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I asked General Gruenther 13. -now wait a minute. First, are these fiscal years or calendar years?

Mr. NASH. They are calendar years.

Mr. VORYS. In December 1951, a group of us from this committee were in SHAPE and General Eisenhower," said to us, "As I stated to General Gruenther, 'I have 28 divisions, 24 ready to go. Under Montgomery's 15 grading system that would equal 19.5 »

He added that was not enough. Mike Mansfield 16 was there, and Mrs. Kelly was there because she comes into this colloquy question. General Gruenther went on, and I am going to skip some of it. I am just trying to refresh my recollection and refresh my own confusion on it.

In the first place, in talking about 1951, without trying to read this over, General Gruenther did not say anything like 24 ready and 30 odd at D-plus-90.

Mr. NASH. I thought that is just what you read. He said 24 or 26, which Field Marshal Montgomery evaluated 19 as being fairly effective.

Mr. VORYS. That was in the fall. That was General Eisenhower talking to us in December, I think it was, of 1951, and he said that we have about 24 that equal about 19.

Mrs. KELLY. And there was one in the United States, or two, that were ready.

Mr. VORYS. And there was a big question as to whether the six American divisions were in or out.

General Gruenther and General Eisenhower as of December 1951, were not talking about anything like 24 plus 30 odd divisions, were they?

Mrs. KELLY. No.

Mr. NASH. Mind you, Mr. Vorys, that the red includes also the blue. By that I mean you have not got one on top of the other.

Mr. VORYS. You have not?

Mr. NASH. No, sir. You did not have 25 blue divisions and then 50 red divisions. I think the chart is misleading in that respect.

Mr. VORYS. It certainly is to me.

Mr. NASH. That chart is misleading in that respect. The total number of divisions set for Lisbon were 50 divisions. That would come out there at the last column. The effort here was to try to make this important distinction between front-line divisions on the day the battle breaks out, D-day.

Mrs. KELLY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VORYS. I yield.

Mrs. KELLY. I think the red that you are speaking of there, D-plus90, in 1951, I believe that was the 25 goal he was speaking of, then, and the D must have represented the actual 19 he was talking of, in

Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther. U.S. Army, at the time referred to by Mr. Vorys was Chief of Staff. Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers. Eurone (SHAPE).

At the time referred to by Mr. Vorys, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, U.S. Army, was Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.

15 Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery of Great Britain was Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe at the time referred to by Mr. Vorvs.

10 At the time referred to by Mr. Vorys, Mike Mansfield was a Representative in ConFress from the State of Montana and a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

cluding the four there and the one in reserve in the United States. That was my interpretation of it.

Mr. NASH. It would come out about right, Mr. Vorys, if he were speaking there, when he was talking about the 26, he was not including the 5 and two-thirds U.S. That would bring you out to about that 32 there, on that fourth column,

Mrs. KELLY. That would be 26. The D-plus-90 would be the 26 divisions.

Mr. NASH. Without the United States being included.

Mrs. KELLY. With the United States included, and I believe it was four U.S. there, is that correct? Four there and one in reserve in the States.

Mr. NASH. Five and two-thirds there, and a reserve division that could be gotten from the United States.

Mrs. KELLY. That is not the way I remember it.

Mr. NASH. When did the fifth division get from here over to Europe?


Colonel BILLUPS. It was there at the end of 1951.

Mr. NASH. We talk about five and two-thirds because we have a regimental combat team which is a third of a division in Austria, and we have another one, the equivalent of it, in Trieste, and we have a few troops, again, in Berlin, but five divisions plus those two regimental combat teams, five and two-thirds divisions, were in Europe at the end of 1951 and we had the 82d Airborne back here in the United States ready to go, and it would take 30 days to lift it over there.

Mrs. KELLY. That would be six and two-thirds, then?
Mr. NASH. That is right.


