to work and draws up a formal pardon, to wit: "This certifies that A. B. has been selected as a subject of executive clemency, and is hereby freely and entirely pardoned of the crime committed against the laws of the State; the officers of the prison are therefore directed to set him at liberty forthwith." How long would such a Governor maintain his reputation for sanity? If this is not sufficient proof of the absurdity of this notion, let any man not yet convinced attempt to reduce it to practice in his common intercourse with society, and if he does not renounce Universalism in twenty-four hours, it will be because he has not sense enough to discern the difference between wisdom and folly or is not sufficiently honest to renounce in theory, what he finds ab surd and impossible in practice.

My fifteenth argument, is founded upon the fact that if men cannot be saved from punishment, they cannot be saved at all, and universal damnation must follow. This we argue, first, from the nature of punishment itself. This is death-The wages of sin is death," "The soul that sinneth it shall die." Now as there is no life in death, and nothing in death that can produce life, hence death is in its own nature eternal. I care not what kind of death it be, physical or moral, or any other kind, if you will show me that in death there is any life, you may do something towards effecting a refutation of this argument. For if life exist in death, that life may possibly overcome that death itself; but if there be no life in death, then death is of its own nature eternal. Death is the punishment of sin-the sinner will be saved from this punishment or he will not. If he is not saved from it, he must remain dead eternally-if he is saved from it, then he is saved from deserved punishment. Hence if he is not saved from deserved punishment, eternal damnation must follow as a natural and necessary consequence. Secondly-if men are punished all their sins deserve, then if saved at all, they must be saved either before they are punished, or at the same time they are punished, or after they shall have ceased to be punished. Mr. Austin admits that they cannot be saved before they are punished, for it would not only be unjust to punish a man after he is saved, but if punishment be inflicted after salvation, it follows that salvation is no preventive of damnation. Again, men cannot be saved at the same time they are punished for their sins, for then salvation and damnation would meet at the same time in the same individual. This also, is admitted by my opponent. Only one alternative remains. They must be saved after they are punished all their sins deserve or not at all. But this we shall soon see is impossible. God's law requires our love and service to the full extent of our powers-mark that. Hence when sin is once committed, the sinner can never expiate his sins by personal suffering. To suppose he can, is to suppose he has moral powers with which to endure punishment, which are not already pledged to God in

the way of obedience, which is unscriptural and absurd. It is the demand of the law-" Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart." Therefore the sinner cannot answer the demands of God's law, and be punished for his sins at the same time. While he is being punished according to his deserts, he cannot be loving and serving God with all the heart, hence his sin is increasing, and he is deserving more punishment, while he is being punished what he already deserves. He cannot cease to sin, until his punishment ceases, and he cannot cease to be punished until he ceases to sin. Hence if he may not be saved from punishment by pardon, his sin and punishment must be eternal.

I will now attend to some points in my friend's last speech not yet noticed. He carries the idea, in all he says of the atonement of Christ, that he was compelled to endure punishment for our sins that the father took the son and punished him, and thus forcibly laid on him the iniquities of the guilty-compelled the innocent to suffer for the guilty. Now the fallacy of this, is found, in the fact that it is not true. It is not the doctrine of the Bible, nor of any orthodox church of which I have any knowledge in our land. The doctrine is, that Christ, in concurrence with the will of his father, "gave himself a ransom for the world." He did, what you or I or any other individual has a right to do; employed his powers in benevolent acts for the good of those who needed his services. As the poet most beautifully expresses it :

"With pitying eye, the Prince of Peace,

Beheld our helpless grief,

He saw, and O, amazing love:
He ran to our relief.

This is the doctrine of the Bible-the doctrine I preach, and which I understand to be held by all orthodox churches. There is nothing in it inconsistent with the principles of justice. It is what every benevolent man does on a limited scale, every year of his life. Mr. Austin says that if Christ bore the sins of men, then he was guilty-that the guilt of men as well as their punishment became his. This is a non sequiter. To bear the sins of men involves a transfer, not of guilt, but of the legal conseqences of guilt-to deny the possibility of this, is to war with facts. A common form of this tranfer, though not for the same end, exists in the infant world, who, though personally innocent of crime, nevertheless experience in part the consequences of another's guilt. It is a fact that men may and some men have, voluntarily assumed the consequences of the sins of others, and this to some extent, is done by every philanthropist, who in the benevolence of his heart endures labor and suffering for the benefit of the human race. But does this imply or involve a participation in the guilt of those whose miseries are alleviated? Does he who by personal suffering and toil, lifts the drunkard from the

ditch, and restores him to habits of sobriety and industry, become thereby a sharer in the drunkard's guilt? Does he who interests himself in behalf of the criminal, and by incurring pecuniary expense, or otherwise giving satisfaction and security to the violated law-obtains pardon, and release from punishment, become thereby a criminal himself? Did the Lockrian king, in submitting to lose one of his eyes, that he might support the law, and at the same time relieve his son from the full penalty of the law against the crime of adultery, become himself guilty as an adulterer? So it would seem, according to the gentleman's notion: and yet the idea is so palpably erroneous, that the bare statement of the above examples, is a sufficient refutation.

Mr. Austin says the murderer to whom I alluded in a former speech, was led to his fatal end, by the system which I advocate. Unless the gentleman's intellect is more obtuse than I have reason to suppose, he knows this is untrue. There is a great want of generosity and fairness, in such representations. I can only account for the pertinacity with which he clings to those false representations of the doctrince of salvation from punishment, on the ground that it is his only hope of success in this discussion. As he cannot answer my arguments, if he fails to make an impression at this point, the ground he occupies, is destitute of even the semblance of validity.

