tioned right, not derived from government, not derived from society, existing independent of law and government, independent of society-a right which man has received from God, and for the exercise of which he is responsible to God alone? How then can the declaration of independence be any authority for another and distinct right, the legal right of a majority to change constitutions at will?

It is assumed here, we are aware, first, that this right of THE PEOPLE belongs to the people as an organized body; and, secondly, that this organized body is a permanent one, acting by a majority; whence it is inferred, since the right itself is indefeasible, the people as an organized body, always have it in reserve to exercise at pleasure. We say both of these positions are mere assumptions, without any proof. In regard to the first, we know with absolute assurance that each individual possesses these inalienable rights, but what is the process of reasoning the intermediate truths, by which we arrive at the conclusion that the organic whole has the same? An organic whole has a will distinct from that of each individual composing it, and the exercise of an indefeasible right by a majority, is incompatible with the exercise of the same by the individuals of a minority. Indeed how could an individual alienate to the body as an organic whole, an inalienable right? Besides, we can give a more consistent meaning to the phrase. The right is inherent in the individual. But the efforts of individuals against an oppressive government, would be in vain, without coöperation. They must exercise their rights in concert, to be successful. They agree to do it. This compact, which is itself a sort of government, may lay each individual who is a party to it, under certain obligations to the organized whole; but the right thus accruing to that body

is not inalienable; they are rights of agreement, governmental rights. We think it evident the expression, the right of the PEOPLE, has reference to this circumstance, and merely indicates that the individuals of any community are united in exercising their natural rights.

There is an equal want of evidence to establish the second position, that this organized body is a permanent one. We may suppose three cases. The first is, that all the individuals of any community are united in overthrowing a government. They are then constituted as an organized body, but by their own consent, and for a specific purpose. But the organization ceases by its own limitation, when the object is gained for which it existed. The next thing after overthrowing a government, is to form a new one, and this of course requires consent and union in the exercise of natural rights. The second suppo sition, therefore, may be, that the larger portion of the individuals of the people agree to act together for this purpose. But this united body is a new organization, made by a new agreement, and for another pur pose. It may have authority over those who are united together in it; but how can it justly exercise any over those individuals who do not join in it? since each has the same natural right to resist the new as the old government, and they may combine together to do it—and that on the authority of the declaration of independence. But we may suppose, thirdly, that all the individuals who were engaged in the revolution, unite as one whole, and consent to invest the body with authority to form a government. Here then is another union of all the individuals of the community, but this too is for a specific purpose, and it must cease when the purpose is secured, and of course with it the exercise of any rightful authority by a majority as a whole, over the individ

uals of the minority. For, suppose the majority of this body, united by consent to form a government, should afterwards endeavor to overthrow it, could it, by virtue of that authority, rightfully demand of the individuals of the minority to act with it or to acquiesce in what it is doing? The reply of each individual is obvious, the authority of the people as a body, over me, is by my consent, and I consented to a union for a specific purpose, to form a government, not to overthrow one, and the individuals of that minority may combine to make resistance, and that on the authority of the declaration of independence. These three things, then, are distinct-the individual man possessing in his very nature from his Creator, certain permanent and inalienable rights; men united as a people into government, possessed in its corporate capacity, of permanent, but not inalienable rights; and, finally, men united as a people into one body, for a temporary purpose, either to abolish or to create a government, and possessed in its corporate capacity of only temporary rights. We say, then, there is no proof that the inalienable rights of the individual reside in the whole people, as an organized body, or that the organization of the people for the exercise of these rights in abolishing or establishing governments, is a permanent one. But upon these fallacious suppositions alone, rests the argument for "the legal right" of the majority to change governments at will; and it is only through a mistaken interpretation, that the declaration of independence can be appealed to in this

case.

