the natural rights of each individual were indefeasible. But how can you stride from this premise to the conclusion, that the majority as an organized body had at the formation of the government, an indefeasible right to make and unmake constitutions at will? Let us suppose for a moment, that the larger portion of the individuals in the community, each one in the exercise of his indefeasible rights, should agree to form a new constitution, and that the smaller portion of individuals, each in the exercise of the same rights, should agree to abide by the old one; how has the former as an organized body a "legal right" over the latter as an organized body? Was it from this that at the outset, each individual in the whole community did agree to exercise his natural rights in harmony, and did then form a constitution? But that agreement ceased when the constitution was established. What other source is there? None. The truth is, it cannot be proved that to the people or the totality of individuals, viewed as an organized body, and expressing its will by a majority, there belong inalienable and indefeasible rights. Indeed, if the people as an organic whole, have an indefeasible right to make a constitution at will, and if any individual of this body has also an indefeasible right to revolutionize it by force, as the writer admits, we think these indefeasible rights are in danger of becoming feasible, and that too by an exercise of them which is admitted to be just. We repeat it, the notion of the people being an organized body distinct from government and to which inalienable rights pertain, has no evidence in its favor, and yet the justification of the new constitution in Rhode Island, as a legal measure, rests upon this falla cy. The important doctrine of the rights of the people, in its legitimate use, can give it no support; and the unmeaning changes which are rung

on these and kindred phrases, amount to nothing, that is, in the argument.

In this connection, we can most easily show the fallacy of another favorite argument. "Sovereignty resides in the people." The act of the majority binds the whole-and therefore, "it is the right of the majority to change the government at pleasure." This sovereignty is distinct, it is to be observed, from the supreme power which the whole people possesses as a body organized in a government. Apart from this, sovereignty can denote only that each individual has no legal superior in the exercise of his natural rights, that no one has any governmental authority over him in this, or that he acts here as a sovereign. He is accountable to no earthly tribunal for his exercise of those prerogatives which his Creator has given him. With this explanation, the first position should read thus sovereignty resides in each individual of the whole body of the people. Then, the second position, that the act of the majority binds the minority, is false; for whatever sovereigns do, is either by agreement-and in the present case, it is supposed the minority disagrees from the majority-or by force, and that is excluded from legal right. The conclusion falls with the premises. Gov. Hubbard says, "the people are emphatically the sovereigns of this country;" and yet, he holds that a larger number of sovereigns had a legal authority over a smaller number of sovereigns. He says, "It is well known, that the necessary result of certain preliminary proceedings, induced the sovereigns of Rhode Island to appeal to what they conceived to be the ultimate principles of American freedom, and the consequences of that appeal, was the adoption by the people of a constitution for the people;" which he regards as "obligatory upon the people of that state." Would it not

have accorded better with the facts of the case to say, that a large number of the sovereigns united themselves together to form a constitution, not only for themselves, but for a large number of other sovereigns, and that these latter, in the exercise of sovereignty, resisted them? We think Gov. Hubbard has stated the doctrine truly, (though we like not the phraseology,) in saying that the people are sovereigns— that is, no individual, so far as natural right is concerned, has any legal superior; we only marvel he did not perceive how completely it overthrows himself.

We have now examined the main arguments to prove that this constitution was legally formed and ratified. "A legal right," existing inde. pendent of law and government, according to any correct use of language, is an absurdity. For the doctrine itself, there is no authority in the declaration of independence, nor in the declarations of rights in the constitutions of the several states, nor any force in the arguments by which it is attempted to be supported.

It may be thought we have been too minute in this examination. Were it a mere tumult, we should think the whole matter worthy of little attention. But it is civil war, and we may be sure, such an event has not been brought about by appeals merely to passion and prejudice. Large masses of the people are at least not kept in commotion, except by some principle which has taken strong hold upon them. It is false doctrines in the language of true ones, it is false principles, not readily distinguished from those which are universally believed in, that are at the foundation of all permanent violations of law and order. And when men act on principle, argument must be met by argument.

The general prevalence of this doctrine would be fatal to the peace of the country. If it shall ever be recognized as an American princiVol. I.