Mr. VORYS. Here is one spot-and this was all classified testimony-but General Gruenther came back again to this conversation that we had and he said, "So, in terms of your conversation with General Eisenhower, there will be an increase in active D-day divisions of roughly five or six divisions by 1952." At the same time the general was talking to you when he said 28 divisions. Actually he could have said something more than that because there was the framework of 40 something, a little bit more than 40.

Mr. NASH. I think that adds up. If you take Montgomery's estimate of 19 divisions being ready to fight and then he speaks there of adding 5 or 6 more divisions, you come to 25, which they agreed at Lisbon to shoot for and which they did achieve at the end of 1952.

The trouble with all this thing is in the previous testimony is failing to make a distinction between a D-day division and a D-plus-30. If I do nothing else this morning I would like to drive that one home so we know what we are talking about.

The 50-division concept at Lisbon was never made clear to the public, that half of those divisions were supposed to be ready to fight right now-active divisions in being right now-and the other half

would be able to fight within 30 days of the beginning of war. I am sorry that the chart is misleading and that you thought the blue was added to the red. The red includes that number of divisions and as Mrs. Kelly suggests it would be better if we carried the blue line right across. We will make that change for any future use of the charts.

I would like to make one other remark before we leave these charts. There are some figures you asked me for the other day and I think the figures that came up from my office showed 51 divisions instead of 50 at the end of calendar year 1952. So that you will not be confused, that extra division is a Marine division which is assigned to SACEUR, to General Ridgway, and which would be on the D-plus-30 side. It would not affect a second U.S. division. There is the 82d Airborne here ready to go, and there is also a U.S. Marine division that General Ridgway can count on having within 30 days of the balloon going up,and that division on December 31 was ready to take the line in Europe 30 days after D-day. I did not show it here because. these are Army divisions and nothing else but Army divisions. The Marine division is included with naval forces.

Mr. VORYS. As of December 1952, General Ridgway had under his command roughly 48 divisions that were ready to go either on D-day or D-plus-30?

Mr. NASH. That is right.

Mr. VORYS. All of them but eight were fully equipped and trained? Mr. NASH. In his personal evaluation, yes, sir. You can get an argument from the National Chiefs of Staff on those other six divisions that he said were not fully ready.

Mr. VORYS. As to those eight divisions, was it that their equipment was incomplete or that their training was incomplete?

Mr. NASH. A little of both. It varied from one division to another as to whether it was a matter of training or a matter of not having the requisite number of noncoms, officers complement, or whether there were items of important equipment that had not been delivered. It was no one factor alone but a combination of them.

Of those, some you might say, just to be arbitrary about it, were D-plus-35 days off, or D-plus-40, or D-45. They were there in large part, but it would take more than 30 days to have them, plus getting the rest of the equipment.

Mr. VORYS. Then there were the equivalent of seven American divisions in the 48?

Mr. NASH. Yes, sir, one of which is in the United States and it would take 30 days to get there, and five and two-thirds there on the line. The five and two-thirds are all D-day. They are all in the blue. They are all ready to fight today.

Mr. VORYS. And the only reason the Marine division is not at D-day is because it would take approximately that long to get them over there?

Mr. NASH. That is right, as well as the 82d Airborne. The 82d Airborne is in that D-plus-30 column. The Marine division is in being and would take 30 days to get on the line.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I have no questions.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Prouty.

Mr. PROUTY. I have no questions.

Mr. SMITH. Mrs. Kelly.

Mrs. KELLY. Does the seven and two-thirds include the navy and air force, complete?

Mr. NASH. No, Mrs. Kelly.


Mrs. KELLY. What is our complete commitment for 1952 there?
Mr. NASH. Those are just ground commitments.

Mrs. KELLY. Then we have met our commitments.

Mr. NASH. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. KELLY. In comparison to that, are the European forces ready? Mr. NASH. They have fallen short of their commitment by the margin there indicated. By two reserve divisions they have fallen short of it completely, or had as of December 31. With respect to eight of the reserve divisions that they brought up, with respect to eight of the reserve divisions they did bring into the picture, they had not satisfied General Ridgway that these were fully effective.

