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in their conduct?" "No, they are good citizens." "Then let them sing praises and pray as much as they please; and when your police want something to do, let them look after your dram-shops, and the noisy, drunken rabble that collect about them." But this Hollander is not alone in wondering how people can be allowed to assemble in prayer-meetings whenever they please, and cry out, as he expressed it, "O cher Jesus! O cher Jesus!"

ARTICLE IX.

" ESSAY ON

66

REMARKS IN REFERENCE TO AN ANONYMOUS
CAUSE AND EFfect," and to THE QUESTIONS OF "INQUI-
RER."-Am. Bib. Repos. for April, 1840.

By Leonard Woods, D. D. Prof. of Theol., Theol. Sem. Andover, Mass.

[Continued from page 242.]

THE essay referred to treats of various topics which deserve a serious consideration, but which have not yet been noticed in my remarks. At present only one of these will be introduced, namely: the question, whether self-love is the spring of all voluntary action.

This question is suggested by the following passage in the essay,* (p. 387.) "According to the doctrine of free agency, the mind of man is endowed with a constitutional desire for happiness, which is the steady, abiding feeling of the mind, and is the mainspring of all the mental activity included in volition." I know not that the author would seriously advocate the principle which seems to be implied in this passage. Be that as it may, the inquiry is an important one; whether all our choices and voluntary actions proceed from self-love, or a desire for our own happiness.

If it is, as the anonymous writer seems to hold, then

*The essay here referred to was published in the Repository for October 1839, p. 381. seq.

66

there is clearly a "uniform, invariable" connection of volition with an antecedent motive. And this uniform, invariable antecedence" would, according to that writer, involve the essence of fatalism; and the fatalism would be universal, leaving no place for free moral agency. For if "the desire for happiness is the mainspring of all the mental activity included in volition," that is, of all voluntary action; then all voluntary action stands in an invariable connectiou with one and the same antecedent motive, and, of course, excludes what the author calls free agency.

I am, however, far from admitting that self-love, or the desire of our own happiness, is the great motive, "the mainspring" of all voluntary action. But I must content myself with a few brief observations on the subject. And perhaps even these are unnecessary to those, who have attentively read such authors as Cudworth, Brown, Payne, Hopkins, Coleridge, and Wayland.

That self-love is not the spring of all voluntary action, may, I think, be made quite evident.

First, there are many principles, and some of them very powerful principles, in the human mind, which prove springs of "that mental action which is involved in volition." Love of offspring, pity for the distressed, gratitude for favors, and other natural affections and propensities, are as truly elements of our mental constitution, as the desire of our own happiness; and each one of them is as truly a spring of voluntary action, as self-love. How then can self-love, or the desire of our own happiness, be the spring of all voluntary action? We can say with truth, it is one of the springs. In all minds, it is a powerful spring. But is it therefore the only spring? In some minds, it is the most powerful spring, -the supreme motive-yea, perchance, the motive which governs almost exclusively. But because this is the case in some minds, can we conclude that it is so in all, even in those which are the most pure and holy? Take the man, who loves God with all his heart and soul and mind and strength;-the man who loves Christ above father and mother, houses and lands, and every worldly object. Has he no spring of action above the desire of his own happiness? Is not his affection to God and to Christ a motive distinct from self-love, and of a far higher and nobler nature? And do not those who maintain, that a desire for happiness

is the spring of all voluntary action, manifestly overlook important principles, and attempt to simplify beyond nature, and in opposition to truth? They discover that self-love is a very powerful motive to action, and then conclude that it is the only one. Others, who find gratitude to be a powerful motive to action, might, with the same justice, conclude that this is the only motive. And others again, finding that pity for the distressed operates as a motive to exertion, might lose sight of every thing else, and hold that all our actions result from pity, and might labor to show that our motives to action are all to be resolved into this as their pervading element.

Farther: It is not only true, that there are many motives of volition, besides self-love, but that some of those motives are evidently of superior moral worth. Every man who suffers himself to think, must be satisfied that this is the case. Suppose you know that a man performs an action or makes a sacrifice from pure love to God, or to man, without the least reference, either in his thoughts or feelings, to his own private good. Do you not at once pronounce it a deed of uncommon excellence? Even that benevolence which is mixed with other things, and of which we can only say, that it has more influence than self-love, is regarded as a virtue. But that benevolence which is wholly disinterested, i. e., which does not proceed from any aim, direct or indirect, to promote our own gratification, is the object of universal admiration. And how many seek that admiration by appearing to be actuated by such benevolence, though really destitute of it. But in this, as in all other cases, the counterfeit proves the existence of the coin which is counterfeited.