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ple, that the people as an organized body, distinct from their organization under government, have a legal right to act at will, and thus to lay every citizen under an obligation to yield the same obedience to its decisions expressed through a majority, as to the laws themselves, then, universal confusion must pervade the land. The enactments of the legislature to-day, may be overthrown by the votes of the convention to-morrow. The decision of the judge upon the bench, may be reversed by the verdict of a jury at the ballot-box. The condemned criminal may be snatched from the gallows, and the acquitted victim of persecution put in his place. Some will say these things are impossible. They may be so at present; but it is because there yet remains a general regard for law. Let it, however, be once established and made familiar to our thoughts, that masses of men in organized bodies have legal power to act against government and law, and who, that knows any thing of human nature, can doubt, but that the power would be used, and frequently used? And who, the best man among us, entrusted with such an authority over government, and that too kept in reserve for occasions of excitement, would feel sure of himself that he should never abuse it? We know the fierceness of party conflicts. What party, in the excitement of political contests, but would appeal, in case of a bare defeat in the elections under government, to this power above government ? And what parties, even the purest, could carry on a series of such contests at the polls, without destroying the peace, if not the morals of the community?

This is a far-reaching principle. It will not be confined to New England. There are other parts of the Union which are interested in it. If the "sovereigns" of South Carolina should get together on their several

plantations and choose delegates, and then at Columbia frame a constitution, giving to each man his inalienable rights, and ratify it by a majority of all the male inhabitants of the state-all of which things they have a legal right to do, and it would be usurpation and tyranny to prevent it by force-we see not how the minority of a different complexion could" help" themselves, that is, legally, and according to genuine American principles. It is nothing to the purpose to say with the Democratic Reviewer, "slaves cannot enter into any political relation. They cannot contract. To say that they are slaves, is to say that they are not thought of as beings having a political existence." But that is not the question, how they are thought of" by others, but how have they a right to think of themselves; and, suppose they should prove by actual fact, that they can enter into a political relation," that they can contract," would there not be a legal obliga tion on the part of the present government of South Carolina, to acknowledge their "political exist ence," and yield to them-according to the doctrine of distinguished statesmen here at the north?

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We have thus far taken it for granted, that this principle might be universally acknowledged and its exercise peacefully acquiesced in. But can we hope for this? We must shut our eyes upon the lessons of history, we must unlearn all that we know of human nature, we must become totally ignorant of our own hearts, before we can believe that such contests as this principle would give rise to, could be long carried on without a resort to arms. It is a principle of war, and the more dangerous, being disguised. It is revolution by force, pretending to be peaceful. It is insurrection against law, claiming to be lawful. And what is worse than all, it is a principle introduced without any neces

sity, not having a single advantage to counterbalance its evils. Governments in the lapse of time may become obsolete, and not fitted to the present state of things. New constitutions are to be formed, or old ones remodeled. Men fall back upon their natural rights. And one of the great political problems at the establishment of our government, was, how to secure the cooperation of the existing powers to the necessary changes, and thus prevent violence and bloodshed. It seemed to be solved by providing in the constitution itself for the aid of the government, in its own alterations or even dissolution. We have been accustomed to regard the establishment of this principle, as one of the great achievements of modern times in political affairs-a principle which produces changes in government with all that ease and quietness, with which the laws of nature revive what is perished, and supply what is decayed, in the material world. We would have no doubt cast upon it, as if it were not adequate to every emergency. is not from the feelings of party politics, it is not from hostility to changes in government, that we oppose this new doctrine, but because of our deep conviction that it is the firebrand of war, and of the worst of all wars, civil war, and sent forth to kindle flames, which we might boast till now, that we had put out.

It

Whatever view we may take of them, the proceedings in Rhode Island must be pronounced to have been revolutionary. But there is no necessary reproach in a revolution. With all the unavoidable suffering which it produces, duty may require us to attempt it. To resist an oppressive and tyrannical gov. ernment, is to be faithful to man. The pledge of life, fortune and honor, in such a cause, is an act of fealty to human nature itself. Although unsuccessful, they, who have ventured all in behalf of lib

erty, deserve to be well spoken of. If the actors in a revolution are ever to be branded as the enemies of their country, it is either because they are in arms against a government, which is not oppressive, or because they resorted to war, before they had sufficiently tried the measures of peace. And surely a war, which convulses the whole community and severs it to its very foundations, disturbing every household, and raging in every bosom, and which, after stirring up the fiercest passions of human nature at the fireside, at the social board, and at places of public concourse, arrays father against son, brother against brother, friend against friend, and citizen against citizen, on the field of battle, can be justified by nothing but oppression, and then only when all hope of other relief has expired.

