Page images
PDF
EPUB

SERMON I

Moral Agency explain'd, and in what
Sense it is to be attributed to God.

Rev. xv. 4.

Who shall not fear thee, O Lord, and glorify thy Name? for thou only art Holy.

O

F all our inquiries concerning the fu- SERM. preme Being, none are more impor- I. tant than those which relate to his

moral Character; for that is the immediate foundation of our duty to him, and our hopes from him. An intelligent Agent, poffeffed of an eternal immutable existence, almighty Power, and infinite Knowledge, might be an object of fpeculation which would naturally end in diftrust and horror: But perfect rectitude, equity, and goodness, are considered as practical principles, which fo determine his views, and direct the meafures of his conduct towards other beings, as to be the object of affections, which we know are in the human mind, and of the utmost

VOL. II.

A

con

SER M. confequence to its happiness; the objects of

I.

reverence, efteem, love, truft and a defire of
imitation. This fhews of how great mo-
ment, and how worthy of our attention the
subject is, which we are now entering upon,
namely, the confideration of God's moral at-
tributes. In this difcourfe I will endeavour,
firft, to fhew what clear and rational evidence
we have of his moral agency in general. 2dly,
In what sense, and with what limitations, it
is attributed to him. 3dly, To what useful
purpofes it
may be applied for the forming
our tempers, and governing our practices.
First, to fhew what clear and rational evi-
dence we have of God's moral agency in ge-
neral. Our idea of moral agency arises from
an attention to what paffes in our own minds.
We find in ourselves confcious perception
with a felf-determining power, and affections
to certain objects variously exerting them-
felves; all which in fome degree, and within
a limited fphere, feem to be common with
us to other animals. But there is in the
mind of man, which the brutal nature ap-
pears to be incapable of, a power of reflect-
ing upon affections, its own, or thofe of other
agents, together with the actions proceeding
from them, which are neceffarily approved
or difapproved, in other words, judged to be

good

I.

good or evil, and become objects of a diftinct SER M. affection, that, like others, is a fpring of action, influencing and directing our practice. It is this that makes us moral agents, which is the most important part of our conftitu tion. It implies not only intelligence, free agency, and direct affections to other beings, but affections arifing from our reflecting upon characters, affections, and actions morally distinguished, that is, appearing good or evil to our minds, according to a certain invariable standard planted in them. Our highest enjoyment arises from self-approbation, or a consciousness of intire moral affection, and a course of morally good action, so far as human nature can attain to it. And our most intense affection to other beings, accompanied with the greateft, the pureft, the most rational pleasure we know, terminates on the fame characters in them, manifested by their works.

Now, if the invifible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly feen, being understood by the things that are made; if from the powers and capacities of the creatures we justly infer his existence and perfections; particularly, if the confcious intelligence and active powers of fome beings formed by him, be a proof of his own felf-original intelligence

[blocks in formation]

I.

SER M. and activity, may we not in like manner from the moral powers he has given to mankind and other rational creatures infer his moral agency? especially fince this character neceffarily appears to our minds the most excellent and amiable, and of all others the most important to a rational happiness. Is it poffible for any man who believes God to be the father, the designing cause of spirits, of their intelligence, liberty, and all their other rational faculties and enjoyments, to doubt whether he himself is poffeffed of intelligence, liberty, and rational enjoyment? Whether fince he has indued them with a power of self-reflection, particularly, of reviewing their own affections and actions, and judging concerning their rectitude, his own actions and the principles from which they proceed, be not the object of his own understanding and attention? Whether having annexed the highest enjoyment to their self-approbation upon this review, and made their principal happiness to depend upon it, he poffeffes the like, or a more exalted enjoyment in the approbation of his own actions and principles of action? And this being the fum of what we mean by moral-agency, can we doubt whether God be a moral agent?

Another

I.

Another way of apprehending this fubject, SER M, will lead us to the fame conclufion. It has been proved, * and must here be supposed, that God is the defigning cause, the preserver and governor of the world, and all things in it; and from the relations and correfpondencies of things which he has made, and continues to uphold, we difcern his particular ends. Now this implies a Character or a Will, a permanent principle determining him to act after one particular manner, rather than another. But it has been alfo proved + that morality is an eminent part of the human conftitution; that is, the mind of man is fo framed, as when it attains to the full exercife of its rational powers, to be neceffarily fenfible of moral obligations, and to have all the determination to fatisfy them, which is confiftent with the nature of fuch a being, and the nature of virtue itself, i. e. with free-agency in an imperfect state: That morality is of the greatest moment to the perfection and happinefs of every individual, and the whole collective body of mankind: And therefore it must be attributed to our intelligent Creator as the true cause of it, thereby intending thofe very ends, the perfection and happiness of our nature, which it is naturally apt to serve.

* Vol. I,

A 3

+ Vol. I, Serm. 3,

« PreviousContinue »