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(H.R. 5710, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.)

MONDAY, MAY 18, 1953


Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session in room G-3, U.S. Capitol, at 2:40 p.m. Hon. Robert B. Chiperfield (chairman) presiding.

Chairman CHIPERFIELD. The committee will come to order.

General Ridgway we appreciate your frankness this morning. It may be that some of the members will want you to answer some questions.

Mr. Vorys.


Mr. VORYS. General, I was reviewing General Handy's statement over the noon hour and he mentions on page 6 other items, such as food, clothing, medical supplies, motor fuels and lubricants should be furnished only under special circumstances.

Last year we attempted to find out whether there was any such thing as food and clothing supplies and we were told no, that except for clothes like firefighting clothes, there were no clothes at all.

I cannot understand any special circumstances where we would be furnishing food and clothing.


General RIDGWAY. Nor to my knowledge either, Mr. Vorys.

I would like to check with my officers, if I may, after making one remark, here. We do supply individual flying equipment, a specially constructed flying helmet and 2 or 3 items like that, but other than that I am not aware of any items of food or clothing.

1 Members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 83d Cong., 1953-54: Republicans: Robert B. Chiperfield, Ill. Chairman; John M. Vorys, Ohio: Frances P. Bolton, Ohio; Lawrence H. Smith, Wis.; Chester E. Merrow, N.H.; Walter H. Judd, Minn. James G. Fulton, Pa.; Jacob K. Javits, NY. Donald L. Jackson, Calif. Karl M. LeCompte, Iowa; Edmund P. Radwan, N.Y.; Albert P. Morano, Conn.: Marguerite Stitt Church, Ill.; E. Ross Adair, Ind.; Winston L. Prouty, Vt.; and Alvin M Bentley, Mich.

Democrats: James P. Richards. S.C.; Thomas S. Gordon, Ill.; Thomas E. Morgan, Pa.; Laurie C. Battle, Ala.; A. S. J. Carnahan, Mo.; Thurmond Chatham, N.C.; Clement J. Zablocki, Wis.; Omar Burleson, Tex.; Brooks Hays, Ark.; Franklin D. Roosevelt. Jr., N..Y; Edna F. Keily, N.Y.; Henderson Lanham, Ga.; Burr P. Harrison, Va,; and The mas J. Dodd, Conn.

Boyd Crawforu, staff administrator.

The commitee's morning meeting with Generul Pidgway was to open session „ni Wis printed Unclassifed ption f be afterpJON S 88. wita im were 8.80 „sine. (See hearing 07 HR 5.10, 334 Cerg., 1st sczs., n. 39–425.)

Gen. Tromas. HeLd was at the me put aier of Saff of the Ar.ny.



General O'HARA. With the exception of Greece and Turkey, where until very recently, because of the economic situation in Turkey, and because of the guerrilla warfare that was going on in Greece, we have supplied some other items of this sort.

The Greeks, for example, had no shoes. We did give them some shoes but it was not successful in that case because their instep is made differently from ours and they could not wear the shoes after we gave them to them and they did not use them.

There are instances particularly in those two countries where we have been more lenient in supplying items that we have in other NATO countries. Other than the items the general has mentioned, there have been no instances in other European countries to my knowledge.

Mr. VORYS. None at all?

General O'HARA. That is right.


Mr. VORYS. Another question I want to ask. Of the 26,000 trainees, some 10,000 are air force people who are in training.

Do we put them through the whole thing, primary, basic, and so forth?

General RIDGWAY. I understand they do, sir.

Mr. VORYS. Of that 10,000, is that mostly pilot training?

It probably would not be mostly pilot training because they do not have that number of planes.

General O'HARA. The 10,000 includes a great many individuals other than pilots. We have brought some people back to put them through mechanics training, both engine and aircraft, electronic training on maintenance and supply of electronic items, and on operations of very complicated electronic equipment.

I do not have the figures on exactly how many of those are pilots. I am sure it can be provided.

The pilot level to which we are training is less than the requirement. They like to have a ratio of 1.5 pilots per frontline aircraft. We are approaching the ratio of one pilot per aircraft, sir.

Mr. VORYS. In any such great number as that, I would think that just offhand that would include all the pilots there are?

General O'HARA. No, sir; that is not true.

Mr. VORYS. Do they have their own pilot training program to boot?

General O'HARA. Yes, sir. We are only training them after they have done as much as they can to train their own people. In certain instances we are providing a nucleus of personel to try to bring up their standards, such as in the case of Italy.

General RIDGWAY. I might say that is a major problem which has concerned me greatly for some time.

We can see at an early date the sharp dropping off of the curve of U.S. pilot training. To provide a substitute for that overseas is very difficult.

In the case of the smaller countries, like Norway and Denmark, there is no justification for building up a flying instructor's training school and all its elements for the small output that a particular national air force would require. It is better to have them combined into one centralized training program which would justify the overhead.

We have that under very careful study at the present time. We do not see a solution to it at present, except to get some of the training done over here. The Scandinavian countries present another problem in that the weather is so poor most of the time that they cannot do the basic flying.

Mr. VORYS. I should think in general it would be cheaper to train pilots-that is something I am mildly familiar with, based on ancient procedures in World War I, but I should think it would be cheaper to train pilots or to have some training schools and train them over there, than to bring them over here.

General RIDGWAY. It would, and that is what we are trying to establish.

France, for instance, carries on pilot training in French Mor


Chairman CHIPERFIELD. I believe the general has a statement he would like to read to us.

