worship, idolatry itself-are apparently practiced by the heathen without compunction. They plead, that it is an act of humanity to destroy the aged who can only suffer if they live, and also infants of feeble constitution or of poor parentage. They claim also, that it is their duty to worship idols, according to the custom of their ancestors. Such, in general, is their blindness, that if they sin by such conduct, it is a sin of ignorance. But is it true, that they commit no sin against conscience by these acts, which it is admitted are naturally wrong? Is it true, that their faith in a false god, renders it their duty to worship him? Is it possible, in other words, that they should be so fully persuaded of the truth of these errors, as to feel, on reflection, no doubt respecting them. Paul teaches us the contrary. In Rom. i, 32, he informs us, that they who do such things as he had charged upon the heathen, are worthy of death. He represents them to be guilty for performing those actions which are naturally wrong, of which he gives an extended catalogue, and of the obligation of which we should suppose them to be ignorant, if entire ignorance is possible. Nor does he justify their idolatry, which it is reasonable to suppose they conscientiously practiced, if man can be truly conscientious in any conduct which is condemned by the light of

nature.

This hypothesis is moreover liable to the objection, that it supposes a person may be led by such an examination of the subject, as seems to him candid and complete, to an unhesitating belief that he ought to do that which is naturally wrong. For if, on reflection, he can not refer to any such ground of conviction, that he is doing his duty, his reason will tell him, that he may be wrong, and conscience will refuse to pronounce an unequivocal sentence of approbation on his conVol. I.

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duct. He can be satisfied only by what he believes to be a full and candid investigation; and it is improbable, if nothing more, that such an investigation would lead him to a false conclusion in regard to a question of natural duty.

What indeed is this hypothesis but the pernicious doctrine of infidelity, that sincere differences of opinion in regard to religious and moral obligations, may be honestly entertained; and that such opinions, if erroneous, are only to be pitied, not condemned. This spreads a shield over the conscience and reputation of wicked men; for whatever may be their misconduct, they feel justified, if it corresponds with their creed, and they expect the community will pronounce on them the same favorable judgment.

This hypothesis farther implies, that human governments may justly punish men for doing their duty to God. Whoever commits murder or robbery is punished, on detection, by the civil power; yet who knows, if a person may be unequivocally impelled by his conscience to do what is naturally wrong, that the most atrocious crimes may not be committed under this conviction? And if so, the crimes ought, in those instances, to be committed; or the agent is placed under the embarrassing necessity of sinning, whichever course he may adopt.

The Bible, we believe, invariably charges man with guilt when he does things which are naturally wrong; and represents his ignorance to be only a palliation of the crime. Thus, Luke xxiii, 34, "Then said Jesus, Father forgive them; for they know not what they do." They were ignorant in some respects, which mitigated their of fense; in other respects, they knew better; and hence they needed forgiveness. Luke xii, 47, 48. Those who are destitute of a written revelation, are represented as not know

ing the will of their master, and yet doing things worthy of stripes. Their ignorance is comparative, not absolute; which mitigates their desert of punishment. This is the uniform representation of the subject in the Bible, with only one apparent exception. Paul declares in his sermon on Mars Hill, Acts xvii, 30, that God winked at the ignorance of former ages, but now commandeth all men every where to repent. But this language can mean no more than the forbearance, with which God had looked upon the sins and impenitence of the heathen, in consideration of their partial ignorance; not that he acquitted them of all blame. For the Bible else where charges them with guilt, and represents the wrath of God to be revealed from heaven against their wickedness. Rom. i, 18, 19. Hence, as a person is manifestly not culpable for actions which are naturally wrong, as murder and idolatry, if he is impelled by an unequivocal sense of duty to do them, we see no way of reconciling the fact with the Bible, but by denying that such an unhesitating be lief is possible. A perfectly pure conscience belongs to those only, who, with pure motives, do acts which are not naturally wrong→ which are to them in every sense right. It often happens that the mind decides, in view of certain considerations, that a given act ought to be performed, which, in view of other considerations of higher authority, it decides ought not to be done; at least not at present, not with existing feelings, not until some prior act or further deliberation. This feeling of the mind, that we ought to reflect, or ought to do some other thing before we proceed to a given action, which we deem to be our duty, is a dictate of conscience paramount to that which urges us to perform that given action. It takes precedence of it; it speaks decisively, without hesitation, with

our

out ambiguity; it must be obeyed before the conscience can insist unequivocally on the performance of the other act. Thus in all cases, in which a person thinks himself under obligation to do that which God forbids, he would, on reflec tion, see reasons for a different opinion. This prior reflection, or a candid and full examination of the subject, is demanded by the conscience before it can pronounce an unequivocal approval on conduct. Although a religious bigot, under the influence of pride and malignity, may feel he ought to persecute heretics, yet his self-approbation can not endure the ordeal of calm inquiry, such as his conscience requires. He must feel on reflection, that he is acting with wrong feelings, or without due de liberation. We must admit it to be universally true, that conscience thus demands, first of all, an honest and full examination of the ques tion of duty, and that such an ex amination never leaves the mind in incertitude, at least not bound by an unhesitating belief that a wrong action is right and obligatory; or else that God has placed us in a condition, where we can not ascer tain his will.