Was there then oppression in Rhode Island, to justify a civil war? We say civil war, because, quiet as may have been the preliminary measure of forming and adopting a constitution, that was the first step, and, if it meant any thing, the necessary step to the violence which followed it. That great grievances existed, we most fully admit. The exclusion of all citizens, excepting owners of real estate, from voting, was a wrong, which it was natural many persons should deeply feel. The extension of the right of suffrage was demanded, however, not merely from respect to the feelings of a large number of the inhabitants, nor merely as a political expedient to quiet the complaints of the people, but not less out of regard to the true interests of the state. It is not enough to say that a state is well governed, which after all only means in general, that taxes are light, salaries small, and public improvements few and late. We have seen the economy of the government of Rhode Island alledged as a sufficient answer to all com

plaints; but we cannot look upon a cheap government as of course a good one. "There is, that withholdeth more than is meet, but it tendeth to poverty." Where the elective franchise is limited to a body of landholders, the majority of whom own small estates, and increase their wealth slowly by hard labor, government will be cheap; the only fear is, it will be too cheap. Personal property, the property acquired more rapidly in mechanic arts, commerce and manufactures, and therefore spent more readily, should be represented at the ballotbox for the very purpose of making government more liberal in its expenditures. Besides, we deny the maxim of the poet in respect to government, that "whate'er is best administered, is best." A good administration of government is a great benefit, but the structure of the government may of itself have a beneficial influence distinct from its administration. And this is the boast of a republic, that it elevates the citizen by making him not a subject, merely to be governed, but a constituent part of the government itself. If government is to be considered as a something done for us, in which we are merely to take a boon, then that which is the best done, may be best; but if government can be so constituted, as that the people under it may share not only in receiving but also in imparting, then the very constitu tion of it is a great good in itself, to each individual; and it is not sufficient to say to those who are excluded from being, as it were, living and organic parts of this body

you are well taken care of and that is enough. With our views upon this subject, we do not wonder, considering how large a portion of the inhabitants were excluded from the polls, that there should be a deep sense of injury, and, as their complaints were disregarded, a strong feeling of indignation at their

wrongs-and both strengthened by the peculiar and marked distinction existing between the freemen and other citizens.

We admit, that from the fluctuations of population and other causes, a uniform ratio between the number of voters and the number of persons to be elected to office, cannot be attained; or if attainable, that the advantage would not compensate for the trouble in securing it. But some limits may be put to the inequality, and we cannot deny but that in Rhode Island, this inequality had grown to be a great grievance. We know it may be said, as before, that it wrought no practical evils; but we reply, it is an evil for government to exhibit before the community an obvious disregard of what is just and fair. Rhode Island was in fact, situated somewhat like England before the reform in the constitution of the House of Commons. Birmingham, and Leeds, and Manchester, had grown into large cities, while many ancient boroughs, once distinguished places, had decayed; and it was no longer to be borne, that the former should be unrepresented, and that the latter should still send the same number of members to parliament, though we have Lord Brougham's authority for saying, that even "this class of seats had certain practical uses." It was a little like this in Rhode Island. Great changes had taken place since the time when the charter fixed the number of representatives for Newport and Portsmouth and Warwick; and the inequality in the ratio of representation had become so great, as to demand a prompt adjustment, though practically, the improvement might not be in sending any better men to the legisla

ture.

We have now mentioned the only real grounds of complaint. In the excitement of the contest, many other things have been brought forward as wrongs and grievances;

but of these, some are utterly unfounded, others doubtful, and others still, mere matters of declamation. We pass them by. The limitation upon the right of suffrage, and the inequality of representation, are the principal political evils which needed to be removed, and we cannot but regard them, notwithstanding the sincere attachment of so many of the citizens to these ancient establishments, as sufficient to justify the use of any legal means to alter this state of things.

But this concession,

which is due to what appears to us to be the truth, leaves untouched the question, whether it was an oppression to call for the dreadful hazard of a civil war. We see not how any one can have a doubt upon this point. But if there could be any, it must cease when we farther consider the exact period of time, at which legal and peaceful measures were renounced for force. There have been various attempts at different times to remedy these defects, but without success. At length, in the January session of 1841, the legislature passed resolutions, calling a convention to meet in November, for the purpose of forming in whole, or in part, a new constitution for the state. This measure appears to have been adopted from the conviction, that the time had come for decisive ac

tion. The only serious objection to it could be, that the delegates were to be elected by the votes of freemen only, and hence it might be inferred, that under such circumstances, full and entire reform could not be expected. We may admit this, and still we say, that here is an opportunity by which in time, every political wrong may be peacefully remedied. And surely, the evil of deferring complete redress, even for some years, is as nothing, compared with the evil of civil war. We take our stand here; we urge the present opportunity as decisive