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5.-HARPERS' FAMILY LIBRARY, No. C.-Outlines of Imperfect and Disordered Mental Action. By Thomas C. Upham, Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in Bowdoin College. New-York, Harper & Brothers, 1840. pp. 399.

We have rarely met with a more entertaining volume than the one here announced. Its plan and arrangement are truly philosophical; and the great variety and eccentricity of its illustrations are such, that they irresistibly allure the mind of the curious reader from chapter to chapter; and he feels himself enriched at every step, not only by the multifarious facts presented by the author, but by the numerous illustrations of the principles inculcated, which these facts are fitted to call forth from the storehouse of his own experience. Most persons, on reading this book, however much they may have prided themselves on their perfect sanity, will find, to their surprise, that they have often been the subjects of mental aberrations when they least suspected it, and that they have reason to be on their guard against those shades and degrees of insanity, which prevail unconsciously, to a greater or less extent, in the intercourse of a fallen world.

The plan of Professor Upham, in this volume, though a novel one in this country, is not entirely unsupported by authority. It was in part suggested by Pinel in France, some fifty years since, and recently more fully announced by a German writer, Professor Keinroth, who represents "the disorders of the mind" as "only limited in number and in kind by the diversities which exist in the mental faculties."

Our author adopts this general principle, and accordingly considers the philosophy of Insanity as parallel with that of Sanity. In preparing this treatise, therefore, he has pursued the same course and order of investigation which he would have pursued in preparing a treatise on the Philosophy of the Mind. He gives us, first, an outline of mental philosophy, and then proceeds to consider,

I. Disordered action of the external intellect,-sensation and perception, conception, spectral illusions or apparitions, disordered state of the power of abstraction, of attention, dreaming, and somnambulism.

II. Disordered action of the internal intellect,-suggestion, consciousness, relative suggestion or judgment, the principle of association, the memory, the reasoning power, the imagination, nature and causes of idiocy, derangement of the sen sibilities, appetites, propensities, affections, moral sensibilities,

etc.

III. Disordered action of the will,-imbecility of the will, and the will in connection with other powers of the mind.

Under these general heads are ranged a great variety of particulars, in philosophical order, and the principles stated are illustrated by numerous facts from medical works, the reports of prisons, asylums for the insane, etc. etc.

6.-The Doctrine of the Will determined by an Appeal to Consciousness. By Henry P. Tappan. New-York. Wiley and Putnam. 1840. pp. 327.

Most of our readers are aware that this volume is the sec. ond of a series of works contemplated in the plan of the author. The first of the series was A Review of Edwards' Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will,'" which was published more than a year since, and was noticed at some length in the Repository for July, 1839. The subject of this whole dis cussion is not only fundamental in philosophy, and of surpassing interest in itself, but singularly wide and important in its relations to morals and theology. We rejoice to see it taken up in a manly, frank, and independent manner. This choice of epithets might seem to indicate some peculiar need of those qualities in such an investigation. So it does; and there is such need, especially when the discussion runs counter to the prevailing current of belief. It needs a disinterested love of truth, and undoubting faith in its prevalence, to venture forth upon this Caspium Mare, this Black Sea of philosophical speculation, never unvexed by storms, and always the dread of mariners.

Mr. Tappan has nothing about him of the partisan. "What I have written," he remarks in his preface, "I throw not out as a bait to logomachists, either in philosophy or theology: but I submit it to the cool, candid, and generous perusal of those who love truth, and who fear not to think." The spirit in which he has addressed himself to his task, and thus far prosecuted it, is eminently candid. Without pugnacity, or ostentation, (the appearance of which, at least, it was very difficult to avoid in approaching, with avowed opposition of sentiment, the examination of the system of Edwards on the Will,) he has quietly undertaken his Review, in the manner of one deeply impressed with the nobleness and certainty of the truth he espouses.

It may seem to savor of presumption, or at least of impru dence, in so young a man, to throw himself unattended into lists where many an older head, if not the wiser mind, would shun

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the exposure, even if he possessed industry and inclination for the work. He is attacking a system that has ground our theological grist for many years: innumerable are the sacks of thought that have been bolted there; nor will we deny that the stuff which has come out has often puzzled the eater, and proved at once too hard and too fine for ruminating stomachs. Some have thought it needed the "triturating bran," we do not say of error, but of reality and of consciousness, to render it salutary, and to keep the mind from being made flatulent for want of practical truth. Our author may be esteemed an adventurer, with more of valor than discretion, thus to set out, in his very first essay, against EDWARDS ON THE WILL! IS he not a sort of Bedoween of the desert, running full tilt upon his Arab courser to overturn a pyramid? But pyramid or temple, we are willing the world should see whether it embalms a dead error or a living_truth. We only say to those who stand astonished at Mr. Tappan's boldness, Gentlemen, read the books, and you will acknowledge that this writer has entered upon his inquiries with modesty and frankness, and also with a simplicity, and clearness in feeling, thought, and style, which are not always found in such discussions.