We have discussed this point at length, because it is only by an accumulation of probabilities, that the result can be established.

While, however, it seems certain that every voluntary act of a moral agent, which to him is naturally wrong, is also morally wrong; his ignorance may very much palliate the criminality of his conduct. The degrees of guilt, which mankind contract by violating the same law, depend on various circumstances, familiar to all, such as their respective ages, professions, informa tion, and even habits which are the result of their own conduct. A strictly temperate person who be lieves the use of intoxicating drinks to be unlawful, and has strong hab

its of self-control, would incur more guilt than a common drunkard by deliberately drinking to intoxication. The question, therefore, arises, whether man is responsible for all the natural results of his miscon duct. It is the opinion of President Wayland, that a person may be equitably punished for acts, which at the time he thought it his duty to do, because his conscience was blinded by previous misconduct. This notion embraces the hypothe sis, which we have endeavored to refute, that a person may be unequivocally impelled by his conscience, to do that, which is naturally wrong; and then, to relieve the difficulty, which attends the supposition, that he is blameless for such acts, affirms that he is guilty, because, if he had always done his duty, he would not have mistaken it in the present case. This is manifestly throwing the whole guilt of the agent, whatever it may be, back upon the misdeeds which lead to his present blindness. It virtually asserts that he is not directly guilty, that he may even deserve commendation, for the actions of to-day, though they are naturally wrong; but that he contracted the same amount of guilt by the previous misconduct, from which his mistake arises, which he would incur by performing his present actions with a full conviction of their unlawfulness.

This hypothesis is carried still farther by the supposition, that a person may be justly held responsible, for whatever amount of virtue and usefulness he would have attained, by a life of undeviating obedience to the moral law-that no present incapacity to do good, which is the result of past negligence, or crime, absolves from the obligation of doing it.

"Man," our author says, "is created with moral and intellectual powers, capa ble of progressive improvement. Hence, if he use his faculties as he ought, he

will progressively improve; that is, be He is assured of enjoying all the bene come more and more capable of virtue, fits which can result from such improvement. If he use these faculties as he ought not, and become less and less capable of virtue, he is hence held responsible for all the consequences of his misimprovement. Now as this misimprove ment is his own act, it manifestly does not affect the relations under which he is these relations; that is, he stands in created, nor the obligations resulting from respect to the moral requirements under which he is created, precisely in the his moral powers correctly." same condition as if he had always used

"As he is at this moment responsible for such a capacity for virtue, as would have been attained by a previously perfect rectitude; and as his capacity is inferior to this; and as no reason can be suggested why his progress in virtue should, under these circumstances, be more rapid than that of a perfect being, but the confall short of what is justly required of trary; it is manifest that he must ever him-nay, that he must be continually falling farther and farther behind it."

"And hence, although it were shown that a man was, at any particular period of his being, incapable of that degree of virtue which the law of God required, it would neither follow that he was not under obligation to exercise it, nor that he was not responsible for the whole amount of that exercise of it; since, if he have dwarfed his own powers, he is responsi ble for the result. And, conversely, if it will not prove that man is now capable God require this whole amount of virtue, of exercising it; but only that he is either thus capable, or that he would have been so, if he had used correctly the powers which God gave him."-Moral Science, pp. 93, 4, 5.

These opinions we think erroneous. Suppose, for illustration, that A and B commence life together, with similar advantages. A embraces all his opportunities of selfimprovement, and becomes distinguished for piety and usefulness. B takes a different course, and sinks into vice and imbecility. The result is, that A now recognizes and performs cheerfully a multitude of duties, to which B is either incompetent or indisposed. Is B responsible for failing to do from day to day the same amount of good which A accomplishes, or which he would do if not prevented by past mis

conduct? To this it may be replied:

So far as the previous misconduct of B has merely increased his aversion to right moral conduct, his present duty is what it would have been, if his past conduct had been right. A mere indisposition and inaptitude to right conduct, since it is no proper inability to do his duty, is no excuse for omitting it.

So far as his past misconduct has destroyed his capacity or proper ability to do good, he is under no obligation to do good. He is responsible for only that amount of piety and well-doing to which he is now competent. The talents, the knowledge, the health, the influence, which he might have acquired, and which he is guilty for having failed to acquire, he does not now possess. A can, therefore, do more good than he, and more than he is under obligation to do. His present powers are all which he can refuse to devote to God, and all which he can choose to prostitute.

The criminality of each wrong act of the life of B, is measured by the violence with which he then resisted his obligations. This is the reason why wrong actions are aggravated in proportion to the light which the agent possesses respecting the nature of his conduct.

