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the service, when it appears that there had been no intention to cause the service to be under unstamped articles, and that it was not the fault of the clerk himself. Re Welch, 5 Week. Rep. 505.

NOTE.-There was an affidavit by the attorney (the father of the articled clerk), stating that he had intended to stamp the articles and have them enrolled, but that immediately after they were executed he fell into pecuniary difficulties, which he did not name to his son, and that the son had done the duties of the office. Lord Campbell distinctly stated that the late act was not intended to give a right to have the articles stamped at any time.

ATTORNEY.-Taxation of costs-Professional skill-Remuneration for-Moving to review after accepting amount of allocatur.-Under particular circumstances, and where clearly for the client's benefit, an attorney is entitled to be paid for. the actual amount of labour and skill he has bestowed upon the subject, and not according to mere measurement. The Master having taxed a bill and reduced a particular item, the attorney intimated his intention of applying to the court for a rule to review, but at the same time required payment of the amount found due by the allocatur, which was accordingly paid: Held, that he could not afterwards apply for a rule to review the taxation. Semble, that where an attorney bestows great skill and labour upon the subject-matter of an item in his bill (such as analysing the depositions in a criminal prosecution against his client), the remuneration in respect of such item should be in accordance with the skill and labour bestowed, and not be regulated by mere measurement of the item itself. Re Marshall, exp. Wooler, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 159.

ATTORNEY. - Arrest — Privilege - Costs-Attorney of bail and not of party to cause.-An attorney who attends a court of justice simply as the attorney of persons putting in bail in another cause, and who is not the attorney in the cause, is not privileged from arrest. A., who attended the Lord Mayor's Court as attorney for B. and C., to assist them in putting in bail for the purpose of dissolving an attachment in an action in that court, but who was not attorney in the cause, was arrested on leaving that court. He obtained a rule nisi for his discharge on the ground of privilege. The Court of Common Bench discharged the rule with costs. Jones v. Marshall, 5 Week. Rep. 623; 29 Law Tim. Rep.


BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT [vol. 2, pp. 58, 63, 65]. 18 & 19 Vic. c. 67-Amendment Common Law Procedure Acts.-Where a writ, under the Bills of Exchange Act, 18 & 19 Vic. c. 67, had been improperly sued out, in a case to which the act did not apply: Held (Cockburn, C. J., dubitante), that the

court had power, under the 222nd section of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, to amend the writ, and to make it a good writ under the latter act. Leigh v. Baker, 3 Jur. N. S. 668.

DISCOVERY OF DOCUMENTS.-AffidavitOf what documents discovery may be had [vol. 2, pp. 225, 263].-To entitle a party to a discovery of documents, their existence must be shown with reasonable certainty. The court refused a discovery of letters from the captain of a ship to his owners, in an action against the latter for breach of charterparty in the ship being out of repair. Thompson v. Robson, 5 Week. Rep. 728.

DISCOVERY [vol. 3, pp. 225, 263].- Interrogatories Ejectment.-A plaintiff in ejectment has no right to call upon the party in possession (the defendant) to answer interrogatories stating by what title he is so in possession. Horton v. Bott, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 228.

EXECUTION.-Fi. fa.-Sale of goods by debtor after writ lodged-19 & 20 Vic. c. 97, s. 1 [see vol. 3, pp. 210, 212].-Section 1 of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vic. c. 97), by which bonâ fide purchasers are protected against writs lodged at the time of the sale with the sheriff against the goods of the seller (see vol. 3, pp. 210, 212), does not apply to any case where the writ was lodged with the sheriff at the time the act was passed. Williams v. Smith, 5 Week. Rep. 729.

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NEW TRIAL.-Verdict under £20 — Fraud.— The rule that the court will not grant a rule for a new trial when the verdict is under £20, except in cases of misdirection, does not apply to cases in which the verdict has been obtained by fraud or perjury. In such cases there is no limit to its jurisdiction. May v. Stevens, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 202.

NEW TRIAL.- Liberty to move-Whether evidence to support finding.—Where the jury find the question submitted to them in favour of one party, and another fact which was not submitted to them in favour of the other, and the judge directs the verdict to be entered for the party in whose favour the jury found the question submitted to them, with liberty to the other to move, the court will consider whether there was evidence to warrant the finding. Wood v. Leighton, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 199.

PAYMENT INTO COURT.-Detinue.-To an action for detaining the plaintiff's goods, and claiming their return or their value, it is not competent for the defendant to pay money into court. Allen v. Dunn, 26 Law Journ. 185, Ex.

