ter) fays it is not in me; And upon inquiry we find that it is not, unlefs one of these fhould be Thought, which would be equal_Extravagance either to fuppofe or to confute. But moreover as our inquiry reports that it is not fo (to prevent all lofs of Labour in a further fearch) our Reafon will affure us that it cannot poffibly be in the Idea of Matter, because of the real diftinction and intire diversity between the Ideas of a thinking, and of an extended Being. Since to fuppofe Thought to be contain❜d in the Idea of Matter, notwithftanding this Ideal diverfity between a thinking and an extended Being, would be all one as if you should fuppofe that a Circle fhould have the property of a Triangle. But now if Thought be not in the Idea of Matter, then 'tis plain that it cannot be in Matter itself, and confequently that Matter cannot Think. And that because Matter (as every thing elfe) is supposed to be made according to its Idea, and confequently to have its Real Nature conformable to its Ideal Nature.

See his reply to

the Bishop of Worcefter's Answer to his 2d Letter.

39. And fo much is granted even by the Author of the Letters against the Bishop of Worcester, viz. that Thought is not included in the essence of Matter. But then he is pleased to betake himself to the Omnipotence of God, which he will have able to bestow upon Matter a power of Thinking, tho' no fuch Power be (by

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Part II. his own Confeffion) included in the effence of it. 'Tis I acknowledge a little odious to difpute the Power of God in any Cafe, and in fome Cafes not very Philofophically done to ingage one in it. And fince this Gentleman exprefly owns that Thought is not included in the effence of Matter, it will concern him to confider whether this be not one of those Cafes. I have, I hope,a due reverence for the Power of God, and would be as far from fetting any undue limits to it as he can be. And yet I must needs fay that to affign the Power of God in ftead of a Natural Reafon, or to fly to the Power of God against clear Reafon, appear to me equally unphilofophical. And indeed confidering that we can take our Measure of Things, only by thofe Ideas which we have of them, if after we have duly compared those Ideas, and determined of the natures and dif ferences of Things according to them, it shall be thought a fufficient Anfwer to have recourse to the Power of God, then we shall never be able to know how to judge of any thing, or when we have concluded any thing. And Tranfubftantiation it felf may be good found Doctrine, notwithstanding all that our Philofophy fhall remonftrate to the contrary from the Idea which we have of Body.

40. But to apply our Anfwer a little more diftinctly, there are two Senfes wherein God may be fuppos'd able by his Almighty Power, to make Matter think. Either in a divided,

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or in a compounded Senfe, that is (to give the meaning of this School-diftinction in plain English) either in this Senfe, that that which before was an extended Being, may afterwards by tranfmutation become a thinking Being, or in this, that an extended Being, remaining an extending Being, may alfo have Thought imparted to it, and fo at the fame time be a Thinking as well as an Extended Being. Now tho' I am not able to comprehend hon, yet I fhall not pretend to deny but that it may be poffible to an Almighty Power to make Matter think in the former way of understanding it. He that could make a thinking Being out of no Being, may, for ought I know, be as › able to make the fame out of an extended Being. And he who was able out of Stones (as the Scripture speaks) to raise up Childen unto Abraham, may alfo for any affurance I have to the contrary be able to make a thinking Being of mere Matter. I fay I know not but that the fame Power that could do the one may alfo do the other, tho' I must withal obferve that neither of the Inftances proves that it can, as, not being fully commenfurate to the Cafe. For when a thinking Being is faid to be made out of nothing, the Phrafe out of nothing, fignifies not the Matter, but only the Term of its production. But when a thinking Being is. faid to be made out of an extended Being, the meaning must be, that 'tis made out of it, as the Matter from whence, which is much hardE

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Part II. er to conceive than the other, unless you will suppose one to be annihilated, and the other to be produced in its room, but then 'tis not making a thinking Being, out of an extended Being, but out of nothing, as in ordinary Creation. And fo again, when God is faid to be able out of Stones, to raise up Children to Abraham, I fuppofe there is no neceffity of Understanding the Text, as to the Souls of those Children, but only as to their Bodily part, that which is intellectual Being, from elsewhere to be derived, as in ordinary Generation. In like manner as when God is faid to have form'd Adam from the Duft of the Ground, we can understand it only of his Body, the Original of his Soul being otherwife accounted for even by the facred Hiftory. But now there is a vaft deal of difference between converting one fort of Matter into another, as Stones into Flesh, or Water into Wine, &c. (for the effecting of which perhaps there needs no more than a new arrangement and difpofition of Parts) and converting Matter into Spirit, or an extended Being, into a thinking Being, things intirely different in their whole Order and Kind from one another; which yet, tho' of the extremeft difficulty of any thing that can fall under our Conception, I will not fay is abfolutely impoffible.

41. But now as for making Matter to think in a compounded Senfe, that is Matter, remaining Matter, this is a Thing of a very different

confi

confideration from the other, and that must be determin'd by other Measures. And yet even here I fhall readily acknowledge that God is able to make Matter to do whatfoever can be done by the Power of Matter, because he perfectly understands what the Power of Matter is, and knows alfo how to manage it to the best advantage. And if Men, by that little Skill which they have in the Mechanical Arts, and that little Power which they have to use and apply that Skill, can yet perform fuch great and wonderful things, God, who comprehends all Mechanifm in its utmost extent, and wants no Power to reduce his Theory to Practice, can, to be fure, if he pleases, perform much greater, even all that the Power of Matter can poffibly rife to, or (which is the true Measure of that Power) all that the Idea of Matter can in any intelligible degree be said to contain. But to go beyond that, or to give Matter a Power or a Perfection that is no way contain❜d in the Idea or intelligible Effence of Matter, this would be to alter the Species, and instead of making Matter to do this or that, to make fomething else to do it, which is not Matter; concerning which, there is no dif pute.

42. If then God can make Matter think, it must be by fomething contain'd in the Idea or Effence of Matter; for as for any fuperinduced Perfection that is not within the Comprehenfion of that Effence, that would make a change in E 2 the