ance with the ordinary rules of international law, that it has determined to throw the responsibility exclusively on the Commander of the San Jacinto. We are not yet in a position to know if this supposition is well founded, and the Government of the Emperor have been therefore compelled to examine the question raised by the removal of the two passengers from the Trent. The desire to aid in preventing a conflict, perhaps imminent, between two Powers towards whom they are animated by equally friendly sentiments, and the desire to maintain, with a view to placing the rights of their own flag beyond the danger of any attack, certain principles essential to the security of neutrals, have convinced them, after mature reflection, that they could not remain perfectly silent on the matter.

If, to our great regret, the Cabinet of Washington should be disposed to approve the conduct of the Commander of the San Jacinto, it would be because they consider Messrs. Mason and Slidell as enemies, or because they only recognize them as rebels. In the one case, as in the other, there would be an extremely painful forgetfulness of principles on which we have always found the United States agree with us.

On what ground can the American cruiser, in the first case, have arrested Messrs. Mason and Slidell? The United States have admitted, with us, in the Treaties concluded between the two countries, that the freedom of the flag extends to persons found on board, even were they enemies of one of the two parties,

except, at least, in the case of military men actually in the service of the enemy. Messrs. Mason and Slidell were, therefore, by virtue of this principle, the insertion of which in our Treaties of Amity and Commerce has never encountered any difficulty, perfectly free under the neutral flag of England. It will not, doubtless, be pretended that they could be considered as contraband of war. That which constitutes contraband of war has not yet, it is true, been precisely determined. Its limits are not absolutely the same with all the Powers. But, as far as regards persons, the special stipulations which are found in treaties concerning military men clearly define the character of those who may be seized by belligerents. Now there is no occasion to demonstrate that Messrs. Mason and Slidell cannot be assimilated to persons in this category. There would therefore remain nothing to explain their capture but this pretext-that they were bearers of official despatches of the enemy. Now this is the place to recall a circumstance which should govern this entire affair, and which renders unjustifiable the conduct of the American cruiser. The Trent was not bound to a point belonging to either of the belligerents. She was carrying her cargo and passengers to a neutral country, and it was, moreover, in a neutral port where she had embarked them. If it was admissible that, under such circumstances, the neutral flag did not completely cover the persons and goods on board, its immunity would be an empty word. At any moment the commerce and navigation of

or

third Powers would be liable to suffer in their innocent or even indirect relations with one other of the belligerents. These latter would not only have a right to require from the neutral a complete impartiality-to prohibit him from all participation in acts of hostility; they would impose upon his liberty of commerce and navigation restrictions of which modern international law has refused to admit the legality. In a word, we should return to those vexatious practices against which, in former times, no Power has protested more energetically than the United States.

If the Cabinet of Washington could only regard the two persons arrested as rebels, whom they have always a right to seize, the question, to place it in another light, could not thereby be solved any the more in a sense favourable to the conduct of the Commander of the San Jacinto.

In such a case there would be a non-recognition of the principle which constitutes a ship to be a portion of the territory of the country whose flag she bears, and there would be a violation of the immunity which forbids a foreign Sovereign to exercise there his jurisdiction. It is not necessary, doubtless, to recall the energy with which on every occasion the Government of the United States have defended this immunity, and the right of asylum, which is a consequence of it.

Without wishing to enter into a deeper discussion of the questions raised by the capture of Messrs. Mason and Slidell, I have said enough, I think, to establish that the Cabinet of Washington cannot, without aiming a blow at those principles

which all neutral Powers are equally interested in maintaining, nor without putting itself in contradiction with its own conduct up to the present day, give its, approval to the proceedings of the Commander of the San Jacinto.

In this state of things, there cannot be, in our opinion, any hesitation as to the course to pursue. Lord Lyons is already instructed to present the demands for satisfaction which the English Government is under the necessity of drawing up, and which consist in the immediate release of the persons taken from on board the Trent, and in sending explanations calculated to remove from this act its offensive character to the British flag.

The Federal Government would be inspired by a just and elevated sentiment in yielding to these demands. One would vainly search for what object, or in what interest they would risk to provoke, by a different attitude, a rupture with Great Britain. For ourselves, who would see in this case a complication in every way deplorable, of the difficulties with which the Cabinet of Washington has already to struggle against, and a precedent of a nature to render seriously uneasy all those Powers not parties to the present contest, we think we are giving a proof of loyal amity towards the Cabinet of Washington in not allowing them to be ignorant of our opinion in this circumstance. I invite you, Sir, to take the first opportunity of speaking frankly to Mr. Seward, and if he should ask it, to leave with him a copy of this despatch. Receive, &c.,

(Signed) THOUVENEL,

the neutral mail-packet the Trent, and the abduction therefrom of Messrs. Slidell and Mason by the Commander of the United States man-of-war the San Jacinto.