SEQUESTRATION.-Priority of writs-Duty of bishops. When several writs of levari facias are delivered to a bishop, the writs of sequestration thereon are to be issued by him in the order of time in which the writs of levari were delivered to him to be executed, and not according to priority of date. Sturgis v. The Bishop of London, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 87.

STAYING PROCEEDINGS.-Suit in equity and action at law for the same subject-matter.-Plaintiff and defendant had been partners. Plaintiff had filed a bill in Chancery for an account, and a certain bill of exchange was one of the matters in question; he also commenced an action at law on the same bill of exchange: Held, that he might do so, and this court refused to stay proceedings. Pearse v. Robins, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 97.


ACT OF BANKRUPTCY.-Assignment to a creditor by a trader of the bulk of his property.—The reader will better understand the bearing of the following decision by referring to 3 Law Chron. p. 33, and the references there. If the sale by a trader of the bulk of his property is bonâ fide, and neither on the part of the buyer nor of the trader is there any intention to work a fraud, and there is no fraudulent preference, and no fraudulent sale, this is not an act of bankruptcy. These are questions of fact for a jury. Bell v. Simpson, 29 Law Tim. Rẹp. 202; 5 Week. Rep. 688.

ACT OF BANKRUPTCY-FRAUDULENT PREFERENCE [vol. 3, pp. 161, 392].—Bill of sale founded on previous verbal promise—Immediate benefit for giving the security.-A bill of sale, founded upon a verbal promise to give security in respect of a guarantee for the bankrupt's benefit made three years previously, and executed voluntarily by the bankrupt upon the occasion of a subsequent additional guarantee, is not an act of bankruptcy, nor a fraudulent preference within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Consolidation Act, although the bankrupt was at the time confessedly in insolvent circumstances. The principle upon which the court proceeds in determining such a question is, whether or not the bankrupt has received an immediate benefit as a consideration for the bill of sale. Re Kindred, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 250.

CERTIFICATE.-Refusal of certificate-Application to rehear―Jurisdiction.-The bankrupt's certificate having been refused altogether in 1844, the

commissioner has no jurisdiction, under sec. 12 of the Bankrupt Act, 1849, to rehear the case except under sec. 207; and there being no evidence before the court of the certificate having been refused by reason of false or improper suppression of evidence, or fraudulently, as required by sec. 207, an application to rehear was refused. Re Westrup, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 99.

EXCEPTED ARTICLES [vol. 1, p. 153].17 & 18 Vic. c. 119, s. 25-Builder-Scaffold poles not within the section.-Scaffold poles used by a builder in his trade are not "tools, implements, and other like necessaries," within the meaning of the 17 & 18 Vic. c. 119, relating to excepted articles to be retained by a bankrupt. Re Davis, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 99.

INSPECTION OF PROCEEDINGS.- Bankrupt's right to inspection of proceedings before surrender. A bankrupt who has not disputed the validity of the adjudication against himself within the time allowed by section 233 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1849, and has been outlawed for not surrendering, will not be allowed to inspect and have copies of the proceedings under section 232. The bringing an action of trespass by the bankrupt in New Zealand, where he resided, against the party who took possession of his property there under a power of attorney for the assignees in England, and following it up by an appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court in that colony to the Queen in Council, is not such an action, suit, or proceeding to dispute or annul the adjudication as is contemplated by section 232. Re Bunny, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 234.

PROOF.-Bill of exchange-Part payment-Proof for residue. Where the acceptor of a bill becomes bankrupt, and the drawers pay a portion of the amount of the bill to the holder of it, the latter can prove only for the amount remaining due. Indeed, it does not follow that because there is a right to recover at law, there is a right of proof in bankruptcy. The obligee of a voluntary bond can recover on it at law, but he cannot prove in bankruptcy. So also a mortgagee cf a bankrupt's estate can recover on his covenant at law, but can only prove for the deficiency in bankruptcy. And it has been decided by the Lords Justices in the following case that the holder of a bill of exchange having, before the proof, received part payment from the drawer, can only prove against the bankrupt acceptor for the residue which is due at the time when proof was made. Re Houghton, 5 Week. Rep. 669.

SURRENDER [vol. 2, p. 176].—Neglect in due time-Leave to surrender after time for doing so expired-Reasons for.-Where a bankrupt is in contempt for not having surrendered to the adjudication within the time prescribed by the Bankruptcy Act,

1849, the court will, in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 12, permit him to surrender, provided the assignees do not object thereto, or threaten criminal proceedings. Re Bunny, 26 Law Tim. Rep. 231.


