judgment and their vote. A very singular spectacle in truth, such a legislature would present. The only point at issue, between a member from Connecticut and one from Tennessee, is regarding the wishes of each other's constituents. Each knows the views and desires of his own state or district infinitely better than the other; and yet each must stoutly contend that on this point, where politicians have almost an unerring instinct, the other is under a mistake; and that he himself, though living a thousand miles off, is better informed with regard to the wishes of a community, than the other, who by the supposition has his office on ly that he may convey those wishes to Congress. Truly a silent vote is the only fit one for a body such as this. A "gag law" ought to be carried out physically upon their persons; and the "one hour" of speak ing by rule should be shortened sixty minutes.

And it may be fairly doubted, whether even on constitutional questions, there can be an opening for debate in such an assembly. For although its members may be bound by oath" to support the constitution," still they may reasonably ask them selves whether these words intend the constitution as they, or as their constituents understand it. If their main duty is the one supposed, and if the constitution was formed by those who supposed so; it may be presumed that the private judgment of the representatives was not thought of, and that they were considered as mere instruments, like ministers of a sovereign, appointed to express the constitutional interpretations, as well as to carry out the measures of their masters. The oath can have two meanings, and that meaning is to be preferred which takes away the burden of deciding constitutional points from the representa tive, because on the supposition, he is freed under the constitution from following his own judgment

in all other cases where he acts officially.

Our course of argument, if true, overthrows the doctrine of instruction in all its forms. The extreme of this doctrine alone wears the look of principle, and will be adopted by right-minded men who are led astray by wrong theories. Its more com. mon shape is that of a mongrel between the two theories which we have been considering. A man must obey explicit instructions, it is said; but when they are not given, may presume that he is allowed to follow the dictates of his own reason. It was with reference to this view that we observed, that the mode by which the popular will is discovered makes no difference, provided it is the ground of duty. We now add the more general and fundamental remark, that if a man takes the place of his constituents, he is bound in all cases to do what they would be bound to do,-to act according to his best judgment as to the public good; and that thus the doctrine of instruction in all its aspects must be thrown to the winds.

In this way we can hope to have good legislators, men who will see the right and pursue it; but the other theory looks like a device to throw conscience overboard, and to free bad lawgivers and corrupt constituencies from all sense of guilt. It is a scheme to transfer responsibility from those who are qualified to feel it, who have had all sides of a measure held up before them during a debate, to those who can not and should not feel responsible. two parties are placed in a position something like that of the two thieves in the fable. The representative knows what is for the best, but is not bound to vote for it; the constit. uents have not the same means of judging, and yet bear all the weight of obligation. A great deal of hu man guilt would be prevented by a like ingenious process applied in oth er cases.

The

If our principles are sound, a representative may not pledge himself beforehand to a particular course, nor promise to obey instructions, nor actually obey them when given, unless they are intrinsically right. We do not say, and we beg those who may read what we write in a captious spirit to notice this,-that instructions may not be given and ought not to be respected. If they are regarded only in the light of advice and of an expression of opinion, they may be useful. If they are looked on as mere wishes, they are not to be thrown away; for it is one part of legislation, though a minor one, to gratify the wishes of particular sections, when they interfere with no greater good. But assur edly an honest man ought never to promise to vote in one way, when the result of deliberation may be to convince him that the very opposite is the right one. Still less ought he to bind himself in a general way to obey his constituents, for he thus multiplies the probabilities that he will give a wrong vote, and admits a most hurtful principle. It becomes all good men to resist the spread of the doctrine of instruction, which was formerly confined to our southern states, but which has of late begun to travel northward during these times of shifting majorities and of party bitterness, owing to the facility with which it enables each newly victorious party to obliterate the traces of its fallen rival. We admired the course of a distinguished lawyer of New York, when held up for the state senate a year and a half ago. He was called upon to pledge himself to vote, if elected, in favor of the system pursued by the public school society, and against that which the Catholics desired. He replied that his present opinion accorded with the proposed pledge, but that as he would be, if chosen, a member of a deliberative body, where he might hear reasons that would alter his persuasion, he could

take no pledge whatever. He was we believe dropped for this answer; being too good now to serve a party that heard him nominated with applause.

