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of forty thousand was to be the confederate army against Spain on the Portugal fide. This treaty was ratified by all the three powers. But in a short time after, the Emperor declared himself unable to comply with his part of the agreement, and so left the two-thirds upon us; who very generously undertook that burthen, and, at the same time, two-thirds of the fubfidies for maintenance of the Portuguese troops. But neither is this the worst part of the story; for although the Dutch did indeed send their own quota of four thousand men to Portugal (which, however, they would not agree to, but
condition that the other twothirds should be supplied by us); yet they never took care to recruit them : for in the year 1706, the Portuguese, British, and Dutch forces, having marched with the Earl of Galway into Castile, and, by the noble conduct of that general, being forced to retire into Valencia, it was found neceffary to raise a new army on the Portugal side: where the Queen hath, at several times, encreased her eftablishment to ten thousand five hundred men; and the Dutch never replaced one single man, nor paid one penny of their subsidies to Portugal, in six years.
. The Spanish army, on the side of Catalonia, is, or ought to be, about fifty thousand men, exclufive of Portugal. And here the war hath been carried on almost entirely at our cost. For this whole army is paid by the Queen, excepting only seven battalions and fourteen squadrons of Dutch and Palatines ; and even fifteen hundred of these are likewise in our pay ; besides the sums
given to King Charles for subsidies and the maintenance of his court. Neither are our troops at Gibraltar included within this number. And further, we alone have been at all the charge of transporting the forces first sent from Genoa to Barcelona ; and of all the imperial recruits from time to time. And have likewise paid vast sums as levy-money for every individual man and horse so furnished to recruit; although the horses were fcarce worth the price of transportation. But this hath been almost the constant misfortune of our feet during the present war; instead of being employed on some enterprize for the good of the nation, or even for the protection of our trade, to be wholly taken up in transporting soldiers.
We have actually conquered all Bavaria, Ulm, Augsbourg, Landau, and a great part of Alface, for the Emperor : and by the troops we have furnished, the armies we have paid, and the diversions we have given to the enemies forces, have chiefly contributed to the conquests of Milan, Mantua, and Mirandola, and to the recovery of the dutchy of Modena. The last Emperor drained the wealth of those countries into his own coffers, without increasing his troops against France by such mighty acquisitions, or yielding to the most reasonable requests we have made.
Of the many towns we have taken for the Dutch, we have consented, by the barrier treaty, that all those which were not in the poffession of Spain, upon the death of the Catholic King, fhall be part of the States dominions; and that
they shall have the military power in the most confiderable of the rest; which is in effect to be the absolute sovereigns of the whole. And the Hollanders have already made such good use of their time, that, in conjunction with our General, theoppressions of Flanders are much greater than ever.
And this treatment, which we have received from our two princip 1 allies, hath been pretty well copied by mof sther:princes in the confederacy, with whom we have any dealings. For instance : seven Portuguese regiments, after the battle of Almanza, went off with the rest of that broken army to Catalonia; the King of Portugal fạid, he was not able to pay them, while they were out of his country; the Queen consented, therefore, to do it herself, provided the King would-raise as many more to supply their place. This, he engaged to do, but never performed. Notwithstanding which, his fublidies were constantly paid him by my Lord Godolphin, for almost four years, without any deduction upon account of those seven regiments; directly contrary to the seventh article of our offensive alliance with that crown, where it is agreed, that a deduction shall be made out of those subsidies, in proportion to the number of men wanting in that complement which the King is to maintain. But, whatever might have been the reasons for this proceeding, it seems they are above the understanding of the present Lord Treasurer; * who, not entering into those refinements of paying the pube
* Earl of Oxford,
lic money upon private considerations, hath been so uncourtly as to stop it. This disappointment, I suppose, hath put the court of Lisbon upon other expedients, of raising the price of forage, so as to force us, either to lefsen our number of troops, or be at double expence in maintaining them; and this, at a time, when their own product, as well as the import of corn, was never greater; and of demanding a duty upon the foldiers clothes we carried over for those troops, which have been their fole defence against an inveterate enemy; and whose example might have infused courage, as well as taught them discipline, if their fpirits had been capable of receiving either.
In order to augment our forces every year, in the same proportion as those for whom we fight diminish theirs, we have been obliged to hire troops, from several princes of the empire, whose ministers and residents here, have perpetually importuned the court with unreasonable demands, under which our late ministers thought fit to be passive. For those demands were always backed with a threat to recal their soldiers; which was a thing not to be heard of, because it might discontent the Dutch. In the mean time, those princes never fent their contingent to the Emperor, as, by the laws of the empire they are obliged to do; but gave, for their excuse, that we had already hired all they could possibly spare.
But, if all this be true; if, according to what I have affirmed, we began this war, contrary to reafon; if, as the other party themselves, upon all
occafions, acknowledge, the success we have had, was more than we could reasonably expect; if, after all our success, we have not made that use of it, which, in reason, we ought to have done; if we have made weak and foolish bargains with our allies, suffered them tamely to break every article, even in those bargains, to our disadvantage, and allowed them to treat us with infolence and contempt, at the very instant when we were gaining towns, provinces, and kingdoms for them, at the price of our ruin, and without any prospect of interest to ourselves; if we have consumed all our strength, in attacking the enemy on the strongeft fide, where (as the old Duke of Schomberg expressed it) to engage with France, was to take a bull by the horns ; and left, wholly unattempted, that part of the war, which could only enable us to continue or to end it ; if all this, I say, be our case, it is a very obvious question to ask, by what motives, or what management, we are thus become the dupes and bubbles of Europe ? Sure, it cannot be owing to the stupidity arising from the coldness of our climate; since those among our allies, who have given us most reason to complain, are as far removed from the sun as ourselves.
If, in laying open the real causes of our present misery, I am forced to speak with some freedom, I think it will require no apology. Reputation is the smallest facrifice those can make us, who have been the instruments of our ruin; because it is that for which, in all probability, they have the least value. So that, in exposing the actions