HIGH BAILIFF.-Practising as attorney—Application under Absconding Debtors Act.-An application to a county court judge, under 14 & 15 Vic. c. 52, s. 1, for a warrant to arrest an absconding debtor, is not a proceeding in the county court within the meaning of 9 & 10 Vic. c. 95, s. 29, which imposes a penalty upon the high bailiff of any county court for practising as attorney or agent for any party in any proceeding in that court. Warden v. Stone, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 90.

PROHIBITION [vol. 3, p. 75].-JurisdictionAction for malicious prosecution-Prohibition where want of jurisdiction [vol. 1, pp. 17, 91, 357].-If the superior court sees that a plaint is in substance for a matter over which the county court has not jurisdiction, it will issue a prohibition. Where, therefore, a plaintiff claimed by his plaint costs and expenses, which if recoverable at all against the defendants, could only be recovered as damages in an action for a malicious prosecution: Held, that it was a proper case for a prohibition. Hunt v. The North Staffordshire Railway Company, 5 Week. Rep. 731; 29 Law Tim. Rep. 214.


BASTARDY ORDER [ante, p. 31].—Amendment of informality-Service of summons-Place of abode12 13 Vic. c. 45, s. 7.- An affiliation order described the mother of the bastard as residing at A., which was in fact, but was not in the order described as being, in the petty sessional division for which the justices were acting. The summons, however, on which the order was made, and which the court held under the circumstances to have been duly served, described A. as in the petty sessional division in question, and the summons was put in evidence and read before the justices: Held, that it was sufficiently in proof before the justices that the mother resided in the petty sessional division to authorise the court to amend the order in that respect under the 12 & 13 Vic. c. 45, s. 7. Reg. v. Hegham, 5 Week. Rep. 507.

EXPOSING CHILD [vol. 1, p. 455].-FelonyCausing bodily injury dangerous to life-Attempt to murder-7 Will. 4, and 1 Vic. c. 85, s. 2.-The 7 Will, 4, and 1 Vic. c. 85, s. 2, enacts that "" whoever shall administer to, or cause to be taken by any person, any poison or other destructive thing, or shall stab, cut, or wound any person, or shall by any

means whatsoever cause to any person any bodily injury dangerous to life, with intent in any of the cases aforesaid to commit murder, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall suffer death." In the following case, it appeared that the prisoner, intending to cause the death of her child, left it on a cold wet day in a field. It was found nearly dead from congestion of the lungs and heart, which would have been in a short time fatal, but it was restored, and no bodily injury to it ensued either from the congestion or otherwise: Held, that as there was no lesion of the organs of the child, a conviction under the above provision of the 7 Will. 4, and 1 Vic. c. 85, s. 2, for causing "a bodily injury dangerous to life," could not be supported. Reg v. Gray, 5 Week. Rep. 736.

FALSE PRETENCES.-Valuable security within the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 53-Bill of exchange, obtaining acceptance of-Property in instrument.-Upon an indictment under the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 55, for obtaining a valuable security by false pretences, it was proved that the prisoner, having by false pretences induced the prosecutor to agree to purchase some leather, produced a bill duly stamped, signed by himself as drawer, and made payable to his own order, and induced the prosecutor to accept and deliver it to him for the price of the leather. The prisoner subsequently indorsed and negotiated the bill, and appropriated the proceeds: Held, that he had committed no offence within the statute, as, in order to support a conviction, the valuable security must be the property of some one other than the prisoner, and must be a valuable security whilst in the hands of the prosecutor; whereas this was of no value to any one at that time unless to the prisoner. Reg. v. Danger, 5 Week. Rep. 738.

FORGERY.- Uttering accountable receipts for goods-Pawnbroker's duplicate.-A pawnbroker's duplicate given in the form prescribed by the stat. 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 99, is an accountable receipt for goods within the statute relating to forgery; and a pawnbroker who upon being summoned before magistrates for not returning certain property which had been pledged with him upon the repayment of the money advanced, with interest, delivered by the hands of his attorney a forged duplicate to the magistrates, as the genuine duplicate which he had given when the goods were pledged, and which he had received back when the money was repaid, was held, properly convicted of uttering. Reg. v. Fitchie, 26 Law Journ. 90, M. C.

