tion to the disordered machine would impress his mind with the idea of a maker of them in a much more forcible manner than his obferving the regular conftruction, and uniform motion of them. It must convince him of the existence of fome perfon capable of regulating, and therefore probably of making these machines, whether he fhould ever fee this perfon or not. Thus do miracles prove the existence of a God in a fhorter and more fatisfactory manner than the obfervation of the uninterrupted courfe of nature. If there be a Being who can controul the courfe of nature, there must be one who originally established it, in whatever difficulty we may still be left with respect to his nature, and the manner of his exift ence. Why men should be ftruck with unusual appearances it is not my bufinefs to explain, though it would not be difficult to do it, the fact of their being fo is fufficient to my purpose. And therefore a perfon acquainted with human nature, and this property of it, would not neglect to avail himself of it when he wished to engage the attention of men, for the purpofe of their inftruction and improvement. Why Why then should we think it unnatural, or improper, in the Divine Being, who, as the maker of men, beft knows what they are, and in what way to apply to them? Let no one then say that occafional interpofitions, or miraculous appearances, are an unnatural, or improper mode of inftructing mankind, when it is in a manner neceffary to draw their attention to a fuperior Being, as a foundation for their intercourfe with him. 4. No lefs are they mistaken who imagine that the evidences of revealed religion have more of difficulty in them than those of natural religion, by which we mean the arguments from nature for the being, perfections, and providence of God. On the contrary, far greater difficulties occur with respect to these, than with respect to the others, and all that can be faid is, that great difficulties must give way to greater. Far am I from fuppofing that the evidence for the being of a God is not demonftrative, fince marks of defign, with which the world abounds, neceffarily imply a designing or intelligent caufe. But notwithstanding this, we can never fully fatisfy ourselves with respect to the objection of the atheift, that if the universe require a caufe, this cause must require require another; and if the Author of nature, or the being we call God, exift without a cause, so may the universe itself. All that we can fay in anfwer to this, is that, whatever difficulty we may labour under with respect to this fubject, which will always be above our comprehension, the actual existence of a vifible world, and of marks of defign in it, cannot be denied, and therefore, whether we be able to proceed any farther or not, we must acknowledge a defigning cause. Otherwise we might say that a house had no architect, or a child no father. If the eye of a man require no defigning caufe, neither would a telescope, which is an inftrument of a fimilar nature, evidently adapted to answer a fimilar purpose. And at this fuppofition every mind would revolt. More and greater difficulties occur when we proceed to the consideration of the unity, the omniprefence, the conftant agency, and what is of more confequence ftill, the benevolence of the Supreme Being, on the principles of the light of nature. So forcibly were the minds. of men in the early ages, impreffed with a view of the evils which abound in the world, and so inconfiftent did they conceive them to be be with the designs of a benevolent author, that they supposed there was an original principle of evil, independent of that of good. And they who fuppofed there was a multiplicity of deities (to which they were led by the extent and variety they obferved in the works of nature) imagined fome of them to be of a benevolent, and others of a malevolent difpofition. That the Author of nature is one, that he is fimply, invariably, and infinitely good, and that all the evils we fee and experience, are calculated to promote good, are great and sublime truths, which we derive from revelation only, though, on a strict examination, they appear not to be inconfiftent with the ances in nature. appear On the other hand, the evidences of revelation are level to every capacity. That it is the Author of nature who interposes must be evident from every interruption of the ufual course of it. For no other than he who eftablished the laws of nature can controul them; and though there may be fome difficulty in diftinguishing fome preternatural appearances from fuch as are merely unufual, this cannot be the cafe with refpect to numberless others. If it was a fact that the Ifraelites walked through through the Red Sea, and the river Jordan; if all the first-born of the Egyptians, and the firft-born only, of man and beast, died in one night, and that announced before-hand; if an articulate voice was actually heard to pronounce the ten commandments from mount Sinai, fo as to be heard by two millions of people, there could be no doubt of a divine interpofition in any of the cafes. And the fame may be faid of numberless other facts in the fcripture hiftory. If the facts be ascertained, there can be no doubt concerning their caufe. Now, all facts may be afcertained by fufficient teftimony, or that of a competent number of credible witneffes, i. e. of perfons who were in circumstances not to be impofed upon themselves, and who had no apparent motive to impose upon others. This is fully equal to the evidence of a man's own fenfes. Nay, there are many perfons who would diftruft their own eyes and ears rather than those of other perfons, who they thought were better judges than themselves. Though fingle perfons may be impofed upon in a variety of ways, or may take it into their heads, for reasons which it is not in the any man to inveftigate, to impofe upon of power others, ་ |