The more he knows of the moral turpitude of an action, and of its bad effects, the more criminality he contracts by performing it. The clearer his conviction is, that he ought not to do an act, the more guilt he contracts by doing it, because he resists more powerful motives to obedience. Thus, every foreseen and probable bad consequence of an action augments the guilt of the act, because the agent chooses, for the sake of forbidden gratification, to give birth to those evils. The bad disposition which he manifests, acts with different degrees of intensity, in proportion as the counteractive influences which it encounters and overcomes

increase in power. This disposition measures the guilt of the agent, because he is worthy of the displeasure of God in proportion to the violence with which his will resists his duty.

B, then, is not responsible for all the unhappy results of his misconduct. In consequence of previous negligence and crime, he is now unable, in many respects, to do the good of which he might have become the author. His sins have reduced him to want, to disease, to mental imbecility. Repentance itself will not completely repair the injury which he has done to his pow

ers.

He can not serve God with the ability of A. Nor, as we have seen, is he now under equal obligations. His present duty is bounded by his present capacity. Neither are the acts which have led to this incapacity chargeable with the same amount of guilt which he would incur, if, possessing the requisite power, he should now refuse to perform the duties for which he has neglected to qualify himself. His past misconduct is loaded with that amount of guilt only, which was contracted at the time by the violence which he did to obligation. The results, which it was impossible for him to anticipate, had no effect on the moral quality of his actions. Because a person steals a pin in his youth, he may in manhood steal a horse; but in stealing the pin, he may contract no more guilt than by a like act in subsequent life, and probably less, since in mature life he sins against clearer light. So far as he knew, in childhood, the effect of small thefts on character, and anticipated as probable the consequent crime of horse-stealing, his guilt in stealing the pin was enhanced. But since many of the bad consequences of wrong conduct it is impossible to foresee, they are not to be considered in estimating the guilt of the agent. Take a familiar case: A man, who knows he can not drink

wine freely without losing his reason, drinks to excess, and in a fit of derangement kills his wife and children, whom in his sober moments he tenderly loves. In this dreadful act he is not a moral agent. Is he then guilty? Not for this act. He manifestly contracts no guilt in doing what he has no free agency in doing. Of what then is he guilty? Of the act of consenting to expose himself to the possibility of such a distressing deed. His criminality is not precisely that which he would have incurred, if he had foreseen the result, not that which would have accrued if he had killed his wife and children in his sane moments, but that which is involved in his consenting, for gross pleasure, to expose his family to the fury of a maniac. Thus, too, if a man sells ardent spirits to a drunkard, and the drunkard is consequently thrown from his horse and killed, though the vender is guilty, he is not guilty to that precise amount which he would have incurred, if he had murdered his customer, or if he had foreseen the consequent catastrophe. This might, if necessary, be made still more evident, by less doubtful examples of the same general character. Suppose a man cuts off his hand, to avoid fulfilling an engage ment to labor. Is he responsible for all the results? What if, in process of time, he stands on the bank of a stream, in which a fellow creature is struggling, and, without assistance, must perish? What if he can not render this assistance, solely because he has only one hand? He stands an afflicted spectator of the death of his brother, lamenting his inability to rescue him. Is he as truly guilty of the crime of murder as he would have been if he had not maimed himself, and had stood there withholding voluntarily the relief in his power? Or did he, when he cut off his hand, contract the guilt of murder? The answer is obvious. He could not rationally have antici

pated the loss of life, as one of the consequences of his act, much less have certainly foreknown it, and hence he is not guilty of the crime of murder.

Thus, universally, the acts which occasion an incapacity of doing good, which it was impossible to foresee, are not chargeable with guilt for the subsequent omission of what would otherwise have been obligatory. Nor is any thing more required of a person, than the right use of his present powers.

He

But is not man responsible at the outset of life, for the highest excellence to which he would attain by uninterrupted acts of duty during his whole life? Certainly not. is not responsible to-day for the conduct of futurity. He is responsible for his actions as they rise from day to day. He is bound to use his powers in discharging his whole duty as it meets him. But if at any time he fails to do so, and this failure impairs his capacity for virtue, he will subsequently be responsible for that amount of virtue only, to which his impaired capacity is adequate. Were it true that man's natural capacity for moral excellence is not affected by his misconduct, but only his moral disposition, it might be said that he must answer for that amount of virtue and usefulness, to which undeviating obedience to God would lead him; for this would only be saying that he will be responsible for all these duties as they rise, and this on the ground that he will have capacity to do them. Since, however, it is true, that the misdeeds of to-day may result in diminishing his capacity for virtue and usefulness, to an extent, which in early life particularly he could not anticipate, it is manifest he did not incur the same guilt when he committed them,which he would have contracted if all these results had been foreseen.

But although no one is responsible, at the commencement of life, for all the personal excellence and