We return now to the true doctrine of that instrument. It is, that to man, as a creature of God, there belong inalienable rights, implanted, as it were, in his very nature, by the Being who made him. The grant of these rights, elevates him

high in the scale of intelligent existences, but at the same time it imposes upon him the most solemn moral duties, and never does man act under a more awful responsibility, than when renouncing the authority of man, he directly appeals to his Creator, as the sole judge of what he is then doing. This is indeed, the necessary characteristic of these rights, which clearly makes them distinct from the rights of government and law, that for them man is accountable, not to man, not to the people as a body, not to government, but to God. The questions arising under them, may be settled peaceably by agreement, or violently by force; but when men have once appealed to these rights for their justification in overthrowing or forming a new government, there is no organized body, armed with the power of law to settle the controversy. Union there may be of those who are de voted to the same object, yet a union of action, not formed by law, but by free consent, and for a specific purpose. Wherefore, according to the declaration of independence, any portion of the people of Rhode Island had the right, if they thought it their duty to exercise it, and could agree to do it in concert, of forming a constitution in the month of November, 1841, at Providence; but the remainder of the inhabitants possessed precisely the same right to form another in the year 1842, at Newport, or to continue to live under the one which had existed for almost two centuries. If the latter thought it best to yield to the former, they could do it; but if in their judgment they thought it best to resist, in order to secure life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, they could do it. It is not necessary to decide here, which party would be in the wrong if wrong, it is a moral wrong, for which each individual of the two bodies is accountable to a higher

than an earthly tribunal-having in these transactions made the appeal alone, "to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of their intentions."

We see not how there is room for a shadow of doubt, but that the right laid down in the declaration of independence, is "the right above all human law, a right of resistance to law, a right of revolution ;" more especially, we see not how there can be any with the writer, whose words we have just quoted. For, he admits this right of revolution "is founded on the natural rights of the individual," and is to be exercised when "government transcends the limits of its just authority." But what other rights are mentioned in the declaration of independence than the natural rights of individuals? and when does it justify their exercise, except when the government" becomes destructive of the ends" for which it exists? Are they not the same right, and both alike the right of revolution? How then can the writer adduce the authority of this venerable declaration in favor of another and very different right? Unless, then, the proceedings in Rhode Island are to be justified as a revolution, it gives them not the sanction of its authority. In fact, the greater part of the writers in their defense, make no distinction. They justify them as a revolution on the authority of the declaration, and then deny that it is a revolution. "A member of the Boston bar," in a review of Dr. Wayland's Discourse, defends the formation of the new constitution, expressly on the strength of the "old liberty doctrine, without which we should never have broken one link of parliamentary despotism, one chain of British misrule," and yet he acknowledges, that Dr. Wayland admits the existence of that doctrine as well as himself. But in the tumult of excited feelings, he confounds all distinctions. For sure

ly he must have seen in his cooler moments, that the greater part of his fiery sentences have nothing to do with the question to be settled. Gov. Hubbard writes in the same loose manner, though he had the benefit of the discriminations in the Democratic Review. He justifies the formation of the new constitution, as a revolution; for he says, the principle on which its supporters acted is the same as that on which we practiced as a nation, "when we recognized the independence of the South American republics and of Texas ;" and yet, he seems all unconscious of what a revolution is, and talks of it as if it were a mere occurrence of party politics.

But we are dwelling too long upon this part of the subject. We will now examine the declaration of rights in the constitutions of the several states, taking that of Connecticut as a fair specimen of the whole. This is the language of it"that all political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit; and that they have at all times an undeniable and indefeasible right to alter their form of government in such manner as they may think expedient." Here is an assertion of an inherent and indefeasible right in the people to form a government, and as this right is exercised peacefully, it looks more like a legal right, vesting the majority with legal authority over the minority. But in order to understand the import of this declaration, we must examine again and with more care, the doctrine of natural rights.

The idea of rights includes, first, power, both physical, intellectual, and moral, for the accomplishment of certain ends, which ends may be summed up in one, "the pursuit of happiness ;" and, secondly, the consciousness of its being a moral duty, to employ this power

for this purpose. These two things in union, the power, and the sense of moral obligation to use it, constitute what may be called an authority to man, founded in his nature to pursue happiness-an authority not from human government and law, but from God. Every man knows without the wavering of a doubt, he has the proof within himself, that he, the individual man, has that right, well denominated a Natural Right. But we must carefully distinguish here; this evidence from the nature of it does not prove that the right belongs to the people as an organized body, but to each individual of those who constitute the people. According to this, each man is a sovereign, and there is nothing to prove that any individual has, by virtue of his sovereignty, any legal claim over another. We have thus far gone on with absolute certainty.