HOMICIDE BY FOREIGNER.—High seas — Jurisdiction-9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 8.-By the 8th sec. of 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 8, it is enacted, that "where any person, being feloniously stricken, poisoned, or otherwise hurt upon the sea, or at any place out of

England, shall die of such stroke, poisoning, or hurt in England, or, being feloniously stricken, poisoned, or otherwise hurt at any place in England, shall die of such stroke, poisoning, or hurt upon the sea, or at any place out of England, every offence committed in respect of any such case, whether the same shall amount to the offence of murder or of manslaughter, or of being accessory before the act to murder, or after the fact to murder or manslaughter, may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined, and punished in the county or place in England in which such death, stroke, poisoning, or hurt_shall happen, in the same manner in all respects as if such offence had been wholly committed in that county or place." An injury was inflicted by the prisoner, a foreigner, upon G., also a foreigner, on board a foreign vessel on the high seas. G. afterwards died in this country from the effects of the injury: Held, that the prisoner could not be tried for the offence in this country. Reg. v. Lewis, 3 Jur. N. S. 523; 26 Law Journ. 104, M. C.

JUSTICES.-Hearing by-What amounts to an adjudication-Mandamus to hear-Complaint against owner of mine.-A mandamus to justices to hear and determine a complaint will lie where they have declined to exercise jurisdiction, but not where they have adjudicated on the matter. On the hearing of a complaint before justices against one of the owners of a mine, under the 18 & 19 Vic. c. 108, s. 4 (an act to amend the law for the inspection of coal mines in Great Britain), for not providing a steam boiler with a proper steam-guage, water-gauge, and safetyvalve, it was objected, after the evidence had been taken in support of the complaint, that the information ought to have been laid against all the owners of the mine, and not against one only. The justices thinking the objection a good one, dismissed the complaint: Held, that the objection was untenable, and being in the nature of a plea of abatement and preliminary, the case was one in which the justices had not adjudicated, but had declined jurisdiction, and that, therefore, the Court of Queen's Bench would grant a mandamus to the justices to, hear and determine the complaint. Reg. v. Brown, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 160; 5 Week. Rep. 625.

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.-Power to remand to prison-Liability to action for corruption in his office-Stat. 11 & 12 Vic. c. 43, s. 16.-The 11 & 12 Vic. c. 43, s. 16, enacts that before, or during the hearing of any complaint or information, a justice may at his discretion adjourn the hearing to a time and place to be appointed and stated, and in the meantime may suffer the defendant to go at large, or to commit him to, amongst other places, the House of Correction, or to discharge him on entering into a recognisance to appear. It has been decided

that a justice of the peace has power, under the above provision of the statute, to commit to the House of Correction during a period of remand, in a case where he could not issue a warrant, but a summons only. A declaration stated that the defendant, a justice of the peace, convicted the plaintiff wrongfully, wilfully, and maliciously, and without reasonable or probable cause, and that the plaintiff was thereby compelled to pay a sum of money, and that the conviction was afterwards quashed on appeal to the quarter sessions: Held, that it disclosed a cause of action. Gelen v. Hall, 5 Week. Rep. 757.

LARCENY OR FALSE PRETENCES [vol. 3, pp. 23, 38, 289, 290].-Obtaining by fraud, a watch sent through the post-office.—A postmaster has no property in letters or their contents, although directed to be left in his office until called for by the party to whom the letter is directed. A., having bought a watch in London, returned it to the seller to be regulated. B. fraudulently wrote in the name of A. to the seller requesting him to send it in a letter to the post-office at C., and on its arrival at C., personated A., and received the watch: Held, that B. was guilty of larceny, as the postmaster was the mere servant of the true owner; and, if the seller had any special property in the watch, it, ceased when he sent it through the post. Reg. v. Thay, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 168; 3 Jur. N. S. 546.

LUNATIC PAUPER [vol. 3, pp. 231, 328, 329, 382].-Irremovability—Expenses since September 1853– Order made before 16 § 17 Vic. c. 97—Parish of settlement and parish of residence-16 & 17 Vic. c. 97, s. 102.-By stat. 16 & 17 Vic. c. 97, s. 102, from September, 1853, all the expenses of the removal and maintenance of a pauper lunatic who was irremovable when sent to an asylum, shall be borne by the parish of residence, if not in any union. A pauper lunatic was sent to an asylum from M., and in September, 1851, an order for maintenance was made on J., the parish of settlement, under stat. 8 & 9 Vic. c. 127, s. 62. This order had been obeyed down to September, 1853, but further payment thereunder to the treasurer of the asylum had been refused on the suggestion by J. that the pauper at the time of being sent away was irremovable from M. by reason of five years' residence there, and that from September, 1853, the costs of maintenance was by stat. 16 & 17 Vic. c. 97, s. 102, cast upon M., which was not in any union. The treasurer of the lunatic asylum obtained a distress warrant against the overseers of J. for the recovery of arrears due for the maintenance of the pauper, under which the plaintiff's goods were seised. In an action against the justices who granted the warrant: Held, that the order of maintenance was not annulled by sect. 102 of stat. 16 & 17 Vic. c. 97,

and the liability of T. continued until by proceedings between J. and M. the fact of irremovability had been found against M., either by admission or judicial decision; and therefore the justices had jurisdiction to grant the warrant. Knowles v. Leigh, 3 Jur. N. S. p. 383.