It may perhaps be said, that while we are influenced by love to God or to man, or by parental affection, we experience pleasure; and from this it may be inferred, that a desire for this pleasure is, at bottom, the mainspring of all moral action, and that all our other motives are to be resolved into this. But what is there in logic, or in experience, which can justify such an inference? The fact that we are pleased with the accomplishment of any object, as the honor of God, or the good of inan, implies that we love that object antecedently to the pleasure we enjoy in it. Without the existence of such love to the object, how could the promo

SECOND SERIES, VOL. IV. NO. II.

18

tion of it give pleasure? It is evident that the pleasure results from the pre-existent affection, and not the affection from a wish to obtain pleasure.

No one can doubt, that a desire for our own happiness is often, yea, too often, the spring of our voluntary actions. But does it follow from this, that it is always so? How can that be considered as a motive to action, which is in no way contemplated by us,-which is not before the mind as an object of thought or desire, at the time of action? Look at a loving father, who, at the hazard of his own life, rushes into the water or the fire to rescue his little children. What moves him to do this? Is it a regard to his own gratification or pleasure? But he will tell you, he had no thought of this, and that he was moved and urged on to do what he did, by the love and pity of his heart for his dear suffering children. If he succeeded in preserving their life, he did indeed experience a high degree of pleasure, as a consequence. But to say that a desire for that pleasure was the motive of the parent's efforts, would be a contradiction to his own consciousness, and an abuse of language. And surely a devout Christian may, sometimes at least, be so influenced, so constrained, so borne on by love to Christ, that all thought of himself and all desire for his own gratification will be excluded, and his fervent, holy love become the great and only motive of action. Facts of this kind do most certainly occur in the history of Christians.

When David Brainerd, in his last sickness, entered on a serious examination of his religious state, he made it a subject of particular inquiry, whether he had exercised any affections, or performed any actions, which could not be traced to self-love, and which must have arisen from a higher principle, than a regard to his own happiness. He considered this as the surest test of a regenerate state. In how many instances are Christians, at the commencement of their course, and afterwards, conscious of loving God and rejoicing in his government, without any reference in their thoughts to their own interests, temporal or eternal? And is not such pure love to God, such a rising above private interest, and such annihilation of self generally regarded as among the clearest marks of holiness, and as what may be expected to exist in proportion to the measure of sanctification? It is indeed true of the unregenerate, that they are

"lovers of themselves." They have no moral affection of a higher character than self-love. But can it be the same with those who bear the image of Christ? Is it true of them, as it is of the wicked, that self-love is the real motive of all their moral actions? Is there no object in the universe which they love, except in subserviency to their own personal welfare? Is all duty performed by saints and angels from that one principle? To suppose this seems to me just as unphilosophical and untrue, as to suppose that all the operations in the natural world are to be traced to the power of gravitation, or to the power of steam, or to electricity. True philosophy leads us to account for the phenomena in the natural world by a great variety of principles or laws, many of which are entirely distinct from each other. And why should it not lead us to do the same in the moral world, and to trace the actions of intelligent, moral beings, to all that variety of principles or motives, from which they evidently result? Why should we refuse to admit what is so manifest, that a variety of causes or springs of action as really exists and operates in the world of mind, as in the world of matter?

I now proceed to the questions and remarks of the writer in the April No. of the American Biblical Repository, (Art. 10,) who conceals his real name, and calls himself "Inquirer." He doubtless has sufficient reasons for writing anonymously. But he will excuse me for asking, what weight there is in the reasons which he suggests in his "Apology." He thinks he may be allowed to conceal his name, because he does not come forward as a teacher, but as a learner. But why is it less proper for one, who presents himself before the public as an "Inquirer" and learner, to make known his real name, than for one who presents himself as a teacher? It is certainly very honorable for a man to "take the attitude of a learner;" especially if, in that modest attitude, he manifests high intellectual attainments, and gives his readers reason to think that he is able to teach, as well as to learn.

But I have no disposition to complain of "Inquirer," for not giving his name to the public, or of the editor for allowing him to appear under a fictitious title. Nor will I evade the difficult task of answering his inquiries because he writes anonymously. As the questions are important, I will seri

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