Let us now look at a fact. We find these individual men at the present time, and so far as we know, always in the past, under government and law. We state the existence of these as a fact, in order to avoid a discussion of the theories that have been made, to explain the manner in which government over a particular nation was first formed. We prefer to look at the historical fact, and to decide each case as it arises on its own merits, by the application of acknowledged principles. What, now, is the relation which government and law hold to this power, which his Creator has given to each individual for the pursuit of happiness? That the pursuit of happiness on the part of each man might be not only consistent with the pursuit of it on the part of every other, but promotive of it, is a possible supposition; and if it were a reality, there would be no need of government and law. These, then, exist in order that each individual may employ in the best way the natural rights which his

Creator has given him, and not for the sake of the whole people as an organized body. Indeed, government and law embody the wisdom of the whole, and use it for the good of the individual. So long as government completely answers this end, no questions arise to be settled, and we need not here inquire into the ground of its authority. We state its undeniable object.

We now turn to another fact. A particular government becomes destructive of the ends for which it exists. Here then a question arises, not for the people as an organized body to decide, but for each individual, as it is the individual who is interested in it. One individual, conscious of his natural rights, knowing that government exists for their security, and feeling that it has failed of this end, judges it to be his duty to resist it, and as far as he can, to overthrow it; another individual does the same, and so on till each individual, either expressly or by implication, determines upon the exercise of the same right; and for this decision, no one is accountable to another, but each and all to God. We will suppose now, that the existing government makes no resistance, and that a new government is to be formed. The individuals, who agreed in the duty of changing the government, agree also in making a new one, and declare it to be the indefeasible right of the people to do so. But the question is, do they mean that this indefeasible right belongs to the people as an organized body, or to each individual of those who, by consent, are united together for that purpose ? The latter; because, the inherent, indefeasible right, belongs to the individual, and is derived from God, while whatever rights belong to the people as an organized whole, are derived from the consent of each individual, and are therefore alienable, since the consent may be with

drawn. This conclusion seems to us certain. The right of altering, abolishing or forming governments, laid down in the declarations of rights, is the natural right of the declaration of independence, with no other difference than this, that it is exercised with the consent, express or implied, of each individual of the community, and with the cooperation of government. But this is a very different thing from a right in the people, regarded as an organized body, and whose will is expressed by the majority and binding legally upon the minority, to make governments at will. We have seen that the proof goes only to show, that the natural, inalienable rights, reside in each individual of the people, and that whatever right belongs to the people as an organized body, is alienable, being by consent, and 'temporary, the consent being given for a temporary purpose.

We stop here for a moment. For it is this ambiguous use of the word people, which gives any plausibility whatever to the opinions we op pose. It may refer to the individuals composing the body, simply as acting in concert and by agreement for a specific temporary purpose, or it may denote.a permanent organized body, expressing its will through a majority. It is used in the former sense, as we have shown, both in the declaration of independence and in the different declarations of rights. But those who defend the legality of the formation and ratification of the new constitution in Rhode Island, uniformly use it in the latter sense, and thus pervert the genuine American principles of the declaration of independence, and of the constitutions of the states, in the very act of appealing to them as authority.

We will now upon this point follow the writer in the Democratic Review, sentence by sentence, and point out the fallacy in the use of this word.

He

After saying that at the Revolution "the whole population was remitted to their original rights," "their rights as men," and that "all the states but Connecticut and Rhode Island, created forms of government for themselves," to the query, "how were these formed?" he replies, "by the actual or implied consent of the whole people." (If you mean of each individual in that body, the whole people, you have proved that, for each man was remitted to his original rights, and he acted accordingly.) He goes on to say, "a constitution being thus once formed by an act of popular sovereignty," (that is, of the sovereignty of the people, and if you mean, that each individual of the body acting sovereignly, or independent of any other, consented to the constitution, you have proved that, and we do not deny it)—" the elective franchise may be restricted to a particular class," &c. then inquires, "is the consent thus given, really or by implication, to a constitution," (by each individual, however, it is to be observed,) "revocable," and "can the exercise of the sovereignty be resumed at any time by the whole people," (that is, can each individual in the body of the whole people agree to renounce the existing government, and acting again in a sovereign capacity, make a new one? we admit such. a case is conceivable,) "without the consent of the parties to whom the power may have been confided ?" (We see not how there would be any parties left to withhold consent.) But let us look to the writer's own answer to these questions. The answer depends, he supposes, upon this, whether the rights which be longed to the whole people, when they formed a new government at the Revolution-that is to say, to each individual in the body of the whole people; for it is only to man as man, that inalienable rights have been proved to belong-" were transferable or defeasible?" Undoubtedly