We must confine ourselves in this short notice to some little analysis of the work before us, the aim of the writer, and the degree and manner in which he has accomplished his object. This work is a Psychological essay, for which the Review of Edwards prepared the way. The plan of the whole undertaking embraces the following particulars: 1. A statement of Edwards' system. 2. The legitimate consequences of this system. 3. An examination of the arguments against a self-determining will. 4. The doctrine of the will determined by an appeal to consciousness. 5. This doctrine viewed in connexion with moral agency and responsibility. 6. This doctrine viewed in connexion with the truths and precepts of the Bible. The three first constitute Mr. Tappan's first volume; the fourth occupies the present work.

In the statement of Edwards' theory, the conclusiveness of the whole argument rests, of course, upon the truth of the exhibition; and, as to the deductions of our author from this theory, the question is not, how startling those consequences may be, but, are they true, are they legitimately drawn? If so, they are neither to be withheld nor softened.

The true difference between contingency and necessity is a point much labored by Mr. Tappan. He endeavors to show that the course of Edwards' reasoning rests upon the assumption of a wrong definition of contingency, as the synonyme

of chance. In reconciling contingency both with cause and certainty, and opposing it only to necessity; separating it from uncertainty and chance on the one side, and from absolute necessity on the other; Mr. Tappan maintains that the reasoning of Edwards, founded on the conception of a contingent will, as a will of chance and without causation, is legitimately set aside, and that the movements of a contingent cause may be foreknown in the Divine prescience, and yet not foreordained in the Divine decrees; i. e. they may be perfectly certain, and yet not necessitated.

Perhaps the most important part of our author's volumes is comprehended in his speculations on the subject of cause. Indeed, here is the jist of the whole argument, and the main point on which the reasoning of Edwards can be met. If you allow the correctness of his view of the nature of cause, his argument follows conclusively, but if you can show that that view is substantially false, his argument is as conclusively set aside. Mr. Tappan argues with all his force the point, that, in the very nature of cause, and as a necessary part of our conception of it, there is self-determination. He assigns the will as the cause of volition. The point of dispute, then, is simply whether the will is necessarily determined, not whether it is self-determined; for the very nature of cause is selfdetermination. Cause is ultimate, and if you make the will a cause, and yet deny its self-determination, you are driven to something else as the ground of self-determination, which itself must be a cause, and if so, then ultimate and selfdetermined; so that you must either deny causation in the will, or resort to the absurdity of an infinite series of grounds of determination, ever receding, but never terminating in cause.

He maintains, that, in the argument, that the will is always as is most agreeable, and that the sense of the most agreeable constitutes the cause of all volitions, disinterestedness ceases even to be a conception, and becomes only one form of selfindulgence; so does self-denial. The will becomes a passive daguerreotype, or a camera obscura, the colors of which change with the play of the sun upon it.

Our author represents Edwards as having mistaken the occasions of volition for its causes; a grand mistake, but one on which he has built his reasoning. Other philosophers, he says, have made the same mistake on other points; the occasions of the perception or consciousness of first principles or ideas, have been mistaken for the origin and source of those ideas, the conditions of our knowledges for the knowledges themselves,

Professor Tappan's style is clear and intelligible; which is a matter of the very first importance in discussions of this kind. His definition of consciousness, and his remarks on the perfection of consciousness as a form of intelligence, and on the true mode of interrogating consciousness, are highly important in entering on such a subject. The distinction of the emotions and passions from the will we think is as clearly made out as that of the reason and the will. His view of the mind as consisting of two elements of necessity, and one of freedom, with their distinctive, yet united action, is worthy of consideration. He maintains that necessity belongs only to the laws and rules of the reason and sensitivity, and that it does not belong to cause. All cause of volition is in the will, human and divine, and will is free. This constitution of mind, he thinks, accounts for all psychological phenomena. Our readers will have ready access to these volumes of Professor Tappan, and we need only add, that we think them worthy of a candid, thoughtful, and generous perusal. In his own view, "the question at issue is not a question between two schools of philosophy holding different theories of the freedom of the will; it really lies between the advocates of human freedom, and the advocates of an absolute and universal necessity." Let it be examined with freedom and candor, and we have no fears as to the result.

7.-The Life and Opinions of the Rev. Wm. Milne, D. D., Missionary to China, illustrated by biographical annals of Asiatic Missions, from Primitive to Protestant Times, intended as a guide to missionary spirit. By Robert Philip, Author of the Life and Times of Bunyan and Whitefield; the Experimental Guide, etc. Philadelphia: Herman Hooker, 1840. pp. 435. Also, New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1840. pp. 320.

In his preface the author says, "this book presents, in the character of Dr. and Mrs. Milne, a model which may be held up to any young man or woman, who is contemplating the missionary work. It exhibits an imitable example, as well as one worthy of imitation. The churches also will do well to study the influences which formed the character of these distinguished missionaries." In these sentiments we fully concur. We have risen from the perusal of this volume, with increasing love for the cause to which this excellent man devoted his life. Indeed, it was the cause of missions which drew out his talents and his worth, and transformed the shepherd boy into the worthy associate of the learned and lamented Morrison.

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