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eral talking purposes, I will say that just in numbers the NATO goal of 4,000 aircraft was met. But the important thing to talk about is the planes that can go up as soon as the battle starts and fight the battle.
Of those 4,000 planes, we have 3,352 that we can say at the end of calendar year 1952 were combat ready in terms of personnel well trained and on hand to fly them, equipment in good shape, and mechanics and ground handling equipment there to take care of the planes as they come up and down out of battle.
I think it is important of those 3,352 aircraft to break them down between jet and piston, because from here on out it is the jets that are important to talk about. Of the 3,325, 2,859 were jets and the balance of 493 were the older piston type, principally transports.
Now as that chart shows you, there were between 600 and 700 other aircraft on hand, but we cannot rate them or we could not as of the end of the year rate them as effective for lack of trained pilots or lack of equipment or obsolescence of the aircraft themselves.
On the side of the Greeks and the Turks who are not reflected in those columns there, I will take the Greeks first. They had a total of 157 aircraft at the end of the year, of which 107 were rated as effective, and the Turks had 283, of which 161 were rated as effective. Now to conclude on how close
Mr. SMITH. Now may I ask at that point, Mr. Secretary, of those effective planes, what was the contribution by the United States as against the other contributions? Do you have those figures?
Mr. VORYS. Two thousand six hundred ninety-eight at the end of January.
Mr. NASH. The Lisbon goal for the United States, 695. The total aircraft on hand at the end of calendar 1952, 671, all effective, so that the United States is off from its goal by 24 aircraft.
Mr. VORYS. I have before me statistics as of March 12 from the Department of Defense. I presume you fellows prepared it. It says, "Cumulative to January 31, 1953, 2,698."
Mr. NASH. Those are delivered aircraft, are they not?
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. GEORGE C. STEWART, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
General STEWART. The front line aircraft of the NATO countries. The United States has given them 1,061 front line jet aircraft. Now, there are all kinds of other aircraft, transports and trainers, all kinds of aircraft, but these front line fighting aircraft, we have supplied 1,061 of those.
Mr. VORYS. That is, from combat-ready, front line aircraft of 3,352, you deduct how much?
General STEWART. That is our contribution, not the U.S. Air Force, 1,061 that we furnished.
Mr. NASH. For other NATO countries.
General STEWART. Now the U.S. Air Force is in addition to that. Mr. VORYS. You are talking of NATO front line aircraft?
Mr. NASH. Including the U.S. Air Force in Europe. The blue line
in the chart entitled "Buildup of NATO Front Line Aircraft" includes 671 U.S. Air Force planes manned by U.S. Air Force personnel.
Mr. PROUTY. Were any reserves figured in that?
Mr. NASH. As General Hansell " explained to the committee on Friday, there is not a reserve backup for the NATO air force. We will have difficulty in attacking the very serious reserve aircraft problem. Mr. CARNAHAN. There are a little under 600 aircraft that have been contributed that did not come from the United States. There were 1,732 we contributed of the total number of 2,300, or whatever it was. Mr. NASH. It was 3,300.
Mr. VORYS. Are you adding 671 and 1,061?
Mr. NASH. Yes. That gives 1,732, and taking that from the approximately 3,300, they have contributed about as many as we have, then.
Mr. VORYS. Do you have handy there a chart of total NATO aircraft against which this aircraft of 2,698 shipped would apply? Mr. NASH. Could I see that chart a minute, Mr. Vorys?
The 2,698 represents total air force aircraft shipped as of January 31, 1953. It includes both piston and jet types, and transport and training aircraft in addition to combat planes.
Mr. VORYS. We are talking about NATO.
Mr. NASH. Of the 2,698, a total of 2,079 were shipped to NATO countries, including Greece and Turkey. Of this 2,079, 1,452 were fighters, 108 were bombers and patrol aircraft, and 519 were other types.
Mr. VORYS. What I wondered was about the statement of things being shipped there. It is 2,698.
I just wondered whether we could determine what that was a contribution to.
Mr. NASH. This includes all types of planes. C-47's, and the great bulk of them, F-84's.
