when he says, that there is first a sensation and then a belief in self. In a later age, Sir W. Hamilton connected the qualitative theory of Stewart with the phenomenal theory of Kant. In doing so he was guilty, we must take the liberty of saying, of a great and inexcusable blunder. Stewart would have repudiated the phenomenal theory of Kant as at all identical with his own. Stewart, no doubt, speaks of the phenomena of the mind, but he means by phenomena not, as Kant did, appearances, but individual facts to be referred to a law; and qualities with him were realities. But, legitimately or illegitimately, Hamilton identifying the qualitative theory with the phenomenal, deduces from them a system of relativity, which ended in nihilism, or at least in nescience. We are glad to notice that Mr. Mansel, notwithstanding his great and just admiration of Hamilton, has emancipated himself from this fundamental error. He proclaims: "I am immediately conscious of myself, seeing and hearing, willing and thinking." (Proleg. Logica, p. 129; also, Art. Metaph. in Encyc. Brit.) We have sometimes thought, that if Stewart had foreseen all the logical consequences to be deduced from his views, he would have fallen back on the same common-sense doctrine. We regret that Mr. Mansel has not gone a step farther, and placed our cognition of matter on the same footing in this respect as our knowledge of mind. We are sure, at least, that this would be altogether in the spirit of Reid and Stewart. We maintain that, just as by self-consciousness we know self as exercising such and such a quality, say thinking or feeling, so, by sense-perception, we know a body as extended and exercising power or energy. This is the simplest doctrine; it seems to be the only one consistent with consciousness, and is the proper doctrine of natural realism as distinguished from an artificial system of relativity.

In the second volume of the Elements, after a feeble and chiefly verbal disquisition on Reason, he proceeds to treat of the "Fundamental Laws of Belief." We reckon the phrase a very happy one, and a great improvement on "Common Sense," which labors under the disadvantage of being ambiguous, inasmuch as it usually denotes that unbought, untaught sagacity, which is found only in certain men, and which others can never acquire,

whereas it can be admitted into philosophical discussion only when it denotes principles which are regulating the mind of all. We have a remark to make as to the place in which he discusses these fundamental laws. It is after he has gone over the greater number of the faculties, and he seems to treat them as involved in Reason. And we acknowledge that there may be some advantages in first going over the faculties and then speaking of these fundamental laws. But we must guard against the idea that these principles have not been involved in the faculties which he has previously gone over, such as Perception, Abstraction, and Memory. The "Fundamental Laws" are not to be regarded as different from the Faculties; they are, in fact, the Necessary Laws of the Faculties, and guiding their exercise. These laws work in all minds, infant and mature, sane and insane. M. Morel was asked to examine a prisoner who seemed to be deranged, and he asked him how old he was; to which the prisoner replied, "245 francs, 35 centimes, 124 carriages," etc. To the same question, more distinctly asked, he replied, "5 metres, 75 centimetres." When asked how long he had been deranged, he answered, "Cats, always cats." M. Morel at once declared his madness to be simulated, and states: "In their extreme aberrations, in their most furious delirium, madmen do not confound what it is impossible for the most extravagant logic to confound. There is no madman who loses the idea of cause, of substance, of existence." (See Psychol. Journal, Oct. 1857.)

Stewart's doctrine of Causation seems to us to be deficient and inadequate. He is altogether right in calling it a Fundamental Law of Belief, which necessitates the mind to rise from an effect to a cause. But he does not seem to observe all that is involved in the cause. He gives in too far to Hume on this subject, and prepared the way for Brown's theory. He does" not see, in particular, that causation springs from power being in the substance or substances which act as the cause, and that we intuitively discover power to be in substances both mental and material. His distinction between efficient and physical cause is of a superficial and confused character. It may be all true that, in looking at physical action, we may not know intuitively where the full efficiency

resides, whether in the physical object alone or in mind (the Divine) acting in it; but we are certain that there is an efficiency somewhere in some substance. We are by no means sure that he is right in limiting power in the sense of efficiency to mental action. We agree here with the criticisms of Cousin (as indeed we agree with most of the criticisms of Cousin on the Scottish School) where he says, that while our first idea of cause may be derived from our own voluntary action, we are at the same time intuitively led to ascribe potency to other objects also, and that Reid and Stewart, in denying that we discover efficiency in body, are acting contrary to their own principles of common-sense, and in contradiction to the universal opinion of the human race, which is, that fire burns and light shines. (See Cousin, Phil. Ecoss., p. 437, ed. 1857.) Stewart has also failed, as it appears to us, to give the proper account of the intuition which regulates and underlies our investigations of nature. This is not, as he represents it, a belief in the uniformity of nature; a belief which appears to us to be the result of experience; which experience, as it discovers the rule, may also announce the exceptions. The child does not believe, nor does the savage believe, nature to be uniform. The underlying beliefs, which carry us on in our investigations of nature are those of identity of being, of substance and quality, of cause and effect. Hence it is quite possible to prove a miracle which may not be in conformity with the uniformity of nature, but is quite compatible, as Brown has shown, with our intuitive belief in causation, for when creature power fails we can believe in creative.