Gentlemen who hold to the duty of obeying instructions, often resign rather than perform it. But upon their principles such conduct is very strange and inconsistent. Why should they resign? Ought they to avoid doing what they own to be right, because it is unpleasant? Can there be any thing dishonorable in doing one's duty, in acting on principles which one has received long since, and perhaps used much to the annoyance of an antagonist? Such a representative too, should bethink himself of the wide range of the services he may render to his constituents: he has a larger sphere to act in, than a man has who feels that he must look at the public good in his vote. He can represent all parties and all combinations of opinion as they happen to be uppermost. He can be the "jack on both sides," and stay with the strongest until its game is out; and all this in obedience to a principle that binds his conscience. Happy man, in whom the love of office and duty thus harmoniously unite, and permit him, in the course of "one revolving moon" perhaps, to say aye and no upon any proposition whatsoever. But we fear that those who resign rather than obey, have an obscure feeling that they thus avoid a degrading situation, or entertain a suspicion that they can not obey without losing the respect of upright men. They now begin to be sensible that a man of far-reaching views and long experi ence is not wanted where any one who can vote would do just as well; and that a man of great talent is meanly employed in doing that to which a man of no talent is equal. If so, we respect them for their honorable feeling, and we receive with thankfulness the light their conduct throws on the subject before us; but

we also maintain that they are most inconsistent and most unjustifiable in declining to do an admitted duty. The tendency of the doctrine of instruction must now appear to be, even in its most qualified forms, that of degrading a legislative assembly. It is not easy to see why men of ability should wish to sit in a body upon which eloquence and argument are wasted; where they can not expect to persuade and ought not themselves to be persuaded. Upright men, again, will not be returned, if they hold the principle for which we have been contending. There remain then only the second rate politicians, with a part of the weaker sort of honest men, to compose a house, the proceedings of which may affect the civil interests of millions and the relations of a country to the world beside. And is this the place from which intelligence or uprightness ought to be driven? Such a body would not probably long have the power to do great good or evil. There is an inconsistency between its capacity and the constitutional powers left to it, which would make itself felt. Or penalties might reasonably come in to prevent disobedience to instructions; for surely the judge is no more justly impeached and punished for a breach of his main duty, to decide according to law, than the representative would be for violating his chief obligation to express by his vote the popular will for the present time. with this, clear specific instructions must be written out to guide the whole course of the representative. He certainly would have a right to demand them, lest he might be punished for mistakes as if they were misdemeanors. Freighted with documents which revealed to him his duty, his great aim would be to make himself master of their contents; and if doubts or new cases arose, the constituents must again be consulted and relieve him from his embarrassment. If he venture to sug

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gest views which they oppose, or argue with them in his communications, they will suspect him of a disobedient spirit, and perhaps remove him to put a more pliant man in his place. Thus the few honest men that might remain in such an assembly would leave it, and be succeeded by those who would not dare to rebuke or give advice, who would sit quiet spectators of the mistakes of their employers, anxious only to avoid their wrath. It would be idle to speculate upon the ultimate effect on political institutions, when this principle had had its perfect work: the probability is that a new wheel would be added to the machine, rendering it only more complex; that a body constituting itself the people's representatives, would meet in caucus to decide what measures the people should approve and what condemn; and that thus, in the place of one body gathered in the center with the ability to compare and adjust the interests of the whole nation, would arise in every quarter knots of local politicians, who, if honest, could not have looked beyond the bounds of their own horizons.

And how widely do the two theories separate from one another, when viewed with reference to a whole country. To the man who feels bound to pursue the public good, it is no matter who elects him; he feels that his duties have a permanent form. It is the same to him, whether he is chosen by a district or by a general ticket, or whether the whole union should choose all its representatives in a body. In all cases, he regards himself as the representative of the whole nation; appointed indeed to take care of the interests of a certain section, but still bound-as the section itself is bound-to make those interests yield to more important ones, when they are inconsistent. He perceives that in his person and that of his fellow representatives, the country virtually meets together;

that there is no other place where the interests of all can be compared and adjusted; and that to make so sacred a body, created to promote the common good, powerless it may be in that respect, and only powerful to carry out the selfish plans of a petty district, is to poison legislation at its source. This being his temper, his ear is not closed to any suggestions that may come from any quarter, east, west, or south; and as his pledge is not given to oppose the best measures, he can view every proposition with candor and accept of it freely. The peoThe people too, feeling that this is the aim of legislation, will select men who can best secure the public weal, men who have looked abroad over the whole of the country, who understand every interest, and most clearly those of their constituents. They will be confident that such men will not deceive them, nor baścly sacrifice their substantial welfare. And they will soon find out that the good of all the parts is so linked together, that their representative, who seeks that good and secures it, will secure their own.