The United States met its commitment fully. The European countries fell short of their commitment. They fell short of it by two divisions that just were not organized, and with respect to eight others which they did bring into the field, those eight were not fully effective as General Ridgway evaluated them as of the first of December.


Let me emphasize the parenthesis at the top of that chart, "(Less Greece and Turkey)." Greece and Turkey came into NATO in February; at Lisbon they were admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As of 31 December, the Greeks had 10 and a third divisions and Turks had 19 and six-thirds divisions for a total of 31 minus-approximately 31 divisions.

General Ridgway has not had time to evaluate them and I cannot break them down for you. The Turks and the Greeks tell us they are all D-day divisions. We do not accept that. We know they are not all ready to fight right today, so we do not have that qualitative evaluation, but there are 31 divisions. That we do know. Their effectiveness is now under study.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Where are those divisions?

Mr. NASH. They are in Turkey and Greece.

Mr. CARNAHAN. None are in Europe?

Mr. NASH. Well, in Europe, that begs the question.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I mean over there under the command.

Mr. NASH. The Greek divisions are in Greece and the Turk divisions are in Turkey, in Asia Minor and on the other side of the Besporus.

I think we can wind up on that ground division picture by just rounding it off that as of the end of December 1952, the total NATO ground force was on the order 60 divisions, including Greece and Turkey.

Now if we could go to the air.

[A chart was shown entitled "Buildup of NATO Front Line Aircraft-less Greece and Turkey."]

Mr. VORYS. Before we go to the air force, Greece and Turkey and the United States as of the end of 1952 had 31 plus 7 at D-day, or D-plus-30.

Mr. NASH. Yes. Without evaluating the Greeks' and Turks' ability to really be there at full strength.

Mr. VORYS. In any event they are equipped.

Mr. NASH. I would not go on the record as saying that all the 31 Greek and Turk divisions had everything that they needed. Mr.VORYS. That made a total, you say, of 81?

Mr. NASH. A total of 48, and that does not include the Marines, so we will say 49. Forty-nine plus thirty-one of Greeks and Turks comes out at eighty, and that will match up with your figures. Of the 80, a total of 30

Mr.VORYS. Thirty-one plus seven.

Mr. NASH. Thirty-eight out of eighty are Greek-United StatesTurk.

Mr. CARNAHAN. And they are all committed to the NATO command?

Mr. NASH. Yes.

Mr. VORYS. I am just trying to get one figure that I can retain in my mind. The United States, Greece, and Turkey have 38 ready and all the rest of Europe has got 42?

Mr. NASH. That is right.

Mr. VORYS. It is true, but whether it is right or not is something else. That is the thing that is so utterly shocking.

Go ahead.


Mr. NASH. On the side of air, the Lisbon goal at the end of calendar 1952 is 4,067 front line aircraft. I would like to round that off at 4,000, which is the figure we use for talking purposes, 4,000 aircraft by the end of 1952. They did not break it down into jet aircraft and piston aircraft.

How did they come out at the end of 1952? I pass over July 1951 and December 1951 of what aircraft they had. There is no qualitative evaluation of those aircraft and it is just to give you some order of comparison with the buildup in 1952. I think from here on we would do well to see just where we stood at the end of 1952 and prepare to buildup from then on, because we do not have any firm data. There was not any SHAPE organization to evaluate what these countries said they had on hand in terms of worthy aircraft really able to fly; did they have the pilots and mechanics to keep them in the air. We do not have that information as of the earlier years, 1950 and 1951. But we do have a critical evaluation of their effectiveness at the end of 1952. We have the same evaluation made for the air as I have just explained to you was made by General Ridgway for the ground forces.

It shows that at the end of 1952, you come out just a little under the mark of the 4,000 aircraft in terms of numbers of craft. For gen

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