secure man's subjection to sin; and, moreover, as sin becomes essential to the attainment of a high and glorious end, God is bound to love sin, as he loves the final aim and design of his government. Is it true, then, that God cannot look upon sin with the least degree of allowance?" We can understand from this, what Mr. Austin means by God's will and pleasure. He means that God positively and absolutely wills and takes pleasure in all events, sin not excepted, as the agencies adopted by himself, to accomplish his high design, the final holiness and happiness of all men. Such is Universalism, and such the doctrine of my friend, as set forth by him in his discussion of the second question. God is contradicted, dishonored, blasphemed-man becomes passive and irresponsible and sin desirable and lovely. Judge now of the gentleman's consistency, not to say effrontery, in wheeling directly about, and commencing the debate on the third question, by objecting and setting forth, that I am about to prove, or attempt to prove, that God ordained and takes pleasure in sin and misery!!!

The view I intend to advocate of sin, and of God's government, in the discussion of this proposition, is precisely what I have all along maintained. It may be expressed as follows: God's government is moral--man is a moral agent, his will is free-moral government and moral agency necessarily admit the possibility of sin-man is a sinner, not by the influence or agency of God, direct or indirect-the gospel is intended to save men from sin and its consequences-its benefits are proffered to all-they are conditional, and none will be finally lost, except such as willfully neglect or reject the means of salvation. Finally, as man is a sinner by his own fault, so, those who are finally lost, are alone responsible for the dreadful issue of their probationary being. Their reflection must ever be, "I knew my duty, but I did it not."

In reply to my first argument, the gentleman admits the doctrine of moral agency, to a certain extent. What does he mean by being free to a certain extent?—does he mean a part of the will is free, and a part not free? If so, will he tell us what part free, and what part bound? Or does he mean to say men are free a part of the time, and a part of the time controlled irresistibly? If this be the view, it seems important that we should know what portion of our time we act freely, and what portion of our time we are so controlled as to be free from moral responsibility, as also how we are to determine when we are bound, and when we are free. When the gentleman shall have explained himself on these points, we will endeavor to give the subject a more full consideration. In the meantime, let the gentleman remember that he cannot separate a moral action from the agent acting—that in morals, the action and actor are inseparable-and that whatever merit or demerit belongs to one, belongs also to the other. If, therefore, he denies moral agency, as to final results, he at the same time denies moral virtue, moral praise-worthiness or approbation, and

moral happiness; and hence, he imposes upon the Deity a final state of things, in which moral desert, moral approbation and happiness, have no existence." God, the Author of all our enjoyments, has willed us to be moral beings. for (without this) he could not will us to be happy, in the noblest sense of that term.— (Brown's Philosophy, vol. 2. p. 233.) In the dissertations which Mr. Austin read to us in his last half hour, we have the same groun lless assumptions repeated, which have figured so largely in all be has said. He says I am endeavoring to overthrow God's purpose and will. And how does he make out this charge? Why, he first assumes that God's purpose and will are just what he would have them-he alledges it to be the purpose of God that all men should be finally holy and happy, whether they obey or disobey the laws and conditions of their being—that it is God's will all should be saved, whether they obey or disobey, believe or reject the Gospel. Need I spend time in showing the futility of this process of reasoning? He begs the question, and then assumes it to be proved, a course wholly unworthy a discussion of this kind. And yet I suppose he will continue this method in every speech he makes, since, if he is not allowed this latitude, he will have nothing to say. I refer to this subject here, for the purpose of reminding the audience and public, that these flourishes and declamatory harangues are without a logical basis, and possess not one element of sound argument. Let the gentleman prove that God wills, desires, purposes the ultimate happiness and holiness of every man, in a sovereign, absolute way, irrespective of moral government, moral agency, and moral character, and then, and not till then, will he have a foundation for his argument. Until then, he is filling up his time with mere trash. I now present my second argument to sustain the affirmative of this question, based on the nature and immutability of

THE MORAL Attributes of god.

The attributes here referred to, are holiness, goodness, and wisdom. By the holiness of God, we mean the infinite purity and rectitude of the divine character. It signifies that the divine nature is at an infinite distance from sin. By the goodness of God, we understand the natural and eternal benevolence of his character: the possession of a disposition to confer happiness upon his creatures. By the wisdom of God, we mean the infinite intelligence of God, under the guidance of which, he makes all his displays of holiness, goodness and power.

In establishing a government, God would conform it to the nature and demands of his own attributes.