While this is being taken down, general, it never leaves the room. The record is kept right here.


General RIDGWAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
If I may, I would like to clear up one point, first:

This morning I touched several times upon my responsibilities with respect to force requirements and force goals.

In order that the committee may have before it a clear understanding of what I hoped to say, but perhaps did not, I would like to, with your permission, sir, put a little statement into the record, here, which I think would be helpful.

My primary recommendations to higher authority are the military force requirements. They are not tied to a particular year. It is to carry out the definite mission assigned to me. These recommendations are purely military in nature. The determination of annual force goals, now, as distinct from force requirements, building toward these requirements, is carried out in the NATO annual review under the Secretary General and with the participation of representatives of each country. The United States was represented by Ambassador Draper.*

During the annual review my headquarters makes further recommendations. The overall level of the resources which will be pro

William H. Draper was formerly the U.S. Special Representative in Europe, Economic Cooperation Administration, and at the time was U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO. At about this time. Ambassador Draper resigned from this position, but his resignation did not become effective until June 30, 1953.

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vided for defense is determined by higher authority. My headquar ters recommends priority of effort and composition of military programs to achieve the highest possible levels of effectiveness within the limits of the resources provided.

It is my further duty, specifically relating to the aid program, to develop lists of equipment deficiencies in order of priority for forces Chairman CHIPERFIELD. General, they cannot hear down there. Just a little louder, please.

General RIDGWAY. Excuse me.

It is my further duty, specifically related to the aid program, to develop lists of equipment dificiencies in order of priority for forces specified by higher U.S. authority.

The military end-item component in the present aid bill is intended to fill these deficiencies, within the level of funds finally made available.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, with your permission I should like to devote this afternoon's executive session to a classified discussion of matters raised in my report to you this morning. My intention is to present further information and evaluations which may guide your thinking on our vast problems of defense.

I speak to you as I did this morning, both as SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander in Europe] and as Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe.

What I have to say does not alter my premises or conclusions of the morning session, but will give you the classified documentation and background and the reasons behind my major observations.


First of all, the Soviet threat: You will recall I mentioned this morning that the U.S.S.R. itself, has some 175 to 180 army divisions, and an air arm of some 20,000 aircraft. Of these, 134 army divisions and approximately 15,000 aircraft are disposed in areas facing Allied Command Europe; that is, approximately 75 percent of their


By facing Allied Command Europe. I mean forces located in occupied countries of Eastern Europe and in the western and southern areas of European Russia. The Soviet Navy has more than 350 submarines, including an estimated 125 ocean-going submarines in the European fleets.

While the number of divisions in the Soviet Army has remained the same since the end of the war, their combat effectiveness has been considerably improved. The troops are well led, well trained and well disciplined. Soviet equipment is considered adequate both qualitatively and quantitatively.

In some respects, present Soviet weapons, such as their armored vehicles, heavy mortars, and artillery, possess excellent combat characteristics. In the air, the Soviets have made significant progress in reequipping their forces with high performance jet aircraft and in increasing overall combat efficiency. The Mig-15, a jet fighter, is a good airplane and as an interceptor is generally the equal of our

F-86F, although the F-86D which is now in production is considered to be superior to the Mig-15 in practically all respects.


The airfield construction program in east Europe which began in 1948 has advanced well beyond the needs of air units currently deployed in the area. There are over 100 major airfields with runways 6,000 feet or longer completed or under construction in east Europe. In addition, there are well over 200 second-class airfields, a great many of which are either fully operable or maintained on a standby basis. The Soviet Navy continued to increase its strength in ships and submarines and to improve the quality of its naval aviation, with emphasis being given to the submarines. The Soviet forces are considered combat ready to undertake large scale offensive operations and would have adequate logistical support. We also accord Russia a considerable aerial and submarine mine-laying capability.


The armed forces of captive nations, as yet, are not as fully prepared. Nonetheless, the most ominous situation in east Europe today is the continued growth of this military power. At the end of 1950. there were 59 divisions. Today there are 74. The air forces of these captive nations now possess some Soviet-made jet aircraft. Their armed forces have grown far beyond what is needed in maintaining Communist power in each country.

While possibly only a third of their divisions could participate in an aggressive campaign, the other divisions, which could constitute a reserve at the present time, are gradually acquiring combat capabilities.

These divisions are organized, trained and equipped along Soviet lines and even some of their commanding officers are Russians. The U.S.S.R. has furnished the armed forces of these captive nations large amounts of equipment and material, including some of the best the Soviets have to offer. To insure that trusted leaders direct the military activities of these forces, the officer cadres have all been purged of doubtful personnel. As a further safeguard, Soviet military advisers have been sent to organize, to train, and to direct the political indoctrination. It seems reasonable to assume that the Soviets have knowingly taken a calculated risk in reequipping these forces and therefore must consider that their worth in any future war would justify the expenditure.


At the present time, the industrial and military mobilization capacity of the U.S.S.R. is such that the present 175-180 Soviet army divisions could be increased to 320 army divisions 30 days after mobilization.

The U.S. F-86 fighter airplane-Sabrejet-achieved remarkable success against the Soviet Mig-15 in the Korean war. The F-86F was the definitive day interceptor version of the F-86. The F-86D, also referred to by General Ridgway, was an all-weather interceptor. Except for the basic wing structure, it had nothing in common with other F-86 models. It was equipped with rockets, and complex electronic target-detection and fire systems. Under the mutual security program, large numbers of various models of the F-86 were furnished to U.S. allies, both in Europe and other parts of the world.

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