This occurrence, as you can well imagine, has produced in England and throughout Europe the most profound sensation, and thrown not Cabinets only, but also public opinion, into a state of the most excited expectation. For, although at present it is England only which is immediately concerned in the matter, yet, on the other hand, it is one of the most important and universallyrecognized rights of the neutral flag which has been called into question.

I need not here enter into a discussion of the legal side of the question. Public opinion in Europe has, with singular unanimity, pronounced in the most positive manner for the injured party. As far as we are concerned we have hitherto abstained from expressing ourselves to you upon the subject, because in the absence of any reliable information we were in doubt as to whether the Captain of the San Jacinto, in the course taken by him, had been acting under orders from his Government or not. Even now we prefer to assume that the latter was the case. Should the former supposition, however, turn out to be the correct one, we should consider ourselves under the necessity of attributing greater importance to the occurrence, and to our great regret we should find ourselves constrained to see in it not an isolated fact, but a public menace offered to the existing rights of all neutrals.

We have as yet no certain information as to the demands made

by England to the American Cabinet, upon the acceptance of which the maintenance of peace appears to depend. As far, however, as our information reaches on the subject, we are convinced that no conditions have been put forward by the British Government which could justly offend President Lincoln's sense of honour.

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His Majesty the King, filled with the most ardent wishes for the welfare of the United States of North America, has manded me to advocate the cause of peace with President Lincoln, through your instrumentality, to the utmost of my power. We should reckon ourselves fortunate if we could in this wise succeed in facilitating the peaceful solution of a conflict from which the greatest dangers might arise. It is possible, however, that the President has already taken his decision and announced it. Whatever that decision may be, the King's Government when they reflect upon the uninterrupted relations of friendship and amity which have existed between Prussia and the United States ever since the latter were founded, will derive satisfaction from the thought of having laid with the most unreserved candour their views of this occurrence before the Cabinet of Washington, and expressed the wishes which they entertain in connection with it.

You will read this despatch without delay to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, should he desire it, you will give him a copy of it. I shall await your report upon the instructions contained in this despatch, and I avail, &c.

(Signed)

BERNSTORFF.

Lyons.

Foreign Office, December 19, 1861.

My Lord,-Mr. Adams came to me to-day, at the Foreign Office, at 3 o'clock. He said he came to ask two questions which concerned himself personally.

I interrupted him to ask whether what he was going to say was by order of his Government, or from his own sense of what he ought to do.

Mr. Adams answered that the proceeding was entirely his own, but that he had with him a despatch from Mr. Seward which he was authorized to read to me if he should think fit to do so. It appeared, he said, from that despatch, that the Government of Washington had not authorized the capture of the two insurgents, Mason and Slidell, and that the United States Government stood quite uncommitted at the time of sending the despatch.

I said that if the despatch did not enter into any controversy with regard to the case of Messrs. Mason and Slidell, I should be glad to hear it read.

Mr. Adams then proceeded to read the despatch. It commenced by referring with approbation to a speech made by Mr. Adams at the Mansion House, and proceeded to notice with gratification the sentiments which had been expressed by Lord Palmerston in a conversation he had held with Mr. Adams in reference to the James Adger.

Mr. Seward then proceeds to declare that the American Government value highly the friendship of Great Britain, and lament that certain causes of difference

imagines, to the want of attention on the part of the British Government to the performance of the duties incumbent on a friendly Power during the struggle in which the United States are engaged. Mr. Seward gives as instances the case of communication to the Confederate authorities by Mr. Bunch; the admission of the Sumpter privateer to purchase coal and provisions at Trinidad, in distinction, as he said, to the conduct of every European State; and the arrival in the Southern States of vessels laden with arms and ammunition from England.

Mr. Seward then proceeds to the case of the Trent, from which ship the two insurgents had been taken. He affirms that no instructions were given to Captain Wilkes which authorized him to act in the manner he had done. Neither had the United States Government committed itself with regard to any decision upon the character of that act. The Government would wait for any representation the British Government might make before coming to any positive decision. He desires that, if Mr. Adams shall think it desirable, this despatch shall be read to me, and also to Lord Palmerston.

In answer to Mr. Adams, I touched upon most of the points treated of in the despatch. I did not think it necessary, however, to recur to the case of Mr. Bunch.

With regard to the Confederate privateer, I said that I could not see that our conduct had been different from that of France and Holland, or of Spain. The Sumpter had been refused coal