conscientious. There is a better sense in which we do right in not committing ourselves to others. The phrase should not always seem reproachful, since we read of One who "did not commit himself" (ox loTEVEV) unto the multitude, " because he knew all men." We put too much faith in men when we of course identify our judgment or will with theirs. We have no right to throw off our personal responsibility in political affairs upon a faction, any more than on a church in religion. It is not patriotic nor manly to surrender our opinion and choice, or to have none of our own, when we are entitled to maintain them.

But it is said, that by such a course as we recommend, one throws away his influence, that his single effort, being alone, is lost, whereas in concert with others it would contribute to the result, and might secure it. There are cases in which such a consideration is legitimate and important, but it is not the only one to be regarded here. The present effect of such a course, or its bearing on the success of a particular measure, is not of the highest consequence. It may be better that a man should throw away his influence, than wield it effectually, yet in a manner which sanctions a growing and alarming evil,-better that he should act single-handed, or not at all, than that he should make himself efficient as the tool of a demagogue, or the slave of a prejudiced and corrupt multitude. His first care should be, his conscientious use of whatever influ ence he has, whether other men conspire to carry out or frustrate that influence, and he will be happier, though his favorite measure should altogether fail, though the candidate he approves should be ut terly defeated, than in any success to which he could otherwise contribute. To act thus is not to disregard all expediency, but to maintain certain principles which carry the

truest expediency in their ultimate and extended operation. And as a part of this operation it should be observed, that so soon as any consi derable number of men come to act thus independently, their influence, instead of being thrown away, must become exceedingly effective and salutary. Let all parties understand that besides those who can be counted in their ranks, there is a reserved body who can be won only by the integrity and wisdom that mark their men and measures. It must then become more obviously the interest of every party to bear such a character, by most successfully aiming at the good of their whole country, rather than at any factious and inferior advantage. Parties will still exist, made up mainly of such as know not how to think or act without them; yet they will find a salutary check and guidance among as many as may move independently yet harmoniously toward the public good. The history of our elections shows that a few men may hold a casting vote between contending hosts. Let but a fiftieth or a hun dredth part of the freemen of this land take their individual positions, aloof from the control of every faction, and the crisis may come which will put the nation's destiny into their hands.

Something more, therefore, is due from conscientious citizens, than merely to lament the prevalence of party spirit, as an evil which can not be remedied nor alleviated. So far as they partake of it, the remedy is in their own hands. It is at once desirable and practicable for them to speak and act and vote, not as partisans, but as individual friends of their country, as citizens who fear God, and regard their responsibility to him in their use of the privileges he has given them, and who esteem truth and righteousness to be the paramount interests both of individuals and of communities. If these words of ours shall stimulate any of our

readers to such republicanism, we have done the "state some service."

And if other dissuasion from party spirit were needed, besides the mischiefs that have been named, we would say, that God has summoned the American people to the correction of this evil. He has suffered party spirit to prevail so far as to be come, in a degree, its own punishment. The people have been alarmed and ashamed on account of excesses and frauds, to which nothing could have led but the madness of partisanship. It is the common foreboding of thoughtful men, that if other grounds of apprehension for the harmony and liberty of this nation in years to come were removed, a most formidable danger remains in the rage of parties, as it has been witnessed in other republics, and sometimes in our own. We can not be insensible to the necessity there is for reformation here, before we may indulge confident expectations as to the purity or permanency of our institutions. Nor can it be yet forgotten, the singular dissonance in our public affairs reminding men of it from time to time,-that this

people have received at least one signal rebuke for the fierce and relentless violence of party feeling. We had seen factions run high, and dash against each other with noise and fury. At last a brave old man rode on the top of the wave, the idol of the multitude, the chief of a triumphant majority. One month was allowed for victory. We shall not soon forget the day when the bells rang out their joyous peal in welcome of him whom the nation delighted to honor, nor that other day when the same bells tolled in announcement of his more imperious summons to another world. At once bitter reproach and intemperate applause were silenced. Partisans felt themselves fearfully admonished. The lesson, if it has been disregarded, can not yet be forgotten. Now, as then, God would have us remember that, more momentous than all political contentions, there is a conflict going on between truth and error, between righteousness and sin, in which every man individually participates, and that far above all factious leaders, the Lord reigneth, and that "the Lord-he is God."

lations are fixed and unchangeable. Guilt and innocence depend upon the knowledge of these relations and of the obligations arising from them. As these are manifestly susceptible of variation, while right and wrong are invariable, the two notions may manifestly not always correspond to each other." In his opinion, a person may in certain cases fail to do that which from the conditions of his being he is under obligation to perform,' and yet be innocent. This position we congreatly mistaken, there is nothing sider untenable. Unless we are

