from motives operating in or upon the mind. Now, does moral necessity, thus explained, involve Fatalism, or lead to it? or, in other and plainer words, does it imply all or any of the particulars above mentioned, which go to make up Fatalism? This is now the subject of inquiry.

Does then the doctrine of Edwards imply, that we are not free agents? I answer; according to that doctrine, we are not indeed free in all respects. We are not free from the influence of motives, whether taken objectively or subjectively. To be free from this influence, would be the same as to be free from the most essential condition of a rational being. Indeed, till better informed, I must hold that acting without motives is impossible. According to the doctrine of moral necessity, we are not free from the established laws of the mind. It would be easy to show that, if we were free from the operation of these laws, we should not know what to do, nor how to accomplish any desirable object, and should be totally unfit to be the subjects of a moral government. Again; we are not free from the sovereign, controlling influence of the Creator and Governor of the world. To be free from this influence, would be to be free from the condition of a created, dependent being;which is surely a freedom that no good man can desire. But according to the doctrine of moral necessity, we are, in all our moral actions, free from every thing of the nature of physical force or compulsion, and from whatever would hinder us from being the fit subjects of divine law, and justly commendable or culpable for our conduct. Moral necessity, as above explained, leaves us in possession of all this freedom, and of all the freedom which would be desirable or useful to us. According to the doctrine of moral necessity, we have liberty to act according to our choice, and liberty to choose according to our predominant inclinations and desires, and as, in view of all the circumstances, we judge to be best. Who could ask for more freedom than this? Surely we could not wish for a freedom to act contrary to our choice, or to choose contrary to what is most agreeable to our inclinations and desires, and what, all things considered, we think to be best. Such freedom as this, possessed and exercised, would take away all order from our mental operations, and unhinge our rational existence.

I inquire next, whether moral necessity is inconsistent

with our being moral agents? That necessity which is moral is widely different from that which is physical. It plainly implies that those to whom it belongs are moral agents. It can belong to no other. So that moral agency, instead of being excluded by moral necessity, is directly implied in it. Those who are not moral agents can no more be the subjects of moral necessity, than they can be the subjects of moral relations and moral affections. Moral necessity is found only where moral causes operate, and moral actions are performed.--Take the case of St. Paul. Who ever acted more entirely under a moral necessity than he did in preaching the gospel? (See 1 Cor. 9: 16.) And yet, who ever exhibited a nature and performed actions more evidently moral? Take the case of those mentioned Matt. 18: 7. There was a necessity that offences should come; but those who committed them most certainly performed actions which were morally wrong; that is, they were sinful moral agents, and deserved the wo pronounced against them.

Again. Is moral necessity inconsistent with our being justly accountable for our conduct? Now, if, under the influence of a moral necessity, we possess all the freedom which can belong to intelligent beings, and put forth an agency which is altogether of a moral nature, then surely we must be accountable for our actions. The examples above mentioned, and others of the same kind, fully illustrate this. Were not those who were chargeable with the offences which Christ said must come, accountable to God for them? A necessity was laid upon Paul to preach the gospel. And was he not accountable to God for his preaching? According to the Scriptures, there was a necessity that Christ should be put to death. But were not those, who had an agency in that event, justly accountable to God?

Is moral necessity inconsistent with our being the proper subjects of law? The answer is much the same as before given. In my apprehension, no beings, except those who act under a moral necessity, in other words, those who are influenced by moral causes, can be proper subjects of law. All agents must act under the influence of physical causes, or moral causes. Now so far as any agents act under the influence of physical causes, they cannot be regarded as the subjects of a moral law. The two things are incompatible. But to act under the influence of moral causes, is the same

as to act rationally and morally; which is the only mode of acting, suited to those who are placed under a moral law.

And why should any think that moral necessity implies, that we are not under the government of a wise, righteous and benevolent God, and are not worthy of praise or blame for our conduct? which is another point of fatalism. May not such a being create moral agents;-agents who act under the influence of moral causes? We shall find that the very circumstance upon which conscience fixes, as that which renders us praiseworthy or blameworthy, is the circumstance, that we are influenced by moral causes or motives.

I acknowledge this to be one of the cases, in which direct, formal proof is difficult; not because the point to be proved is obscure or doubtful, but because there is nothing more evident. All that belongs to the doctrine of moral necessity, as stated by Edwards, appears to me to be a matter of direct consciousness. I am sure that I act in the manner described; and I am sure that I am a free, moral, accountable being, because I do act in this manner. I want no support for the doctrine, but my own consciousness. And whenever I have been embarrassed in my reflections respecting the doctrine of moral necessity, it has been the consequence of my mistaking the import of the terms by which the doctrine is expressed, or of my suffering speculative reasoning, not at all adapted to the subject, to interfere with the decision of consciousness. If we disregard the plain decision of consciousness, it is in vain that we seek for evidence from other

sources.