His wisdom would be seen in the nature and design of his government, and in the adaption of its parts to each other, and to the end proposed.

His goodness would prevent his bringing into existence intelli

gent beings, without the power to acquire and enjoy happiness. On the contrary, it would require him to give them such a constitution as would secure their happiness, unless its laws and conditions were violated, and power also to preserve them unimpaired. The holiness of God would not only prevent his using any active agency, directly or indirectly, to bring sin into existence, but it would lead him to use such means as were not subversive of his government, to prevent it. As the holiness of God is infinite, so his opposition to sin is infinite: hence, he would be bound by the law of his own nature, to employ the strongest motives possible, to prevent the introduction of sin into his moral universe, while, at the same time, these motives should be of such a character as not to subvert the moral or responsible character of man as a subject of God's moral government.

The sources whence these motives would be drawn, are his goodness and justice. His goodness would furnish the strongest motive to obedience, that could possibly be drawn from that source, and so also his justice. While, therefore, the goodness of God would make an infinite display of benevolence, to inspire confidence, excite affection, and secure allegiance, the justice of God would make an infinite display of God's opposition to sin, by the penal enactments of the divine law. Reasoning a priori from the attributes of God to the nature of his government, and the means employed to preserve it free from sin, we cannot conceive of anything less than this, as answering the end proposed, or harmonizing with the Divine attributes.

But if God displays his infinite opposition to sin, with the view of preventing it, or punishing it when it occurs, (as he is required to do by his infinite holiness,) this can only be done by enacting the severest penalty the nature of the case admits-a penalty which would involve eternal loss-the forfeiture of those positive blessings made sure to the holy and obedient. We can see no way te avoid this conclusion. Any thing less than this, would come short of meeting the nature and demands of the case, as much as the difference between finite and infinite. It would be to contravene the nature of God, and resist and suppress the tendencies of holiness. Thus we see the moral attributes concur in opposing and visiting sin by capital punishment: that is, by the strongest possible motive that penalty can present to the human mind.

And we reach the same conclusion by considering the attributes of God as immutable. What the attributes of God were, in the unfathomed depths of past eternity, or when God's moral universe was first brought into being, in obedience to the fiat of omnipotence, and his laws were published to his moral subjects, they are now, and ever will be. If, when his government was established, and his laws extended over his moral realms, his attributes required him to present the strongest motives against sin, and enact the severest possible penalty as its punishment, the same moral neces

sity still exists, and will exist ever, commensurate with the continuance of an equitable divine administration. Moreover, what has been, and is now required by the attributes of God-what has been and is now consistent with the attributes of God, will always be required, and always be consistent in regard to the subjects of his moral government.

It has always been required that the sinner be punished with death, on account of his sins. It has been consistent with the attributes of God, that this penalty should reign over the ungodly for six thousand years. No sinner has escaped it, except by believing in Christ. Hence, as the attributes and government of God are, in their principles and essence, changeless, we argue that the penalty-the severest penalty the case will admit of-enacted to deter from sin, and punish transgression, will always hold its power over the guilty and incorrigible sinner.

We have, therefore, all the moral force which the nature and immutability of God's attributes can furnish in support of morai government, to prove the doctrine of the irretrievable perdition of the ungodly. The foundation of this argument is in the divine character, and its soundness and force are equal to the moral perfection and immutability of God.

We next present our third argument,

DRAWN FROM THE ANALOGY OF NATURE.

God's Government is the same in its principles and bearings, as t extends over all its subjects, and all worlds. In this world we ee but a part of it-but the incipient stages of its operations. Yet what we see here, is an index of what is unseen. The revelation of principles, and development of facts, in the government of God in this world, are data from which we may safely infer what will be the principles, facts, and practical results, of his administration under its more advanced stages.

Moral laws or causes produce their results as certainly as those that are physical, unless counteracted by supernatural power. Hence, when we see the operation of a law in the moral government of God, producing its certain results in this life, we must infer, (as God's government is changeless,) that the same law will operate always, and always produce the same results. This, I say, we must infer, unless God does specifically inform us, that he intends, at a particular stage of his proceedings, to counteract the tendency of such law, and produce a change.

Now, if this view of the divine government be correct, (and I see no defect in it,) we are bound by the established constitution of things-by the operation and known results of the laws under which we are placed in this world, to conclude in favor of the future and endless unhappiness of the wicked.

The moral constitution of things under which we are placed, and by which we are governed, which confers its rewards, and deals