But upon the other theory, unless the interests of all the districts shall be seen obviously to coincide, there can be no broad or generous legis lation. Until the selfish interests of the parts, by some magical system of balances, shall turn into the good of the whole; until then will a country under such lawgivers, fail of prosperity and true progress. A kind of feudal principle will prevail over the principles of free republics, to keep the parts in a state of isolation, and split that into fragments whose excellence consists in

being undivided. The nearest approach to an enlarged system possible under such a theory, is that of log-rolling, as it is significantly called; which has tended to burden some of the United States with useless public works, ruinous expenses, and disgrace; or the still worse

system of parties as at present carried out in practice; under which the majority who choose the representative, are his only constituents; the party arrange the measures for the state or country; the members of the party in the district are dragged into those measures by force; and the representative himself is like the men in some armies, who are chained together to fight for their masters.

Nor is it of any use to say, that by the doctrine of instruction you obtain representatives who will not be faithless to the interests of their constituents. For whether they are pledged or not, the fact still continues the same, that they can vote on which side they please, and under the influence of any kind of motives. The impulse to follow the wishes of one's constituents, is surely stronger in ordinary cases than any other; and many a man, who has discarded the doctrines of obedience to them, has obeyed them in practice even against the convictions of his own judgment. The possibility now remains on the one hand, that men professing to have the highest interests of the whole country in view, will act from base motives, when they disregard the interests of their constituents; and on the other, that men who promise to mind their constituents in all things, will desert their cause for the sake of filthy lucre or of office. If what we have said above is true respecting the kind of representatives which the two theories in question would bring into legislative assemblies, there can not be much doubt on which side the greater evil would lie.

The principle which we have been advocating, but not the opposite one, can be reconciled with the provis ions of the Constitution. This instrument does not indeed, in express words, set forth the relation which it regards the representative as holding. Our argument from it can only

reach the point of showing, that the practice of obedience to constituents tends to results certainly not looked for by the constitution, and is opposed to its spirit, so far as can be argued from the analogies of other provisions. We will give the considerations which have occurred to us, without much regard to order. It is expressly provided, that the members of neither house shall be questioned in any other place for any speech or debate. (Art. I, sect. 6.) But if so plain a thing as obedience to the express will of constituents is a duty, resulting from the only true theory of government, the opposite is a crime and ought to be punished as such by statutes, and not, as now, simply by the loss of public favor. Such a course tends too, to change the term of office allowed under the constitution. And this it does the more effectually, because the same reason which requires obedience from the representative during his office, will more imperatively call on him to lay down his office if the people of his district should so wish. And hence, every oscillation of the majority, every change of a few voices, which in these days, like the clouds, are banked up and scattered by alternate blasts of wind, must require a resignation and a new elec. tion. The constitution again allows the two houses to place themselves in a situation where they can neither consult or guess at the will of the people, by permitting secret ses sions and the suppression of such parts of their journals, as in their judgments may require secrecy. (Art. I, sect. 5.) Why should it increase or even make insurmountable, the difficulty of finding out that, upon which the duties of legislators depend? It gives Congress also the power to "provide for the general welfare of the United States," (Art. I, 8,) within certain limits, which it attempts distinctly to mark out. May it not be fairly Vol. I.

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argued, that they who receive such a power become obligated to use it; that, as it requires the highest judg ment and oftentimes a disregard of local interests, they are bound to act accordingly? And which is most consistent with the spirit of an instrument which was framed for union and for the general welfare, to keep that welfare in view as the most important thing in every vote, or to keep it in view only when the selfish wishes of the parts do not oppose? Our position again receives some support, from the discretionary and advisory power of the President. This officer being chosen by a majority of the people, is bound according to the principles of the doctrine of instruction, so far as his relations to legislation are concerned,* equally with the representatives, to obey the voice of the people in every measure. But when he is required "to recommend to the consideration of Congress such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient," it is no doubt presumed, that he will afterwards also judge concerning the necessity and expediency of measures, when they are presented to him for his sanction; that is, that he will accept or reject them, as he shall think the public good demands. (Art. I, sect. 7.) And so much weight is given to his objections, that he has the questionable power of impeding legislation by his veto; nay, in most cases, of preventing it altogether.

We believe that this principle is distinctly recognized in the constitutions of some of the states, but we have no leisure to enquire whether this is really the case. It is rather amusing, that when one party in one of the houses of the legislature

Though the President has no legislative power according to the constitution, (Art. I, sect. 1,) there can be no law without him; and that, as a judging, reflecting person, (Art. I, sect. 7,) not as a formality.