I ask those for proof, who affirm, that the theory of moral necessity is incompatible with free, moral, accountable agency. Let them show in what respects it is incompatible. Let them bring forward some instance in which a free moral agent ever did deliberately act otherwise than according to that theory. They say indeed, that whenever they choose, they have the power of a contrary choice. But do they pretend that they ever, in any case, exercised that power ? Do they pretend that they can exercise it?

As the charge of Fatalism has been so seriously urged against the doctrine of Edwards, I am desirous of making another free quotation from President Day's book on the Will. He cites the remark of Cousin, that "the theory of Locke concerning freedom tended to Fatalism;" and then

he says: "This calling in the aid of an odious appellation, is a very convenient and summary mode of confuting an opponent. It has a special advantage when the name which is substituted for argument, is so indefinite and mysterious, that the reader is in no danger of discovering its meaning. Fatalism is commonly understood to be something heathenish. But it has assumed such a diversity of forms, that it is sufficiently unintelligible to answer the purpose of an argument, which is most efficacious when least understood. It would be a more simple, if not a more satisfactory mode of reasoning, to offer direct proof of the reality of contingent self-determination.- Whatever was meant by the Fatalism of the ancients, it did not imply that all the changes in the world are under the guidance of a Being of infinite wisdom and infinite goodness. -It is urged that the Fatalists refer every change to a cause. So do believers in selfdetermination; not excepting even acts of the will.— Is it Fatalism to believe, that he who formed the soul of man can so touch the springs of its action as to influence the will, without interfering with the freedom of its choice? Is a chain of causes, suspended from the throne of nonentity, to be likened to the purposes and agency of the omniscient Creator? Is it Fatalism to believe, that motives may have a real influence in determining volition, and that they may be presented by the providence of God; that the state of the heart has also some concern in giving direction to our acts of choice, and that this native or acquired state is not always the product of chance?—The object of our inquiry is to learn whether moral acts are determined by accident. If they are not, does it certainly follow that they must be subject to the Fates of the heathen? Is the authority over the heart so divided between fate and contingence, that what is not ascribed to one, must of necessity belong to the other? Is there no room left for any effectual influence from infinite wisdom and benevolence?"

"The suggestion that a denial of contingent self-determination leads to Pantheism, is as indefinite in its application, as the charge of Fatalism. The doctrine of Pantheism, as held by Spinoza and his followers, is that the universe is God. What has this to do with the dependence of volition on the state of the heart, and the influence of motives? -If in God we live and move and have our being, does

it follow that our life is his life, our motion his motion, our existence his existence? Is it Pantheism to believe that he worketh in us both to will and to do? Does such agency of his imply, that he only acts in the case? that there is neither willing nor acting on our part? that there is really but one agent in the universe? See Day on the Will, Sect. 9.

SELF-DENIAL.

This duty is sometimes thought to militate against the doctrine of Edwards, and to prove that our volitions do not always follow our strongest desires, or that we do not always choose according to our strongest motive, or according to what is the most agreeable. The anonymous writer of the essay says: "Do you not at times practise self-denial, and does this consist in choosing that which is at the time of choice the most agreeable?" Again he says: "The Bible never teaches that self-denial consists in choosing that which seems most agreeable." pp. 298, 299. Now, in my opinion, the duty of self-denial does plainly and strikingly exemplify the principle that we are governed by the strongest motive. When a Christian denies himself, he does indeed act against certain inclinations and desires, which operate as motives. Sometimes these are very strong. And how could they be overcome without something stronger? Why does the Christian deny these inferior desires and motives? He is influenced to do it by love to Christ, which is an affection of a higher and nobler kind than any which he denies. It is his supreme, his commanding motive. He is willing even to lose his life for Christ's sake. Luke 9:21. He hates his earthly relations in comparison with Christ, that is, he loves Christ above them, and under the influence of this motive, he forsakes them, when duty requires. So the apostles acted. Love to Christ constrained them. Under its influence they chose to deny themselves in regard to all their worldly inclinations. It was the most agreeable to them, as friends and followers of Christ, to do this. It was most gratifying to their supreme desire. Suppose any one should deny himself, without this higher affection, this superior motive, would it be Christian self-denial? The desires of the natural, unrenewed mind are very strong, and no one ever did or ever will deny and subdue them, unless he has a motive of superior strength. The strong man cannot be disarmed SECOND SERIES, VOL. IV. NO. I.

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