MANSLAUGHTER. [vol. 2, p. 216].-Omission of duty-Commission, act of, not essential to constitute manslaughter-Death caused by negligence to put a stage over the mouth of a shaft-Murder and manslaughter distinguished-Culpable negligence.-Where death is the direct consequence of the malicious omission of the performance of a duty, this is a case of murder. If the omission is not malicious, and arises from negligence only, this is a case of manslaughter. There is no authority for the position stated in some text books that without an act of commission there can be no manslaughter. It was the duty of the prisoner, who was banksman at the mouth of the shaft of a colliery, to superintend the placing of a movable stage over the mouth of the shaft. Materials were sent down the shaft in crickets, and these were carried by trucks upon a tram-road on to the stage, which was removed when the buckets were attached. The prisoner negligently omitted to place the stage over the mouth, and by reason of the absence of it a bucket and truck fell down the shaft and killed the deceased, who was employed in walling the inside of the shaft: Held, that the prisoner was guilty of manslaughter. Reg. v. Hughes, 5 Week. Rep. 732.

MASTER AND SERVANT [ante, p. 33].Habeas corpus-Commitment under the Master and Servant's Act-Second commitment for a continuing absence from service-Form of warrant.-This is the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench referred to ante, p. 33, as having been before noticed, but which we now find was not the case. The commitment of a servant to prison under 4 Geo. 4, c. 34, for absenting himself from his service does not dissolve the contract; and if, upon the expiration of his imprisonment, he does not return to his master's service, but upon request refuses to do so, his continuing absence is a fresh offence for which he may be again committed to prison. A warrant of commitment stated an adjudication as "well upon examination of J. M. upon oath in the presence of the accused as otherwise," that the accused "did misconduct himself in his said service by neglecting and absenting himself from his said service:" Held, that it sufficiently appeared that the accused had entered the service; that the words " as otherwise' did not import that any evidence had been taken in the absence of the accused or in any illegal mar ner; and that the warrant did not allege two offences.

Exp. Baker, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 159; 5 Week. Rep. 623.

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS [vol. 2, p. 375].—Election auditor-Appointment when to be made.-An appointment of an election auditor for a county, in May, by the High-sheriff, who came into office in the preceding March, is valid, and supersedes the appointment made by his predecessor in a former year: section 15 of 17 & 18 Vic. c. 102, which provides for an appointment in the month of August, being directory in that respect. Reg. v. Griffiths, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 196.

PAUPER [vol. 3, p. 291].— Order of removal – Construction-Residence.-An order of removal of a pauper described her as the "wife of J. C., who is now absent from her, and not residing with her in the same township :" Held, that it sufficiently appeared on the face of the order that J. C. was not residing in the township in question, and that the court could not look at affidavits as to this not being the case. Reg. v. The Inhabitants of the Township of Leeds, 29 Law Tim. Rep. 499.

POOR.-Action by guardians of one poor-law union against another for relief administered to non-resident poor-Orders of the Poor-Law Board.-An action cannot be maintained by the guardians of the poor of a union, against the guardians of another union, in respect of relief afforded to the non-resident poor of the latter union, unless the accounts of such relief have been transmitted quarterly, in conformity with the orders of the Poor Law Board, notwithstanding that the relief was duly ordered, and never countermanded. Quære, whether an action could be maintained against the guardians, even if the account had been duly transmitted. The Guardians, &c., of Wycombe Union v. The Guardians of Eton Union, 26 Law Journ. 97, M. C.

PUBLIC HEALTH ACT [vol. 3, Index, tit.].— Local board-Rating-Appeal— Prohibition — Sum adjudged, limit of for appeal purposes.—The local board of health for the borough of Maidenhead had made rates for the purpose of carrying out the intentions of the Public Health Act, and A. had been included in the rates for property, the greater part of which, it was asserted, was out of the jurisdiction; one he had paid, but three others remained unpaid; he did not appeal, and, after the time for appealing had expired, the board caused a summons to be issued under the 103rd section of the act, and on the hearing an order was made for payment of the rates, or, in default, that a warrant of distress should issue; and against this order A. appealed to the quarter sessions under the 135th section of the Act, and the order was quashed with costs as against the local board, and the Court of Exchequer refused to grant a writ of prohibition to

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