reluctance or remorfe.

Of this it would be

eafy to give inftances in the clearest of all cafes; but this would take up too much of our time, and fomething of this was mentioned in my last discourse.

2. Still less would men, by the mere light of nature, have ever attained to any fatisfactory conclufion with refpect to the ultimate defign of the Author of Nature in the formation of man: I mean the prolongation of his exiftence beyond the grave. On this most interesting of all questions, nature is altogether filent. Judging from appearances, as the brutes die, fo does man; and all his faculties and powers die with him. That at death any thing escapes, unaffected by this catastrophe, is a mere arbitrary fuppofition, unfupported by any appearance, or probability of any kind.

That the belief which the ancient Greeks and Romans had of a future life, imperfect and of little value as it was, was originally derived from revelation, but exceedingly corrupted by tradition, is pretty evident from this circumftance, that when they began to Speculate on the fubject, and examine the reasons they could produce for it, all serious

belief in the doctrine foon vanished. With the Platonifts, who made the most of this doctrine, it was only a curious fpeculation, of no real use in the conduct of life, fuch as it is with Jews and Chriftians. Indeed, the reafons which the Platonifts gave for this doctrine, and which Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates, are fuch as could not poflibly have any weight with thinking men. That on which he lays the greatest stress, is the doctrine of pre-existence, that the fouls of men were originally without bodies, and afterwards confined in them as in a prifon, and that death is the breaking of this prifon. But where is the evidence of men having pre-existed? This doctrine of pre-existence we find most fully established in Egypt and the Eaft, whence Plato and other Greeks derived it. With modern unbelievers it certainly has no weight.

It is well known that the first philofophers among the Greeks did not pretend to discover any thing by their own reasoning. They only taught what they had learned of others, who had received the tenets that had been tranfmitted to them from early times, and that what they taught was delivered to their

pupils on their fole authority, as what was not to be contradicted. This was the established custom of the Pythagorean school. Reasoning came into their schools afterwards, and with it the wildeft theories on all fubjects, as I fhall fhew in its proper place, and a total fcepticism with refpect to the doctrine of a future ftate of retribution, as a motive to virtue.

Suppofing that it were poffible, by the mere light of nature, to arrive at the belief of a future ftate, yet, judging from prefent appearances, it could not be the future ftate announced in the scriptures, a state in which virtue will find an ample recompence, and vice its juft punishment, but only fuch a life as this, and in all other refpects refembling the prefent; which is the belief of the North American Indians, and most other barbarous nations. If, because we diflike any thing in the present system, we entertain an idea that the inconvenience complained of will be removed in a future ftate, where is the evidence that, under the fame powers, or principles, of nature, whatever they are, things will be ordered in a better manner? Is it poffible to infer from what we fee (and we have nothing

elfe by which to guide our conjectures) that thofe evils which the Author of nature has thought proper, for whatever reason, to introduce, or to permit, here, will not be continued there alfo? If we fay that it is not agreeable to juftice that good and bad men fhould be treated as they are here, where is the evidence, from any present appearances, that the Author of nature intended that they should ever be treated otherwife? Left to the light of nature, we could only reason from what we know, and this would lead us to expect that, if there be any life after death, it will be fimilar to the prefent. It is only from the express affurance of the Author of nature, communicated by revelation, that we believe the future ftate will be better than the present, that in it the righteous will be fully rewarded, and the wicked punished. It is evident, therefore, that when we abandon revelation, we give up all religion properly fo called, all that can have any falutary influence on the hearts and lives of men.

3. With respect to men, there is certainly a great advantage in precepts and commands, promises and threatenings, being delivered in words, proceeding as from a real perfon, it

being by this means that inftructions are delivered with the greatest diftin&ness. It may, indeed, be faid, and with truth, that nature speaks to men, and that nature teaches, and nature threatens, but befides that the information is more indiftinctly communicated, it is in a manner lefs apt to make an impreffion, and command refpect. It is, therefore, of great advantage that the attention of men be directed to fomething beyond mere nature, viz. to the Author and Lord of nature, and that he be confidered not as an allegorical perfonage, but a real intelligent being, capable of communicating his will in words, and such figns as men are daily accustomed to, and apt to be impreffed by.

Besides, all men feel an unavoidable propenfity to address themselves to the Being on whom they depend; and without fome mode of intercourse with him, they would foon lofe fight of him, as a child would of his father, if he never faw him, and had no accefs to him. Without an idea of God different from what we could collect from the contemplation of nature, there would be no fuch thing as prayer. Indeed, unbelievers in revelation ridicule the idea of prayer as unna

tural