This speaks of January 31, 1953. It speaks of shipments and we are talking about planes on the frontline. I do not have with me any chart that would show just where all these other planes that have been shipped actually are. They are in various stages of being worked into active forces.
Mr. VORYS. Some of them may be broken up or worn out and everything else.
Mr. NASH. There has been attrition on some.
I would be glad to try to break that down for you. It takes a long time to take a delivered aircraft and have it be a frontline aircraft with a trained crew.
Mr. VORYS. The chart is entitled "Key MDAP Statistics." I thought aircraft shipped was an important item. However, when we go over it here it is of no significance because we cannot find out where it fits in at all.
17 Maj. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell. In 1951-52. General Hansell was Chief of the Air Force Military Assistance Group, and in 1952-53 he was a member of the review board of the weapon systems evaluation group. Later he served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development. As a member of the Army General Staff in 1936-39. General Hansell prepared the European air war plan used in World War II. During World War II, he commanded the 19th Air Force. Retired after the war, he had been recalled to active duty in 1951.
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Mr. NASH. What we are trying to address ourselves to here is what forces we have to meet the enemy if the balloon goes up today. You are talking about apples and pears.
We also have a number of planes that have been shipped to Indochina and Formosa and a small number to Latin American countries. It can be broken down for you if you want a reconciliation of the figures but what I am addressing myself to this morning is how close we came to effective units, not just furnishing the equipment. You have to have bases, men and equipment in order to have effective forces.
NUMBER, TYPES, AND STATUS OF NAVAL VESSELS AVAILABLE TO
We will turn to the navy now.
[A chart was shown entitled "NATO Naval Forces BuildupLess Greece and Turkey."]
Mr. NASH. The overall total of vessels we spoke of as being the Lisbon goal has to be broken down between major and minor vessels. Otherwise you get into the old story of rabbit stew, one horse, and one rabbit.
What we have here is major vessels, we mean by that everything from aircraft carriers down through destroyer escorts. We classify as a major vessel from a destroyer escort up. Minor vessels includes smaller vessels of the greatest importance, such as minesweepers, minelayers, motor torpedo boats, and patrol craft. I might underscore the importance of the mine sweepers as being one of the most important parts of our program. The furnishing of mine sweepers.
Now, the Lisbon goal on major vessels is 451, D-day; that means on the line, ready to start steaming and firing on D-day. Four hundred fifty-one, D-day and four hundred sixty-four, D-plus-one hundred eighty. It takes longer to break out a ship than it does to bring a reserve division up. It takes three times as long.
We came out against that target with 420 D-day major vessels. That little white stuff at the top there, like on the previous chart, shows the margin by which General Ridgway, or Admiral McCormick, I should say, rates them as not up to full effectiveness either because of crew training or because the vessels are not fully fixed up. On the side of the D-plus-180, it came out at 754. That white part at the top is again the margin of relative ineffectiveness. On the side of the navy, they came out pretty well on the target.
You can look over at the earlier columns by way of seeing what has come in in the way of buildups since 1950 and 1951. I want to emphasize that there again there is no qualitative evaluation. You see the column of D-plus-180 is higher than that set at the Lisbon goal but those are in reserve. They are all kinds of cats and dogs and in various states of ability and what Lisbon set was effective vessels and those that could be made effective at D-plus-180. That includes bringing in existing vessels and getting them properly fitted out, rehabilitated and manned. New ship construction does not figure materially in the buildup of these major combat vessels. There has been some slight buildup in the minor vessels but it takes quite a long
time to build even a small vessel, like a mine sweeper. It takes 2 years.
Are there questions on that, Mr. Chairman?
Then we can take the last chart, the minor vessels.
[A chart was shown entitled, "NATO Naval Forces Buildup-Less Greece and Turkey-Minor Vessels."]
Mr. VORYS. With regard to the major vessels, the goal has been met?
Mr. NASH. Yes. The new vessels we have in mind are mine sweepers, both coastal and inland-that is a big threat, the Soviet capability of laying mines-and the destroyer escort vessels.
