made such. And to this the kings of England are obliged, in virtue of a solemn oath taken at their coronation, as often as the necessity or equity of the case shall so requirea.

a

This part of Fortescue's Treatise is quoted in the Preface to the eighth Report, in which Coke expresses the resolution of the Court to discountenance all unnecessary delays, which he calls the device of the devil. In the second Institute he repeats in several places a rule for the construction of Statutes which accelerate the progress of causes, that they are to be construed liberally for effectuating that purpose. În Lord Chancellor Bromley's speech to C. J. Anderson, which is given in Moore's Reports, the oppressions arising from delay in judicial proceedings are enumerated: and the Chancellor concludes by declaring that he who prosecutes his right would rather have a speedy judgment against him, than a tardy one with him. A Court was established in the Reign of Edward III. for redressing delays in judgments; a particular account of which Court is given in the fourth Institute. In the second Institute is found a multitude of statutary provisions in restraint of the abuses arising from the doctrine