It is in the second volume of the Elements that we find the logical disquisitions of Stewart. He has utterly failed in his strictures on Aristotle's Logic. The School of Locke, and the School of Condillac, and the School of Reid, have all failed in constructing a logic of inference which can stand a sifting examination. The Aristotelian analysis of reasoning stands at this moment untouched in its radical positions. The objections of Campbell and Stewart have been answered by Whately; and those advanced by Mr. J. S. Mill, have been answered by Mr. Kidd, who has also thoroughly undermined Mr. Mill's own attributive theory

of reasoning.* In giving our adherence to the Aristotelian analysis, we admit that improvements are being wrought in it by that school of logicians which has sprung from Kant, and of which Hamilton is the leader in this country, followed by such eminent men as Mansel, Thomson, and Spalding. But their improvements ought not to be admitted till the formal logicians thoroughly deliver their exposition of the laws of thought from all that false Kantian metaphysics, which represents thought as giving to the objects a "form" which is not in the objects themselves. Besides, we can not allow Logie to be an à priori science except under an explanation; we admit that the laws of thought operate in the mind prior to all experience, but we maintain that they can be discovered by us only à posteriori, and by a generalization of their individual actings.

But while we may thus expect a perfected Universal Logic, treating of the laws of thought as laws of thought-not independent of objects but whatever be the objects-we hope there will grow up alongside a Particular Logic, which will be a more practically useful Logic, to consider the laws of thought as directed to particular classes of objects, and to treat of such topics as Demonstrative and Probable Evidence, Induction, and Analogy. In regard to this latter Logic, Stewart must ever be referred to as an authority. So far, indeed, as the theory of definitions and axioms is concerned, we prefer very much the view of Whewell, as developed in his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciencs. But, in regard to Induction, we believe that Stewart's account of it is, upon the whole, the best which appeared from the time of Bacon down to this our own age. We have now, however, two great works, which have left every other far behind, that of Whewell and that of Mr. J. S. Mill. Not that we regard either of these as perfect. Dr. Whewell has exaggerated the place of the mental element, and has expressed it in most unfortunate phrase ology, such as Fundamental Ideas and Conceptions, terms which have been used

Dr. Whately, as far as can be judged from the editions of his Work, seems entirely ignorant of all that has been done in Logic the last quarter of a century, but he has met with an acute defender in Mr. Kidd.—See his Primary Principles of Reasoning.

in twenty different significations, and are used by him to denote that the mind superinduces on the facts something not in the facts, whereas the mental power merely enables it to discover what is in the facts. Mr. Mill, on the other hand, has overlooked the mental element alto

gether, and denies all necessary and universal truth. We may hope, in future years, to have a perfect Inductive Logic, by a judicious combination of those two works, but this could be done only by a man of the same high intellectual stature as Whewell and Mill, and this will seldom be met with. It is to be regretted that, since the days of Stewart, there is not a single Scotchman who has presented a work on Induction of any name or value.* In regard to Analogy, the recent discoveries as to the typical forms of animals and plants will enable logicians to give a far more comprehensive and yet more stringent view of reasoning from analogy than has been done by Stewart, by Whewell, or by Mill.

The third volume of the Elements treats of certain concrete and practical matters, which Stewart was peculiarly qualified to discuss, and which bring out some of the finer qualities of his mind. All his disquisitions had tended to become verbal, and here he treats exclusively of language, which he does with fine discernment, but falls into a great blunder in regard to Sanscrit, which he represents as of comparatively late origin, and analogous to mediæval Latin, whereas it has a literature reaching back at least twelve hundred years before Christ. He has some interesting, though by no means profound, remarks on the sympathetic affections. But by far the finest parts of the volume are those in which he treats of the varieties of intellectual character, and of the peculiarities of the metaphysician, mathematician, the poet and the sexes. Thus, of the mere metaphysician, he says, that

"He can not easily submit to the task of examining details, or of ascertaining facts, and is

* It is a good sign of the times, however, that we have excellent works on Bacon from England, France, and even Germany. The edition of the Works of Bacon by Ellis and Spedding, now in course of publication, will ever be the standard one, in consequence of the pains bestowed on it. The public seem to expect from Mr. Spedding a life of Bacon of an impartial character, and justifying him from some of the sweeping charges of Pope and Macaulay.

apt to seize on a few data as first principles, following them out boldly to their remotest consequences, and afterwards employing his ingenuity to reconcile, by means of false refinements, his theoretical assumptions with the exceptions which seem to contradict them."