On the side of minor vessels, the Lisbon goal for D-day was 261. It came out, actual accomplishment, at 196, with that top white margin there representing not fully effective units. For D-plus-180, 767, it came out at 638, of which again that white margin represents work still to be done on the ships or on the crews to make them fully effective.
Mrs. KELLY. How are the submarines?
Mr. NASH. They are all effective.
The navy picture is pretty good. The ground picture is pretty good. The air picture is the difference between about 3,300 and 4,000 planes, by way of quick summary.
Is there any question on that, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. CARNAHAN. I would like to see the ground chart again just briefly, please.
[Chart No. 1 entitled "Buildup of NATO Army Divisions-Less Greece and Turkey"-was referred to.]
Mr. NASH. Is there any question on this?
Mr. CARNAHAN. No; I just wanted to see those Lisbon goals, again.
FUNDING OF PROJECTED NATO INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS
Mr. NASH. If there are no questions as far as I have gone, Mr. Chairman, the last point that needs to be stated to give the complete picture of what was accomplished in 1952 has to do with the problem of what is called by this fancy word "infrastructure." I do not want to bore the committee by going into a long dissertation on infrastructure but I do want to emphasize that for too long a time people did not pay enough attention to the importance of having the facilities, bases, barracks, communications, signals, jet fuel lines, all those things that you need in the way of physical facilities.
Mr. SMITH. Who do you mean by "people"?
Mr. NASH. Everybody. But I am speaking principally of the NATO members. I am speaking now of a point that has had a good deal of publicity about it, particularly at the December meeting, about the difficulty that the ministers had in negotiating a cost-sharing program-what it costs to build these facilities. It was a problem at the Ottawa meeting in September 1951; at the Lisbon meeting in February 1952; at the Paris meeting in December 1952. We hope it will be less of a problem at the April meeting that is coming up next month and we hope at that April meeting to have pretty much gotten it completely on the track.
Here is why it has been a problem? The cost-sharing of infrastructure has come up for the ministers' determination at a time subsequent to the fixing and voting by NATO parliaments of defense budgets, and in their planning they did not put into their budgetary requests of their various parliaments what they would need in the way of funds to finance this construction work. It has always been a case of trying to squeeze out of a budget that is already pretty tight, enough funds to take care of that very prime requisite of the construction work necessary to provide the facilities.
Now at the December meeting, the ministers addressed themselves to that problem eloquently and at length, in terms of dealing with first things first. It is no use building aircraft and training pilots if you are not going to have a requisite number of bases to fly from. It is no use having divisions deployed throughout Europe if they do not have the requisite communications to communicate with one another. It is no use to have the aircraft if you do not have jet-fuel-supply lines and so on.
I need not go into that further.
You have to provide-and it has a long lead time factor in it-it takes a long time to build a telecommunications system or a pipe line or an air base, and you have to plan for it in advance.
[A chart was shown entitled "NATO Infrastructure-Military Construction."]
INCREMENTAL BUILDUP AND COST-SHARING OF NATO INFRASTRUCTURE
Mr. NASH. The whole infrastructure program has been presented in slices, bite by bite, as have the forces: The total military requirements in terms of forces, are dealt with in terms of an annual increment. Lisbon said, "Out of the 97 divisions that the military called for by July 1954, we will try to have 50 of these by December 31, 1952."
What we will do at the NATO meeting in April, what we started back in December, will be to see how much of a further bite in forces. can be accomplished by the end of 1954 or 1955. And we hope next fall at still another NATO meeting they will determine what bite. they want to take to have accomplished by the end of calendar year 1955 or 1956. They have done the same thing with respect to infrastructure. Infrastructure has been presented in terms of three slices. You will find on the chart a first, a second, a third and a fourth slice. The first slice of infrastructure was something that those five countries that formed the Western Union in March of 1948: United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg took on in common. The United States was not in the picture at that time because NATO had not yet come into being.
That first slice came to $92.4 million and those four countries bore the cost of that. It consisted mostly of airfields. A number of the airfields were in existence, but had to be rehabilitated from World War II.
The first time the United States came into the picture of infrastructure was at Ottawa in September 1951, and there the program consisting principally of more airfields in Germany and in the NATO countries principally France and a telecommunications system in