...conceiving with the force of imagination: "Likewise the idea of man that l frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight,...crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. l cannot by any effort of no. lbid., a:2s9a1. lbid., 1:4o6. 22. Descartes, Meditatinnn de Prima Phthaophia,...

...must have some particular shape and color. Likewise the idea of a man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight,...crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. 20 If Berkeley is indeed denying the existence of any less than fully determinate images, then his...

...imagine they must have some particular shape & colour. The idea of man that I frame to my self must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight or a crooked, a tall or a low or a middling sized man. I cannot by any effort of imagination frame to my self an idea of man prescinding...

...notion of abstract ideas, Berkeley famously remarks, The idea of a man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight,...thought conceive the abstract idea above described (Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction §10). Like Aquinas, Berkeley believes that one's idea...

...one copse. Berkeley's criticism takes a different form. 'The idea of man that I frame myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight,...any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea.' Here, Berkeley's criticism shares the ambiguity of Locke's terminology. Like Locke, Berkeley will use...

...image of that thing. Now take the alleged abstract idea man. To be truly general, this idea cannot be 'either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight,...crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man' (PHK Intro 10). The objection is then that no mental image can be suitably indeterminate so as to be...

...refuting Locke's position when it is so understood. "The idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight,...effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described.'1 1 cannot, that is to say, frame an image of man which both omits and includes all the...

...have some particular shape and colour. Likewise, the idea of a man that I frame to my self, must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight,...any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea. (Berkeley 1998a: 92 [Introduction: §10]) In this passage, Berkeley is clearly arguing that to have...

...colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to my self, must be either a white, or black, or tawney, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized...idea above described. And it is equally impossible to me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift...

...myself. . . . [W]hatever hand or eye 1 imagine. . . . [T]he idea of man that I frame to myself. ... 1 cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described.' seems fairly clear, however, that this is Aquinas's view, more or less. Certainly he does think of...