He shows that the metaphysician is safe from the checks met with in physics, "where speculative mistakes are contradicted by facts which strike our senses." Again, of mathematics, he says:

"That while they increase the faculty of reasoning or deduction, they give no employment to the other powers of the understanding concerned in the investigation of truth."

He adds:

"I have never met a mere mathematician who was not credulous to excess."

In the same volume he discusses cautiously and judiciously the comparison between the faculties of man and brutes. We suspect, however, that the theory has not yet been devised, it has certainly not been published, which is fitted to give a satisfactory account of the relation of the brute to the human faculties. We suppose that Bonnet is right when he says that we shall never be able to understand the nature of brute instinct, till we are in the dog's head without being the dog. It is certain that we have at this moment nothing deserving of the name of science on this subject. We have sometimes thought that the modern doctrine of homologues and analogues, if extended and modified to suit the new object, might supply the key to enable us to express some of the facts. Certain of the brute qualities are merely analogous to those of man, (as the wing of a butterfly is analogous to that of a bird;) others are homologues, but inferior in degree; while there are qualities in man different in kind from any in the brute. Aristotle called brute instincts, μιμήματα της ανθρωπινης wns. They would be more accurately described as anticipations or types of the coming archetype. The volume closes. with an account of a boy born blind and dumb.

The Philosophical Essays are an episode in his system as a whole, even as his numerous notes and illustrations are episodes in the individual volumes. We are tempted, in looking at them, to take up two of the subjects discussed, as a deep

the questions agitated can not yet be regarded as settled.

Every careful reader of Locke's Essay must have observed two elements running through all his philosophy-the one, a sensational, or rather to do justice to Locke, who ever refers to reflection as a separate source of ideas, an experiental element, and the other a rational. In the opening of the Essay he denies innate ideas apparently in every sense, and affirms that the materials of all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection; but, as he advances, his language is, that by these sources ideas are "suggested and furnished to the mind;"* he calls in faculties with high functions to work on the materials; speaks of ideas which are "creatures and inventions of the understanding;" appeals to "natural law" and the "principles of common reason;" and in the Fourth Book gives a very high, or rather deep place to intuition; says that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence; speaks of the "mind perceiving truth as the eye doth light, only by being directed toward it ;" declares that in the "discovery of and assent to these truths, there is no use of the discursive faculty, no need of reasoning, but they are known by a superior and higher degree of evidence," and talks even of a necessary connection of ideas." It unfortunately happened that in France, to which Locke was introduced by Voltaire and the Encyclopædists, they took the sensation element alone, and the effect on thought and on morality was most disastrous. Unfortunately, too, Locke has become known in Germany, chiefly through France, and hence we find him all over the Continent, described both by friends and foes as a sensationalist; and the charge has been reëchoed in this country by Sir W. Hamilton and Mr. Morell. Yet it is quite certain that Locke has an intellectual as well as a sensational side. We have, in a careful perusal of the Essay, mainly for this very end, discovered in every book, and in the majority even of the chapters, both sides of the shield; but we confess that we have not been able to discover the line that joins them.t We

this subject are exhaustive or decisive; he is evidently wrong in supposing that Locke identified reflection with the reason which discovers truth; but his strictures are always candid and sometimes just.

In the Philosophical Essays Stewart has many fine observations on Taste and Beauty. On this subject he was favora bly disposed towards the Theory of his friend Mr. Alison, and he ascribes more than he should have done to the associa tion of ideas. But he never gave his adhesion to this hypothesis as a full explanation of the phenomena. "If there was nothing," he says, "originally and intrinsically pleasing or beautiful, the associating principle would have no materials on which it could operate." The theory of association was never favorably received by artists, and has been abandoned long ago by all metaphysicians. The tendency now is to return to the deeper views which had been expounded long ago by Plato, and we may add by Augustine. We find that Stewart refers to the doctrine of Augustine, who "represents beauty as consisting in that relation of the parts of a whole to each other which constitutes its unity ;" and all that he has to say of it is: "The theory certainly is not of great value, but the attempt is curious." The aesthetical writers of our age would be inclined to say of it that there is more truth in it than in all the speculations of Alison, Stewart, Jeffrey, and Brown. It may be safely said that while earnest inquirers have had pleasant glimpses of beauty, to no one has she revealed her full charms. When such writers as Cousin, Ruskin, and M'Vicar dwell so much on Unity, Harmony, Proportion, we tempted to ask them-does then the feeling of beauty not arise till we have discovered such qualities as Proportion, Unity, and Harmony? and if they answer in the affirmative, then we venture to show them that they are themselves holding a sort of association theory; for they affirm that the beautiful object does not excite emotion till, as a sign, it calls forth certain

are

*This is the very language adopted by Reid and Stewart.