blifhed in the World make upon it; and that because these different impreffions of other Bodies have different Effects upon hers; fome of them tending to its Good, and fome to its Hurt; by Hurt, meaning not the Sentiment of Hurt, but only the Diffolution of its Structure, or the Disorder of the Machine, fo as to indifpofe it either wholly, or in part, for the Functions of Life: I fay, upon thefe Confiderations it being neceffary that I fhould know, if not what Bodies are in themselves; yet what they are to me, or what Relation they have to my Body, as to the Mechanical Good or Evil of it, that so I may either joyn my felf to them, or avoid them, as there fhall be occafion. And there being again but two poffible ways of knowing this, either by Ideal Perception, or by Sentiment; that is, either by examining and confidering the Nature or Internal Conftitution of other Bodies, the Contexture of their Parts, Bulk, Figure, Degree of Motion, &c. together with the Relation or Proportion that all these bear to the Make and Temper of my own Body, or by having a different Feeling within, as the Impreffion is which is made without, my Soul receiving a new Modification as that of her Body is alter'd by the incurfion of other Bodies. And the firft of thefe Ways, befides its being too anxious and ingaging, and apt to detain the Soul (which was made for higher Imployments) too much in the Contemplation of things bemeath her, being alfo too flow and tedious, (fince (fince if I were not to quit the Fire till I had gone through the Philofophy of it, I should be burnt) and by reason of the invincible Difficul ties of it, and the numerous returns of the occafions no way united to the Proportion of our narrow Faculties; and indeed, to fay all at once, utterly impracticable, it was necessary I fhould be advertized of the Relations other Boedies bear to mine, and of the Congruity and Difcongruity of their Impreffions, by a quicker and more compendious Method. And accordly the Wife and Good Author of my Being has not left it to my Reason to explore the Nature of fenfible Objects, and thence to conclude what Effects they would have upon a Body fo difpofed as mine is (which if poffible could not be done without infinite trouble) but has established fome general Laws, whereby upon certain Impreffions, I find my felf touch'd with certain Sentiments, preventing all ufe of Thought or Confideration about the occafions of them: Which Sentiments, because Pleasure and Pain are the Natural Marks of Good and Evil, are either Eafy or Uneafy, Pleafing or Difpleafing, according as the difference of the Impreffion E requires. 45. I fay, as the Difference of the Impreffion requires. For tho' there be no Proportion in general between Motion and Senfation, and tho' there be nothing in the particular Impreffions themselves refembling thofe particular Senfations, which we have in Confequence of them Part II. them; the Impreffion which is follow'd with Pleafure, differing only in Degree from that which is follow'd with Pain; yet forafmuch as in reference to the good or bad State of the Body they differ Effentially, as putting the parts of the Machine into divers Configurations, naturally tending to the Prefervation or Diffolution of it: It is fit that these Impreffions, tho' only gradually different in themselves, and fo of themselves indifferent to any Sentiment, or none at all, fhould yet be attended with Senfations Effentially, or Specifically different, fuch as Pleasure and Pain, as much as if there were all that Natural Correfpondence or Connexion between them that is commonly imagin'd. 46. This fuggefts to us at once an occafion to move a Question, and a Meafure whereby to refolve it. It may here be demanded, Are then the Impreffions of Bodies merely Pofitive and Arbitrary Conditions of our Senfations; or is there not rather a kind of fenfible Congruity between the one and the other? To which, according to the premised Account, I Answer, That they are only Conditions in oppofition to a proper Caufal Efficency, is, I think, what may abfolutely be affirm'd. But whether purely Pofitive and Arbitrary or no, must be answer'd by a Diftinction. If by purely Positive and Arbitrary Conditions be meant, that there is no real Analogy, or (abftracting from the Divine Order and Conftitution about it) neceffary Connexion between fuch Impreffions, and fuch fuch Senfations; fo they are purely Pofitive and Arbitrary Conditions. For most affuredly there is nothing in thofe Impreffions that cither refembles the following Senfations, or that Naturally and Neceffarily infers them. But if by their being purely Pofitive and Arbitrary Conditions be meant, that there is no greater Reafon why God in Confideration of the good of the Body, fhould touch the Soul with fuch a Sentiment upon fuch an Impreffion, rather than with another, or with its contrary; in this refpect as I do not, fo I need not fay, that they are purely Pofitive and Arbitrary Conditions, fince that greater Reafon is taken, not from the Relation which the Impreffion has to the Sentiment (which is none at all), but only from the Relation which fuch a Sentiment has to fuch a State or Difpofition of the Body, which fuppofing it is the Will of God to have preferved, it is neceffary he fhould give me fuch a Sentiment as fhall naturally admonish me to avoid whatever Impreffion is injurious to it, tho' there be otherwife no manner of Congruity between that Sentiment and that Impreffion. 47. And thus we have feen what Senfation. is, how it differs from Idea, and whence it proceeds; but before we difmifs the Confideration of it, I think it would be a great Omiffion here not to remark that the Errors of the Senfes (as they are more commonly than properly called) are indeed nothing elfe but those wrong Judgments which we make upon our Senfati ons Part II. ons or fenfible Perceptions, or elfe truely I know not what to understand by them, but muft reckon it among fome other forms of fpeaking, which tho' cuftomarily used, or for that reafon prefumed to be well understood, are yet without any diftinct or intelligible meaning. For Error being no more nor no less than a wrong Judgment, 'tis impoffible that Sense fhould be strictly capable of erring, as having no Capacity of Judgment belonging to it. That therefore which is call'd an Error of Senfe, is really an Error of the Mind, giving a falfe Judgment upon the occafion of what is truely perceiv'd. For as Error in the general is a wrong Judgment, fo then 'tis an Error of Senfe (to fpeak as the World does) when this wrong Judgment proceeds in Confequence of a Senfation, of which fenfible Errors we may confider two forts, fome that refpect the Objects without us, and fome that refpect the Senfation it felf. The former are they that are the Subjects of Common Difcourfe, and 'tis what People generally mean when they talk of the Errors of the Senfes. But tho' the former fort of fenfible Errors be most talkt of, yet the latter is that whichMen are moft guilty of,and which I take to be of the moft confiderable Confequence. Not that there is any room for Error, or poffibility of erring as to Senfation, abfolutely and in it felf confider'd. For what I feel, or am confcious of to my felf that I feel, that I do certainly feel, and confequently cannot err in judging |