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which they perceive, and which they now have ability to perceive. Their duty is measured by the rules of rectitude applicable to perceived and perceivable relations. By obedience to these rules, they would be prepared to receive Christ as soon as they should discover his existence. But at present they sustain no relation to him which imposes obligations on them, so that their want of Christian faith is wrong, and, if it can be traced back to some past misconduct of theirs, criminal. Thus universally, relations, of which man is necessarily ignorant, are not yet sustained by him in any practical sense; they are still in futurity as the sources of obligation, like the filial relation in infancy; and no obligations now exist in regard to them. A foundling may arrive at manhood in ignorance of his origin, and be daily associating with his parents without knowing them in this relation. It is then in no sense wrong for him to treat them as indifferent persons. The conditions of his being do not require him to act the part of a son to them. A knowledge of the relation might promote the happiness of both parties, but while that knowledge is wanting, there is nothing naturally wrong, any more than there is moral turpitude, in his treating them as mere neighbors. In a practical point of view, they are to him nothing more than neigh bors. And so in respect to them; if they do not know him to be their son, and if they have no present means of knowing it, they are not under any kind of obligation to perform parental duties to him, not even if they were the guilty authors of this mutual ignorance. They do not now sustain to him the relation of parents in any practical sense. When a relation is not perceived, no obligation arises from it, unless the mind of the agent has some hint or intimation of its existence, which binds him to investigate the

subject. When such an intimation is wanting, the mind not only does not perceive, but can not yet perceive the existence of the relationand conscience does not bind itthe rule of rectitude does not require it-to act in harmony with that relation, or to pay it the slight est regard. This was not the posi tion of Saul of Tarsus in respect to Christianity. He did not indeed perceive the Messiahship of our Lord.

But he had a hint, an intimation, and evidence at hand, of the truth of this claim of Jesus of Nazareth. The claim he knew he had not fairly investigated, so that he could not with a pure conscience reject it. His ignorance of the relations of Christ as the son of God, was not in fact total-for this intimation was sufficient to bind his conscience not to reject Him without farther inquiry. The position, therefore, that man sustains no necessarily unknown relations from which obligations arise, will bear to be modified by substituting for "necessarily," totally, or absolutely. Whoever is totally ignorant of a relation is under no obligation in respect to it; for total ignorance excludes every intimation of its existence, and implies that the mind is now unable to perceive it. That the moral law takes no cognizance of the conduct of men beyond the limits of those relations of which they have some hint, seems no less obvious than the exemption of an idiot, or brute animal, from human obligations. Total ignorance, as we have defined it, that is, ignorance from which the mind has no present means of relief, is incompatible with the existence of a relation in that practical sense which makes it the source of obligation.

But it is also maintained, that a person may so far mistake the obligations arising from his known relations as to be innocent in disre garding them. Total ignorance of

an obligation does undoubtedly vacate the obligation; but is such ignorance of the obligations of a person possible? Can conscience be wholly deceived in respect to the moral character of an act, which a person is bound by the conditions of his being to do or to refrain from doing? Is it possible, in other words, for man to do what it is wrong for him to do, and not at the same time transgress some known rule of moral obligation, and contract guilt? We think not. It is not to be believed, without examination, that our Creator has made us susceptible of being incited by an unequivocal sense of duty, to perform actions opposed to His will or our own well being and usefulness. That man is often hurried on by passion to do things contrary to his obligations, persuading himself that they are lawful, is a fact of familiar observation and experience. But the question is, whether he can do such an act with a perfectly pure conscience. Does he unhesitatingly believe on reflection, in the rectitude of his conduct? Is he impelled by an unequivocal voice of conscience to do what is wrong, or to neglect what is required of him "by the conditions of his be ing?”

This hypothesis sets up the judg. ment of man even when erroneous, as the rule of rectitude. Whether an act is naturally right or wrong, the agent contracts guilt, if he does it with a hesitating conscience. "He that doubteth is damned if he eat." Rom. xiv, 23. Hence, if he is fully convinced, that he ought to do a wrong act, he ought in fact to do it. He must otherwise do what he believes to be wrong. He must choose to sin against God, which is actually sinning; or else he must do that, which in itself ought not to be done. He ought to lie, to steal, to commit murder, to worship idols, to persecute heretics, if he sincerely believes it to be his duty? What

if these acts are contrary to the immutable law of rectitude, would he not break that law by refusing to do what he believes, though erroneously, to be required by it? Is not the papist, if he feels bound by conscience to worship the virgin Mary, obliged to worship her, or disobey God in fact though not in form? For refusing to do what he believes to be his duty, is really a refusal to obey God. Thus the notion, that conscience may unhesitatingly impel us to act unlawfully, exalts the erring judgment of man to the rank of a supreme lawgiver.

This notion does violence to the common sense of mankind. It some times happens that the fires of religious persecution rage, when brother delivers up brother to death, and parents their children. In such cases the delusion of the mind is very strong. But is it complete ? Does the persecutor entertain no secret suspicion, that his conduct is not, in all respects, right? Is he truly conscientious? Is it possi ble for him to feel, on reflection, that there is no doubt of the rectitude of his conduct? If so, he is placed under the necessity, either of refusing to obey God, or of delivering up his kindred and neighbors to the fires of persecution. The common sense of mankind revolts at such a conclusion. ever superstitious and ignorant a persecutor is, they consider him guilty; they believe he acts more from passion than intelligent conviction, and if he would honestly ask himself whether he has ever duly examined the moral nature of his present conduct, he would feel self-condemned.

How

This hypothesis contradicts also the representations of the Bible respecting the conduct of the pagan world. The murder of superannuated parents, the exposure of infants to perish in the streets, the sacrifice of human beings to false gods, and all the cruelties of idol