One of Mr. Austin's objections to the doctrine of atonement, is, that it represents God as exacting of the substitute, the whole amount of what was due from the sinner. Though this is not strictly true, yet, if it were, it could not be consistently urged as an objection by a Universalist, since it is fundamental in Universalism, that God never pardons a sinner until he has paid the last mite. This objection comes with an ill grace from the gentleman who appears here as the champion of a theory which admits no pardon, without the full infliction of penalty. This however, is a specimen of the consistency and harmony of my friend's course of argumentation.

We have said the above objection is not strictly true; that is, it does not represent the subject fairly. Christ, as the sinner's substitute did not make satisfaction for him, by suffering, in kind and quantity exactly what the sinner deserved: but the satisfaction is found in the dignity of the substitute, and the moral value of his sufferings.

The gentleman also says there is no pardoning power in a perfect government. But is not God's administration perfect? and is it not the doctrine of the Bible, that the pardoning power exists in the divine government? If he means to say that in a perfect government there is no occasion for the exercise of this power on account of misgovernment, I agree with him; but if he intended to say that there was no pardoning power in such a government, that I deny. God is the arbiter of the whole universe, and prof

fers a general amnesty to all, whatever may be their state of degradation, on condition of their improving the advantages he gives them in redemption. The case is, as though the Queen of England should proffer an amnesty to the prisoners at Botany Bay, on conditions which would sustain the ends of good government, as fully, as the course that would retain them there, according to the original terms of banishment. He has referred to law commentators, and I would ask if the very declarations he has quoted from them do not sustain my views of pardon? They do, to the very letter, every one of them. And in addition to the names he has given, I would add Blackstone. He says in his commentaries, book 4, chapter 31: "to pardon is to remit treasons, and felonies," and by consequence, to save from punishment for these crimes.-[Time expired.

[MR. AUSTIN'S SEVENTH REPLY.]

Gentlemen Moderators:-My friend opposite has misstated my argument on the pardoning power, though of course, not intentionally. I said that in the government of a perfect God, there was no pardon from punishment; not that there was no pardoning power. God pardons the sinful, on the principle of repentance. But his government being perfect, there can be no necessity for the exercise of pardon from a punishment designed for the good of the creature. And besides to pardon from punishment, pre-supposes some error in the adjustment of the infliction, to the sin committed. This liability to error cannot attach to God's government. To save the guilty from punishment designed to restore them to virtue and godliness, would be as wise as to save a patient from a salutary and health-restoring medicine, because it is nauceous to the taste, and gives temporary pain.

He says I maintain that if Christ was punished for the sins of men, then their guilt must also rest on him. I do not know that I have said this, but concede that I did. If Christ was punished in the stead of mankind, then the sins and the guilt of all men must necessarily have been placed upon him. Punishment pre-supposes guilt. You cannot punish a being if he is not guilty. Suffering may be laid upon him, but it will not be punishment. There can be no such thing as punishing the innocent. They may be injured, scourged, tormented, but all this will not be punishment, in the true sense of that word. They may endure privation, pain, ignominy, in behalf of others, but in no correct view can all this amount to the least particle of punishment. It is only when pain is inflicted on the guilty, in correction of their guilt, that it is punishment. If Jesus was not sinful-if guilt in black and dread reality, did not rest in his heart, then, (however much he may have suffered,) he was not punished. And if my friend's doctrine is true, that no man can be saved unless Christ has been

punished in his place, then the whole world will be lost forever! The Son of God was not punished in the place of sinners, but he suffered in behalf of men-for the benefit of the world-setting mankind a noble example of devotion to the good of others, and the benefit of the race.

The ninth argument which Elder Holmes brings in the affirmative, is based on the intercession of Christ. What is an intercessor? It is one who acts in behalf, or for the benefit, of another. This is the sense in which Christ is our intercessor. Being the Mediator between God and men, (1 Tim. ii. 5,) through whom all our spiritual blessings flow from the Father, he is represented as our Friend, or in a figurative sense, as our Intercessor. He is not described in the scriptures as interceding to save men from punishment-but as one who obtains blessings and favors for us.

Dr. Adam Clarke gives us the following explanation of the office of Jesus as an Intercessor : "Our Lord makes intercession for us, by negotiating and managing, as our Friend and Agent, all the affairs pertaining to our salvation."-(Clarke on Rom. viii. 27.) This undoubtedly approaches a true view of the work of Christ as man's Intercessor.

The tenth argument in the affirmative, my friend builds on the assumption that the gospel proposes to save sinners now, which, he says, cannot be, if men are punished all they deserve. I cannot appreciate the point of this argument. I am aware the gospel proposes to save sinners now-that there is a present salvation. The scriptures clearly teach this. "Behold, now is the accepted time; behold, now is the day of salvation."-(2 Cor. vi. 2.) "God is the Savior of all men, especially [i. e. immediately] of those who believe."-(1 Tim. iv. 10.) But I cannot conceive how this important truth affects the argument in relation to the certainty of punishment. Recollect salvation is from sin, and not from punishment. The fact that an individual repents and turns to God, and experiences present salvation, so far from proving he has been or will be, saved from punishment, is the strongest evidence he has already been punished. For punishment is one of the instrumentalities through which men are brought to genuine repentance of sin. No moral being can experience true repentance of crime, without having felt the chastisement which sin, sooner or later, invariably receives.

His eleventh argument, is founded on the fact, as he asserts, that if the sinner is, and must be punished to the full extent of his deserts, his punishment is so indefinite as to time and place, that it exerts no influence on him.

It requires but slight reflection to discover that this argument possesses no real weight. We maintain that upon the principles of Universalism, the scriptures inculcate all the definiteness in regard to place, and time, and means, of punishment, that can produce the slightest practical influence. A knowledge of the place and